France

1 General information

Source: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc
France is the second-largest country in Europe and one of the world´s top six economies. 65.073.482 people live in the French Republic. 62.448.977 live in metropolitan France. [1] The President of the Republic is Emmanuel Macron, who has been the head of the state since May 14, 2017. There are 22 official regions located in France and each of these regions are subdivided into departments. France is bordered by six countries: Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg to the northeast, Switzerland and Italy to the southeast and Spain to the southwest. [2]
France is a founding member of the United Nations and is one of the members of the UN Security Council. Furthermore, it is a member of the G8, World Trade Organization (WTO), the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), and the Indian Ocean Commission (COI). France hosts the second largest assembly of diplomatic missions in the world and the headquarters of international organizations, for example, the OECD, UNESCO, and Interpol. The country is ranked as the world's tenth-largest and the EU's second-largest economy. Financial services, banking and the insurance sector are an important part of the economy. The French health care system is one of universal health care for the most part financed by government national health insurance. [3]

2 Covid-19 in France

2.1 State preparedness

The basis of good preparedness is a strong health system. To prepare for health threats such as COVID-19, countries should develop surveillance, laboratory capacities, a trained workforce and emergency operations. Other elements of preparedness include defining potential health threats, identification of available resources and the capacity to support responses. [4]
In France, according to the COVID-19 surveillance protocol, physicians suspecting a COVID-19 case have to contact an emergency hotline or infectious diseases specialist. The case has to be reported to the Regional Health Agency, the French Public Health Agency and the Ministry of Health. Possible cases have to be hospitalized and isolated. Until 27 January, only the National Reference Centre for respiratory viruses was able to test for the presence of the SARSCoV-2. On February 4, French laboratory capacities were reinforced from one to five to perform the diagnostics more effectively. [5]
Several country-level preparedness indicators exist including the Global Health Security Index. According to this index, France is one of the most prepared countries in the world with an average score of 68.2. [6] But these results overestimated the preparedness and capacity of the French health care system, which later resulted in excessive demand on the medical staff and lack of hospital capacities. The shortage of equipment, especially of the ICU beds, was also experienced in New Zealand, India and Israel. By contrast, the preparedness of certain countries, including for example Germany, Singapore, and South Korea seems to have been underestimated. 
France, like many other countries, developed their PIP that aims to mitigate against pandemic influenza. It consists of the following phases: 
Phase 1: Prevent pandemic influenza from being introduced into the country.
Phase 2: Restrict viral dissemination and propagation.
Phase 3: Attenuate the effects of an eventual epidemic to a minimum.
Phase 4: Return to normalcy and business continuity.
The French PIP recommends stock masks and medical supplies in sufficient quantities. Despite the high GHS Index, the government was not able to satisfy these requirements at the beginning of the epidemic. The first signs of panic began by March 4, 2020, and resulted in stocks of masks and hydroalcoholic gels. Other countries, especially Spain and Croatia where empty store shelves were observed at the beginning of the pandemic, experienced this problem as well. [7]  
France is one of the countries that are facing the Corona crisis in the period of economic weakness. The economic costs of shutdowns differ across sectors and therefore the effects of the crisis are hard to estimate. France had high pre-crisis unemployment and dependence on high-risk sectors and small companies and is predisposed to the negative economic consequences. [8]
The lack of tests at the beginning of the crisis was a very big problem, so the country couldn’t get a clear picture of the growing catastrophe. That limited the ability to do widespread testing, which is critical to slowing an outbreak. France's health system was seen as one of the world´s best, but it was unable to deal with the COVID-19 crisis. Many hospitals in France, particularly in rural areas, have closed down over the past 20 years to make the system more efficient, but these cuts resulted in the collapse of the hospital´s capacities. [9] The shortage in nurses was another big problem and resulted in overtime hours and exhaustion of the hospital staff - the same situation that experienced Iran. On January 28, 2020, all hospital grade unions and associations took part in the nationwide strikes and demonstrations. [10]
Sources: National Center for Biotechnology Information, Intensive Care Medicine, Critical Care Medicine
The number of ICU beds in the country is also an important indicator of good preparedness. France has about 11.6 critical beds per 100.000 inhabitants and is at the EU average. Compared to Sweden with 5.8 ICU beds or New Zealand with only 3 ICU beds per 100.000 people, France was supposed to have a better preparedness, but in the critical situation, it was not sufficient and has lead to the collapse of the hospitals´ capacities. 

2.2 Defining the problem

The realistic definition of the problem is an important precondition for an effective policy response. On January 24, France’s then-Health Minister Agnès Buzyn announced that two people in the country were tested positive for the coronavirus. But Macron’s government didn´t see the urgency. February also went with little action. Health officials advised citizens to wash their hands, keep a distance from others, cover their mouths when sneezing and stay away from retirement homes. Macron held video conferences on the virus and inspected hospitals and clinics to see how his country was coping. But very few actions were taken to introduce social distancing measures or promote massive testing. Macron didn’t follow his own government’s advice: during a late February, he visited Naples and Italy.[11]
By February 13, 2020, there were 11 confirmed cases of infection. At the same time, cases in Lombardy started to increase and extremist political parties demanded border closures, but French authorities downplayed risks and advised only self-isolation if possible. By March 4, the government communicated that protective masks should be ordered only for those who showed signs of illness and for health professionals.
On March 3, France took real action. But many other European countries including Portugal and Spain waited until March to implement the first measures. Switzerland and Israel in contrast acted quickly - already in February first policies came into effect. Taiwan also proceeded with a proactive implementation of measures. The French government closed 120 schools in two regions, as they had become the hardest-hit areas in the country. Thousands of students stayed at home, but Education Minister Jean-Michel Blanquer tried to downplay the risks. “It wouldn’t make sense to confine everyone at home, to paralyze the country,” he told a local television station.
The government still allowed gatherings of up to 1.000 people. Macron attended a theater performance on March 6 and he also visited a retirement home on the same day, even as the number of coronavirus infections in the country was doubling. [12]
The first presidential address about the coronavirus disease took place on March 12, 2020. He explained that the nation was in the "midst of the greatest health crisis never seen before in this century". At the same time infection was contained at phase 2 of the French Pandemic Influenza Plan (PIP) and only 48 h later, authorities announced that the country had entered phase 3 with more than 4.500 confirmed cases. Limited knowledge about COVID-19 led to the assertion that infection was harmless with fatalities limited only to high-risk groups. Furthermore, communication by authorities was inadequate. There was a difference between the message given by authorities and public perception. [13]  
Then-health minister Agnés Buzyn declared on January 26 that there would be no shortage of masks in France during the outbreak. However, health professionals were underprepared for the crisis because of the lack of protective equipment. [14]
Three events forced Macron to act: the first was Italy’s coronavirus situation. In late February, Italy had just three confirmed cases but by mid-March, that number increased to 15.000. The second was the discovery of 2.500 coronavirus cases that could be traced back to a religious gathering in mid-February. [15] Another important event was the coronavirus outbreak on the flagship aircraft carrier, Charles de Gaulle in April in consequence of which more than 1.000 crew members were infected and send into isolation. [16]  
At the beginning of the crisis, the government was faced with a lack of transparency and limited capacities to deal with the crisis. At the end of March, there was a change in crisis communication. Prime Minister Edouard Philippe and Health Minister Olivier Véran convened a press conference and tried to use statistics and graphs to explain the crisis management of the government. [17]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MiwkmbGdp7U
In this video, you can see the presidential address on March 12 in which Macron recommends to stay at home for at least 15 days and declares France "at war" with a virus.

2.3 Diagnosing causes

Cases of COVID-19 were first identified in Chinese nationals who visited France on January 24. The French government didn’t order a lockdown until March 16  and that would help explain the rapidly developing catastrophe in France and Europe. There have been thousands of cases, hospitalizations and deaths. [18]
France and UAE have confirmed two new cases on February 8. France's health minister said that five British nationals in the country have been tested positive for coronavirus. France reported its first COVID-19 death on February 15. French Health Minister Agnes Buzyn confirmed the death of a Chinese tourist, who traveled to France from the Hubei province on January 16.
On February 28, France has confirmed 19 additional cases, taking the total to 57 cases, with two deaths so far. On March 1, French health officials said that the total cases in the country reached 130. On March 5, one of France’s National Assembly members has been hospitalized after being infected with the coronavirus. At the same time, France had confirmed 423 Covid-19 cases, with a total of seven deaths.
On March 19, French health reported an increase in death by 108 to a total of 372. The number of cases jumped to 10.995, a 20% rise in 24 hours. On June 3, France’s death toll rose by more than 100 in a 24-hours for the first time in 13 days. [19]
https://covid19.healthdata.org/france
On May 19, the director-general of health in France has repeated the importance of getting tested for Covid-19. He reminded people of the possible symptoms and presented a new online tool on government health website Sante.fr, which allows people to find the closest testing center near them. The tests are nasal and only take a few minutes. PCR tests check if someone has the virus at the time of the test. In contrast, blood tests can only check if someone has blood antibodies against the virus and has therefore already been exposed to it. [20]
https://covid19.healthdata.org/france
Jean-François Delfraissy, who is the chair of the scientific committee that advises the government on lockdown exit plans, has estimated that the country needed to perform 500.000 tests per week. In March the country could test only about 150.000 people a week. “France failed on testing in February because it didn’t have enough of them", Mr. Delfraissy told at the beginning of April. Furthermore, France couldn´t follow the WHO advice: for a system to be "doing enough testing to pick up all cases", the benchmark should be at least 10 negative tests for every one positive case. On April 13 - April 20 France had only about four negative tests for every one positive case. In India the situation was much worse - only one test per 100.000 people was made. South Korea and Thailand in contrast had large testing capabilities and made 15.000-20.000 tests daily. [21]

2.4 Policy response

The virus was confirmed to have reached France on January 24, 2020. On February 15, the emergency plan ORSAN was introduced. This plan allows the possibility of postponing non-essential operations and an increase in the number of ambulances. Two weeks later France entered phase 2 and first major events such as the Paris Agricultural Fair or the Paris half marathon were canceled. The Grand Est region was hard affected by the pandemic and indicated an "enhanced security level 2". In the Alsatian town, all schools were closed and events and meetings of more than 50 persons were prohibited. [22]
On February 28, the health system started to be overwhelmed and the government response was to cancel all sporting events and concerts. By March 4, the price of the hydroalcoholic disinfectant gel was blocked when the first signs of panic were observed.  [23]
On March 12, Emmanuel Macron announced that all schools and universities would close on March 16. From the next day, gatherings of more than 100 people were prohibited. Two days later, security level 3 was indicated and the prime minister ordered the closure of all non-essential public places, including restaurants, cinemas and nightclubs. [24]
Despite these measures, the first round of the local elections on 15 March was carried out and resulted in sharp criticism of the government. During the elections, the President announced a nationwide curfew for France for 15 days and then extended for a further 15 days. On Easter Monday, Macron announced a further extension until 11 May. [25]  
Starting from March 23, everyone in public was required to carry a self-completed declaration with reasons for being out in public. Acceptable reasons for being outside included shopping for food and essential needs, traveling to a place of work, accessing necessary healthcare, exercising within 1 km of the home or care of the elderly. [26]
On May 2, Olivier Véran announced that the government would extend a health emergency until 24 July. [27] On May 11, new policies came into effect limiting general travel to 100 km without a permit. Police set up roadblocks to check the streets. At the same time, France wanted to reopen primary schools on a voluntary basis. But many local officials have criticized this decision. [28] On May 11, 2020, the government announced an exit from a strict lockdown because of decreased coronavirus infections. The decision was to introduce a differentiated territorial approach, classifying departments as green or red regions. Inter-departmental travel to and from red zones was limited to professional or personal reasons for the first three weeks. [29]  In April Macron inserted “Operation Resilience,” which allows French military troops to provide logistical and medical support throughout the country. The government also helped provide 5.000 additional ICU beds, and Macron’s team has proposed an aid package of 100 billion euros to boost the economy. [30]  On June 2, the country´s restaurants, cafés and bars were allowed to reopen. [31]
On June 6, parks and gardens in the capital began reopening. Middle and high schools were permitted to reopen from June 2. Swimming pools, gyms, amusement parks, theatres and concert halls are allowed to reopen starting June 2 in green zones and from June 22 in orange zones. Cinemas reopened across the country on June 22. Border restrictions remain in place until June 15, but France is in favor of reopening them "without a quarantine period for travelers arriving from European countries. [32]
The fiscal responses should also be examined. France has postponed income and corporate taxes for all companies and self-employed persons affected by the crisis. But the liquidity guarantees remain more limited ( approximately 15% of GDP). A short-term work-program can pay out as much as 6.850 euros per month. [33]  
Bars and restaurants receive automatic direct help in the value of 1.500 euros. For small and medium-sized enterprises the bills (water, gas, electricity, rent) may be temporarily suspended. A one-month curfew in France can lead to a loss of three percentage points of GDP. The originally planned 45 billion euros will not be enough to face the crisis. The Ministry of Finance announced an increase to up to 100 billion euros. [34]
https://covid19.healthdata.org/france
Source: AFP/DENIS CHARLET
Following the example of many European countries, the French government introduced a contact tracing app "StopCovid". It can be download from June 2, 2020, and will coincide with the lifting of several restrictions like reopening bars, restaurants, beaches and parks. [35] If you are diagnosed COVID-19 positive, your doctor or hospital hand you a QR code which you enter in the app to share the list of ephemeral IDs of people you have interacted with over the past two weeks. Each user is associated with a risk score and if it goes above a certain threshold, the user receives a recommendation to get tested. [36] Of course there are some technical limitations, for example, the use of Bluetooth technology, because it is not precise for estimating the distance between smartphones. Furthermore, the app is based on the risks defined by epidemiologists on the basis of their current knowledge, but some areas are uncertain and there is a risk of false positives or false negatives. [37] Other countries, for example Taiwan and South Korea also used contact-tracing methods to control the spread of the disease. 

3 Sense-making

Boin et al. (2017) define sense-making as "collecting and processing information that will help crisis managers to detect an emerging crisis and understand the significance of what is going on during a crisis" (Boin et al., 2017, p.15). Early detection can help to deploy resources on time and achieve effective measures in order to save lives. [38] We observe the development of the pandemic and testing logic to be able to analyze the sense-making in France. 

3.1 Development of the pandemic 

The first case of the coronavirus infection was reported on January 24. At the end of February, there were already 100 reported cases, but only two deaths were registered. In March the situation started to get out of control: on March 20 there were 12.612 coronavirus cases and 450 deaths, but only 10 days later the number of cases was four times higher and the number of the total deaths increased by six times. On March 12 the country has entered phase 2 and only two days later moved to phase 3. In April there was a sharp deterioration in the country: from April 1 to April 30 the number of cases increased from 56.989 to 129.581 and the number of deaths from 4.032 to 24.376. Since May the number of total cases and total deaths increased slowly: by about 1.000 new cases and 100 deaths every day.  [39]
Since the start of the outbreak, the death toll in France was at 28.332 on March 25, with cases of infection up to 144.806. The number of hospitalizations decreased on May 24 with 17.178 cases. Those in intensive care fell to 1.665 from May 22. Despite the seriousness of the virus, most people experience mild symptoms. Since the beginning of record-keeping for the disease, 64.547 people have recovered in France.
At the moment (June 17) there are 157.716 total coronavirus cases, 29.547 deaths and 73.335 recovered people. [40]
More than 30.000 people have died in France as a result of Covid-19. The hospital death toll from the virus rose by 31 on June 1 to 18.506. The number of patients in intensive care (1.302 on June 1) has returned to levels seen on March 20. Overall, more than 14.000 coronavirus patients remain in hospital. Today, only three territories – Île-de-France, overseas territories Mayotte in the Indian Ocean and French Guiana neighboring Brazil are highlighted in orange, which means that the lockdown easing will happen here later. Other countries such as New Zealand or Thailand had a low number of cases and since June 2020 no more active cases were observed. [41]
https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/france/
https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/france/

3.2 Testing and reporting logic

Since the beginning of the pandemic, the WHO recommended massive testing. Frequent testing allows identifying and isolating people who are infectious before the symptoms develop and therefore it helps to reduce the risk of the second wave. Subnational governments play a leading role in implementing the “track, isolate, test and treat” exit strategy. The actual policy implementation is the responsibility of regional and local governments. In countries with more centralized health service delivery, local and regional governments are likely to contribute to organizing testing and isolation measures. [42]
The testing is very crucial to understanding the spread of the pandemic. No country knows the total number of people infected with COVID-19. All we know is the infection status of those who have been tested. Without this data, we can not know which countries are doing well, and which are underreporting cases and deaths. [43] In France, testing can be done at home, by visiting a healthcare professional, at a hospital or clinic. It will usually take around 72 hours to receive a result. There are some limitations: the first is how many tests a single laboratory can carry out in a day, and another important limitation is the availability of reagents needed to run the tests. Contamination or degradation can also be problematic and these can lead to false positives or false negatives.  [44]
French government officials downplayed the effectiveness of wider testing at the beginning of March. On March 23, World Health Organization chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said, countries need "to attack the virus with aggressive and targeted tactics — testing every suspected case, isolating and caring for every confirmed case, and tracing and quarantining every close contact." But France didn´t change its testing strategy. [45]  
The country lacked the capacity to mass test from the beginning of the crisis. At the end of March, Covid-19 tests were still done manually and only 45 labs had the capacity for the test. In addition, the results had taken three to five hours to come back. Since March 16, a test by Swiss pharmaceutical company Roche Diagnostics has been authorized for use in Roche-made lab machines. These machines can run 100 tests every three hours, equating to 1.000-1.400 tests per 24 hours - it is 10 times’ faster than previous methods. [46]  
In April, France has carried out fewer tests (around 200.000 a week) than the average of OECD countries and less than a third of Germany relative to its size. The goal was to carry out at least 700.000 tests per week, so the country´s capacities should be tripled. [47]  
At the end of March, after having developed its first test in mid-January, Germany conducted between 300.000 and 500.000 tests weekly, while France conducted between 35.000 and 85.000. According to OECD figures from April 28, France was carrying out 9.1 tests per 1.000 people, less than half as many as Germany(25.1) and Spain (22.3), and three times less than Italy. [48]
On May 24, France did 87.33 tests for each new confirmed case, on June 1 there were 32.8 tests for each new case. Countries that do very few tests per confirmed case are unlikely to be testing widely enough to find all cases. The WHO has estimated around 10 – 30 tests per confirmed case as a general benchmark of adequate testing. Where the number of confirmed cases is high, this suggests that there may not be enough tests being carried out. So the true number of infections may be higher than the number of confirmed cases. But not only France underestimated the number of infected persons - Iran had the same problem, but a more critical situation could be observed in Brazil where the numbers, in reality, could be seven times higher as officially reported. Testing for COVID-19 informs our understanding of the pandemic and the risks it can cause, therefore it is a crucial task of each country. [49]
 
Statista 2020. Europe, Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics; July 2, 2020
https://www.ft.com/content/391e9ea6-fb1c-4d95-837f-9495508ed91b

4 Decision-making and coordination

Decision making and coordinating means "making critical calls on strategic dilemmas and orchestrating a coherent response to implement those decisions" (Boin et al., 2017, p.15). Leaders have to weigh policy, tradeoffs, risks and opportunities. Make decisions ist not enough - they must be also implemented and it requires horizontal and vertical coordination. [50]

4.1 The timing of adopted measures

In January some people were positively tested for the coronavirus, but the government did not take action and did not understand the urgency of the situation. By February 13, 2020, there were 11 confirmed cases, but the government still downplayed the risks of the infection and waited until March 3 to implement the first social distancing measures.
In response to the crisis, the country adopted various measures aiming at both tackling the health crisis (through restrictions on freedom of movement, closure of all shops except those which are  "essential"), and at supporting businesses. The French Government began with ministerial orders and decrees. Then the French Parliament has voted for an amending Financial Law on 20 March and on 22 March for the Emergency Law. These two laws were published on 24 March. At this time there were already 22.304 total cases and 1.100 deaths in the country. One of the key measures of the Emergency Law is to enable the Prime Minister to declare a "health emergency". Health emergency has been declared from March 24 to May 24. It was 11 days later than in Bulgaria, four days later than in Portugal and 10 days later than in Spain. The declaration empowers the Prime Minister to take "general measures limiting the freedom of movement, freedom of enterprise and freedom of assembly and allowing the requisitioning of any goods and services necessary to combat the health disaster". Such measures must be appropriate to the circumstances of the time and place. [51]
All schools and universities in France were closed on March 16 until May 11, 2020. At this time, the country already had 6.633 total cases and 148 deaths. [52]  On March 24, exceptional measures had been implemented, for example, restrictions to the freedom of movement, prohibition on certain commercial activities, restrictions of transportation, prohibition on gatherings. French authorities have also taken measures to facilitate the provision and the availability of masks and to control the selling prices of hydroalcoholic gels. 
As we can see, at the beginning of the crisis the French government did not take action on time. In March the gatherings of up to 1.000 people were still allowed and could be one of the reasons for the quick spreading of the infection. Since April the government recognized the urgency of the situation and took an example of the neighboring countries to implement various restrictions.

4.2 Subnational divergence in measures

 France, like most other countries – including those with relatively high levels of decentralization, such as Italy or Germany, developed a strong top-down approach with a centralized decision-making process. Leadership, trust, science-based language, and transparency are all key elements of success but they have been lacking in this crisis. [53]
Subnational governments are responsible for critical measures, health care, social services, and economic development. Because such responsibilities are shared among different levels of government, coordination is critical.  In addition, subnational governments play a large role in delivering education: regional and local governments manage the closing and re-opening of schools.  In unitary countries like France, health care is a major responsibility of state governments, which are responsible for secondary care, hospitals, and medical services. The role of municipalities in health care concentrates on primary care centers and prevention. This health crisis has led to significant increases in subnational government health expenditure, especially on healthcare equipment and consumables (masks, ventilators, tests, protective equipment), covering staff costs, and medical transport. Local governments have to participate in the distribution of masks, in the testing and development of contact-tracing programs. 
A combination of national and subnational measures are required for an effective response to the COVID-19 crisis.  The OECD has identified nine categories of  measures  undertaken by national and subnational governments that help ensure effective coordination and support regions and cities:
1. Reinforcing vertical coordination among national and subnational governments
2. Supporting cross-jurisdiction cooperation
3. Managing exit strategies from containment: testing, social distancing
4. Strengthening data collection and digital governance at local and regional levels
5. Managing the impact on local finance
6. Supporting vulnerable populations by all levels of government
7. Introducing more flexibility in administrative procedures at the subnational level
8. Supporting SMEs and the self-employed
9. Promoting public investment as part of crisis exit and recovery
Vertical coordination between the national and subnational governments is the “first step of an effective response". Effective vertical coordination is required in all countries, be they federal, unitary, centralized, or decentralized. Non-coordinated action can cause conflicting responses. Horizontal cooperation across jurisdictions is also important. The impact of the crisis is huge so that no single jurisdiction can manage these on its own. France has opted for differentiated territorial strategies, with stricter measures in the most affected regions. Iran and India also implemented the state-specific response dividing the country into three zones.
A centralized approach can support a rapid and effective response across a country. This was evident at the beginning of the pandemic in France when the government transferred patients from hospitals in the most affected regions. It can also facilitate quick information and knowledge sharing. On the other hand, a decentralized system can support greater flexibility and make room for bottom-up innovative approaches. Inter-governmental coordination across all levels of government is important. Quickly mobilizing public, private, and third sector actors can help to respond to a crisis more effectively. It means communicating early, clearly, and regularly. [54]
In France, we can observe some discrepancies between the president and Prime Minister Edouard Philippe. Macron was strongly pushing for the lifting of lockdown measures on May 11 and has rejected a possible “geographically" solution, whereby parts of the country less affected by the virus would allow people more freedom. The prime minister is more cautious and does not exclude the possibility od the second wave. [55]
Another problem is that some ministers are not always informed of the president’s decisions in terms of crisis communication. They struggle to explain the government's guidelines in press conferences. This highlights the personalization of crisis communication in the French case and the president appears as the main communicator. [56]

5 Legitimacy

5.1 Trust in government officials

Trust in government means the confidence of citizens in the actions of a “government to do what is right and perceived fair”. It depends on the conformity between citizens’ preferences, their interpretation of the situation, and the functioning of government. [57]
At a broad level, trust in government builds on two main components: social trust that represents citizens’ confidence in their social community, and political trust, when
citizens evaluate government and its institutions. Political trust includes both macro-level trust and institution-based trust. Core levels of trust in government are necessary for the fair and effective functioning of government institutions. [58]
Public authorities across the world are facing the challenge of dealing with the COVID-19 crisis. At the moment, the responses are taking two routes: finding a vaccination or reduce the virus’s spread through social distancing measures. Governments must rely on citizens to be willing to accept the information and guidance given by public officials. [59]
France is suffering from a grave crisis of trust in the government. Government officials calling masks “useless” when France was facing mask shortage and “necessary” a few weeks later, or the call to open schools on May 11, are examples that can explain why only 24% of French people are satisfied with their president Emmanuel Macron. But not only France has experienced the mistrust in the president´s actions, for example in Bulgaria the rating of the president is the lowest the country experienced before. The people in Chile as well as in Thailand have low trust in the government´s actions. In comparison, Taiwan and South Korea show high support for the government. [60]
In France, there was a noticeable mistrust towards institutions (the trust dropped from 55% on March 23 to 35% on April 23, before rising to 39% on May 4 and falling again to 34% on May 7). [61]
In contrast, the trust in the health system is relatively high: about 70% of the population between 30 and 44 years old trust in medical advice and health information from the government, about 95% of the population trust medical and health advice from doctors and nurses. About 85% feel confident in hospitals and health clinics.  [62] In Sweden, like in France the population has more confidence in health authorities than in government´s actions. 
Confidence in experts is lowest in France: (only 15%) and 47% of people believe, that experts have been instrumentalized.[63]
Israel in contrast shows high trust in scientists.
Statista 2020. France; May 14-15, 2020; 1.012 respondents; 18 years and older; Computer-assisted web interviews (CAWI)
This survey was carried out between March and May 2020 and shows the level of trust French people have in their government to deal effectively with the coronavirus situation. It shows that 39% of French people had trust in the ability of the government on April 22. On March 20, the majority still trusted their political leaders. By May 15, trust levels were back to 44%. [64]
Source: ECFR

5.2 Perception of crisis management among the public

The lockdown was difficult to understand for the French people. They were critical to the government because of three topics: contradictory positions on masks, digital tracking measures, and the reopening of schools. 59% of French people were against the reopening of schools and 7 out of 10 parents did not want to send their children to school on May 11. In Netherlands, there were even mass protests against the governmental measures, because teachers felt unsafe and insecure. The government's communication has been also criticized: after stating that unaffected people were not required to wear masks, the government changed its position and now obliges every citizen to wear one. [65]
All categories of the population have the opinion that local authorities have been able to face their responsibilities in the current health crisis. While the local authorities were able to convince the population of their capacity, only 31% of French people perceive the French government to be able to handle the crisis. International organizations are judged very strictly. 55% of French people would like to see the powers of local authorities strengthened, while 38% believe they should continue to have as much power as they have today. 55% of French people want border restrictions to continue permanently after the coronavirus crisis, 38% want them to remain in place only for the duration of the crisis, and 6% want them to be lifted immediately. [66]
What is interesting is that despite the difficulties of remaining in isolation, most people said they were favorable to limitations in their personal freedoms for the greater good. For example, 94% of French people said they were favorable to the obligation of wearing a mask in public transport. [67]
Over half of the people approve of the government’s reopening plan. But they don’t approve of Macron: 30-40% judged his dealing with the epidemic. In another poll, 62% of respondents found Macron’s manner ‘‘arrogant’’ and ‘‘authoritarian.’’ His speeches during the crisis were long-lasting and literary.  [68]
In France, the lack of trust is linked to contradictory political decisions. The general distrust toward politicians is reinforced by public attacks against citizens by President Macron and his ministers. For example, on March 13, President Macron gave a speech inviting all people to stay at home. But he added that the population had to vote at the local elections on March 15. Later he told, that it was irresponsible to spend this day outside. After elections, people discovered that many citizens were contaminated at voting locations. In response, Didier Lallement (french official) explained that if somebody is contaminated, it’s his own fault: he shouldn’t have gone outside. The strangest example is the government’s position on masks: at the end of March, masks were seen as incapable of preventing the spread of the virus and in April they were necessary to stop the virus’s spreading. This sequence of contradictory statements cannot produce trust in leaders. The main threat is the increasing anger of the population, especially from those confined in small apartments.  [69] The life under lockdown can be very difficult: many people loosed their jobs, many families have a really bad financial situation and not enough money to survive the crisis. In Thailand many people were desperate and committed suicide because they didn't see the way out of this situation. In the following video "Our lives in lockdown" French people describe how they are dealing with social isolation. [70]

6 Overall evaluation

6.1 Analyzing the French response according to Boin et al.

In the book „The politics of crisis management” the authors examine how leaders deal with the challenges and what political risks and opportunities they encounter. The first chapter of this book explains the importance of crisis management and defines the crisis as an “undesirable and unexpected situation” with an urgent threat to the social system and its basic structures (Boin et al., 2017, p.5). The key components are threat, urgency, and uncertainty. COVID-19 crisis includes all these components. It is an uncertain situation because no country experienced this before and there is no preexisting knowledge about how to deal with it. It is also an urgent situation because the virus spreads quickly and is seen as a big threat to societies and the country´s economy. The coordination across decision-making systems is important and crucial for an efficient response. As we could see in France, there was a subnational divergence in measures and this led to an ineffective response at the beginning of the crisis and to a loss of trust in governing officials.
There are five tasks leaders should make during the crisis: sense-making, decision making and coordinating, meaning-making, accounting, and learning. Because the coronavirus crisis still continues to cause damage, we can only analyze the first three tasks.
Boin et al. (2017) define sense-making as “collecting and processing information that will help crisis managers to detect an emerging crisis” (Boin et al., 2017, p.15). To be able to analyze the sense-making in France we examined the development of the pandemic and the country´s testing and reporting logic. The number of daily new cases in France grew very quickly. In April there was a huge rise: the number of cases increased from 56.989 on April 1 to 129.581 on April 30 and the number of deaths from 4.032 to 24.376. The situation got out of control and French authorities could understand the significance of the crisis. The lack of capacities for the massive testing hampered the detection of the true number of infected people and led to the underestimation of cases and deaths. Therefore, the early detection of the catastrophe was not possible and the deployment of resources was not fast enough. To improve the crisis sense-making leaders should consistently ask for "candid reporting from advisers, including worst-case scenarios" (Boin et al., 2017, p.150) and develop a clear picture of the unfolding events.
Decision making and coordinating is the second important task of leaders. Crisis managers have to weigh policy, risks, and opportunities and to implement decisions. It requires horizontal and vertical coordination and helps to prevent conflicts between governments and actors involved. In France, we analyzed the timing of policy responses and convergence in adopted measures to understand how decisions were made and coordinated within networks of actors. At the beginning of the crisis, the French government did not take action on time. The risks were downplayed and possible consequences of non-decision making ignored. The problem of divergence became visible when president Macron made a push for the lifting of lockdown measures on May 11. Prime Minister Edouard Philippe opted for the differentiated approach which allows people in “green zones” to regain their freedom faster than people in “red zones”. But the president rejected this plan which demonstrates the clash of authorities´ opinions.  A well-structured delegation of decision-making authority can facilitate a more effective and legitimate response. In France the initial structuring of information and communication was not perceived as successful and this undermined emergent collaboration. To improve coordination during the crisis, leaders should create institutional and social conditions in order to facilitate network coordination. Decision making is more effective when leaders use improvisation and don´t follow detailed plans.
The third task of leaders during a crisis is the meaning-making which includes strategic policy choices in order to get others to accept leaders´ decisions. This process consists of two parts: first is to formulate a persuasive message to explain what has happened and how it can be resolved, and second, to deliver this message. The first important message the president formulated and delivered to the public contained the explanation that the nation was in the "midst of the greatest health crisis”. The government recognized the complexity of the situation and wanted to provide citizens with information to avoid panicking. To improve crisis meaning-making, leader credibility and effective communication are important.
 Successful framing of context is also an important part of meaning-making and means emphasizing certain dimensions of consideration over others (Druckman, 2011). [71] Boin et al. mention that an effective frame does a credible explanation and creates the illusion that leaders are in control. In his first addresses, Emmanuel Macron consistently developed a “war” framework, denoting the virus as an enemy. The framing was used very frequently among countries´ leaders- in South Korea the seriousness of the crisis was emphasized to justify strong measures, in India the crisis was denoted as "battle of life and death". The French President declared a “general mobilization” on March 12, defined crisis management as a war effort on March 16. In his address on March 20 he used many war metaphors, for example, deceased nurses “falling” during the crisis, a response organized around “lines of defense”, “the children of the nation fighting” against the virus. The President’s speeches called for “national unity” to defend the nation. He repeats the importance of slowing down the epidemic by adopting an appropriate behavior. In comparison, the Prime Minister refers only three times to war in seven discourses since the beginning of the crisis and adopts instead a more emotional “human interest” framework.  In his April 13th address, the French president abandoned his earlier insistence on war, focusing instead on compassion, uncertainty, and severity. The French case shows an approach towards crisis communication that favors the head of state as the main communicator and this leads to inconsistencies in government crisis communication.  [72] [73]

6.2 Coping with the crisis

Policymakers will need to plan how to build and fund healthcare systems with enough capacity to deal with the next pandemic, without needing to shut down economies for long periods of time. [74]
There are four probable scenarios of recovery from the Covid-19 crisis that can occur in the next few months. The first is “an epidemic under control”, which is the most optimistic scenario. On May 29, France ´s Public Health agency stated that there were no signs of a resurgence in Covid-19 despite easing of lockdown measures on May 11. Even so, the council recommends that France maintain social distancing and the use of face masks. The second scenario is “critical clusters in local areas”. The goal is to limit the number of cases to prevent the coronavirus from spreading nationwide. The Council proposes an early and quick response and the maintenance of social-distancing measures with a proactive approach to isolating vulnerable sections of the populations.
In the case of a “low-level epidemic”, the virus would spread throughout the entire country. This outcome might arise if people don’t follow social-distancing measures. If there is an increase in the number of people testing positive, the Council recommends strengthening measures and increasing hospital capacities.
The worth scenario is “a critical health situation”. It will happen if the measures of the third scenario fail. The Council emphasizes the importance of tracking the cases to avoid this outcome. [75]
The Bank of France said, that the French economy will shrink about 10% this year and will only recover to pre-crisis levels by mid-2022. Minister for the Economy, Bruno Le Maire said, "I do not believe in extraordinarily rapid recovery after a brutal collapse which would allow us to find at the end of 2020 the same level of growth that we had at the beginning of this year". [76]
Unemployment is likely to reach 11.5% in mid-2021. The central bank said that the second wave of infections could plunge the economy into a 16% downturn in 2020. [77]
German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron presented a joint Franco-German proposal on the European recovery from the coronavirus crisis on May 18, 2020. The main aim is to set up a €500 billion Recovery Fund at the EU level for solidarity and growth.  The funds will be distributed among the EU Member States that have been most impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. [78]
Now France is fully reopening its economy to accelerate the recovery after the crisis. From June 22, all nursery schools, primary schools, and junior high schools will be open and mandatory for all students. Macron also confirmed that the second round of local elections that have been interrupted, will take place on June 28. France is reopening its borders with other European countries on June 15 and will start allowing visitors from other continents on July 1.[79]
The economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis will differ across regions, depending on the region’s exposure to tradable sectors. For example, regions with economies that are dependent on the tourism industry, will be more affected by the coronavirus than other regions. The economy in Thailand for example, depends on tourism and the border closure will have an enormous impact on the state´s revenues. Capital regions or other metropolitan regions have a higher risk of job disruption than other regions. Subnational government finance will be strongly hit because of reduced revenues. In France, estimates from May 2020 indicate that lost revenue among subnational governments could reach EUR 7.5 billion in 2020, the tourist tax will likely drop by 40%. 
The COVID-19 pandemic is expected to result in a strong drop in both shared and own-source tax revenues. Declining economic activity, employment, and consumption arising from COVID-19, and particularly containment measures, will reduce revenues from personal income tax (PIT), corporate income tax (CIT), and value-added tax (VAT). Subnational governments may also suffer from a large decrease in user charges resulting from the closure of public facilities and reduced demand for local public services. 
The COVID-19 pandemic will have short- and long-term effects on territorial development, subnational governments, and finance. One risk in government responses is to only focus on the short term. The COVID-19 crisis highlights the importance of effective multi-level governance in managing mutual dependence. There is a debate surrounding centralization/decentralization and the need for a coordinated response to emergency situations. Coordination is necessary across and among levels of government as well as between government and non-government actors. A flexible multi-level governance system requires the balance between centralized and decentralized territorial management, therefore leaders of all countries need to rethink their governance systems and improve these in order to produce effective decisions.
 [80]

7 Country´s favourite stay at home song

8 References


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