Iran

1 Introduction

This wiki is about the Iranian state response to COVID-19.
 
The article should give an overview of how Iran acted during the corona crisis and will include the required chapters in the syllabus.
A rough summary of the country should help to understand the content of the following chapters.
https://www.weltkarte.com/typo3temp/images/karte-iran-regionen.png, accessed on 19.07.2020

2 General Information

With its 1,648,000 km2 the country Iran is located in the Middle East between Asia, Europe and Africa and is subdivided in 31 provinces. 9 Million of the 81 Million inhabitants live in the capital Teheran.
The official language is Farsi and the Islam is by far the most widespread religion. 99% of the inhabitants are Muslims of whom 51% are Persians, 24% are Azerbaijanis, 8% are Gilaki and Mazandarani, 7% are Kurds, 3% are Arabs, 2% are Turkmen, 2% are Luren, 2% are Baluch, Armenians and others.
Continuing, Iran's constitution is decisive for who is allowed to make decisions in the country and how power is distributed.
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic is from 1979.
The Revolutionary leader Sayed Ali Khamenei is Head of state and ruling jurist. He has the power over the army and the highest judges.
As President, Hassan Rohani is the Head of Government and presides over the Cabinet.
With 18 years you are eligible to vote. As well as the President, the parliament with 290 seats has to be elected every four years.
Moreover, every 8 years elections for the Expert Council, which consits exclusively out of clergy and controls the revolutionary leader, are held.
The Guardian Council, which consists out of 6 clergy and 6 judges is partly elected by the parliament and nominated by the Revolutionary leader. It examines the compatibility of new laws with the Islamic law.
The Arbitration Council, which is also appointed by the revolutionary leader, mediates between Parliament and the Council of Guardians. [1]
https://www.bpb.de/internationales/asien/iran/308699/infografiken, accessed on 30.07.2020

3 Preparedness

3.1 National Disaster Management Plan

There is a developed National Disaster Management Plan of Iran. This plan contains strategies for action for different disasters such as earthquakes, floods or droughts. Pandemics are not listed individually in the plan, so there is no ready-made strategy for a situation like Corona.
In general, like many other countries, they write that any disaster can best be solved with the following four steps:

1. Mitigation: Taking sustained actions to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to people and property from hazards and their effects.
2. Preparedness: Building the emergency management function to effectively prepare for mitigate against respond to, and recover from, any hazard by planning, training and excercising.
3. Response: Conducting emergency operations to save lives by positioning emergency equipments and supplies, evacuating potential victims; providing food, water, shelter, and medical care to those in need; and restoring critical public services.
4. Recovery: Rebuilding communities so that individuals, businesses, and governments can function on their own, return to normal life, and protect against future hazards [2]

It should remain clear that ready-made crisis management plans do lead to precise responsibilities, a high degree of reliability, clear structures and legitimacy. However, a feeling of false preparedness can also arise. Furthermore, a plan cannot be adapted to every situation and may be too specific. [3]

3.2 GHS Index

"The Global Health Security (GHS) Index is the first comprehensive assessment and benchmarking of health security and related capabilities across the 195 countries that make up the States Parties to the International Health Regulations (IHR [2005])." [4]
Iran's total index score is 37,7 out of a possible 100 points. This puts it in third place among the Southern Asian countries and 97th out of 195 countries.
Sweden, for example, is in seventh place worldwide with 72.1 points. In the first place are the United States with 83.5 points.
The index is measured using six different categories. The category "Detect" includes the indicator "Epidemiology workforce", in which Iran achieves a score of 50, as the country offers at least one field epidemiology training program (FETP) in-country that is explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals. But there is no publicly available evidence that the Islamic Republic of Iran has at least 1 field epidemiologist per 200,000 people.
It is striking that the country performs very poorly on the indicator "Emergency preparedness and response planning" with a score of 0 and ranks 108th. Iran's national public health emergency response plan is not very up-to-date. In addition, pandemics are an issue, but there is little evidence that this plan considers health emergencies as separate events. [5]

3.3 The Iranian Health System

Article 29 of the Iranian Constitution states that every Iranian citizen has the same right to access health services.[6]
The healthcare system is already over one hundred years old and operates in various micro and macro systems through 47 medical and scientific universities in the country.[7]  A national health care network consisting of health houses, rural and urban health centres, city, provincial and regional hospitals ensures primary health care. On the basis of the following macro plans, the goals of Universal Health Coverage have been pursued over the last 40 years: Health corps, establishing and expanding health-care networks, law of universal health and social security insurances, family physician and referral system plan, and health transformation plan (HTP).[8]

But despite the plans and the law, it must be noted that the specialized medical care, especially in case of emergencies or accidents, is in large parts of the country medically, hygienically, technically and organizationally not on the level of the capital and not comparable with European standards. Even in the cities, a reliably functioning rescue system is not always available.
In Tehran, medical care in all disciplines is available at a fairly high level. Thus, even in the case of serious illnesses, medical evacuation abroad, e.g. to Dubai, or immediate repatriation rarely needs to be considered. [9]

In addition to the poor health system, many Iranians are poor and cannot afford face masks, or any kind of hospital treatment.
It is simply not possible to disinfect their hands or keep sufficient distance. Families often live close to each other, and if someone gets infected, the virus spreads rapidly.
[10]

3.4 Former experience with pandemics (H1N1)

Between 1st of June and 11th of November 2009, 2662 cases of Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1) were confirmed in Iran. 75% of these cases were between 5 and 40 years old. 58 patients (2.18%) were confirmed dead during this period.

All Provincial Universities of Medical Sciences were provided with case definitions and monitoring questionnaires to be distributed to all health institutions in their provinces.
The forms included questions regarding demographic data and clinical information on suspected cases of H1N1.
Some hospitals were appointed by the Provincial Universities of Medical Sciences as special referral hospitals and clinics for all public health facilities.
Using nasopharyngeal swabs, the centres were asked to collect samples from patients who met the criteria of the case definition and send them via a sample transfer system to regional and national influenza laboratories.
If cases were confirmed, the information was sent to the Influenza Surveillance Centre of MOHME,  recorded in national forms and forwarded to all the other Provincial Universities of Medical Science. A committee was formed, which agreed on four general objectives: „educating people via national broadcasting, providing adequate stockings of oseltamivir and other necessary drugs including other antivirals and antibiotics, designing a national protocol for case definition, as well as diagnosis and evaluation of the provincial preparedness plan.“ [11]


Doctors and other people who work for the health of their fellow human beings should be informed in detail about the virus. Persons entering the country had to disclose their health status and be examined by a doctor if necessary.

Brochures and posters were distributed throughout the country to inform citizens about the disease and confirmed cases were treated with oseltamivir.[12]

In fact, this would have been a good chance to learn something from health crises and record it for the future. Boin et al (2017, 15) also write that "determining the causes of a crisis, assesing the strengths and weaknesses of the response to it, and undertaking remedial action based on this understanding" is an important last step in strategic crisis leadership. However, Iran was not able to take much from this crisis. [13]

3.5 Political Conditions Before the Crisis

When the corona pandemic hit Iran, the Iranians were celebrating Persian New Year. Everyone was glad that the old year was over because it was not an easy year for the country. The economy has been in a deep crisis for some time now and US sanctions, which exacerbate the economic stituation continue to increase.
The first case of corona infection probably occurred on 19 February. Two days later, parliamentary elections were held in Iran on the 21st of February. The Government tried to cover the whole thing up so that the elections could take place normally. Some even thought that it was a conspiracy to keep people away from the elections. [14]
https://www.bpb.de/internationales/asien/iran/306929/interview-coronakrise-und-sanktionen, accessed 14.07.2020

3.6 Evaluation Preparedness

All in all, the political situation and the deficient health care system are not good preconditions for the emerging challenges in the course of the Corona crisis. The sanctions have been a burden on the country for a long time and prevent the country from further development. [15] As a result, the country does not perform particularly well on the GHS Index. [16]  The National Disaster Management Plan does not contain more detailed information about pandemics and the extent to which the individual emergency steps can be complied with is questionable. [17]  

4 Sense-Making

Sense making can be defined as "collecting and processing information that will help crisis managers to detesct an emerging crisis and understand the significance of what is going on during a crisis." (Boin et. al. 2017, p 15) [18]
In the following section it will be analysed how Iran is testing and reporting during the Covid 19 pandemic.
It is assumed that the coronavirus was brought to the Iranian city of Ghom by Chinese theology students. [19]  Poor medical care and the intransparency of politics were the reason for the enormously rapid spread throughout the country. [20]

4.1 Infections, Deaths, Cured

4.1.1 Confirmed Cases

On 10 July, the number of all confirmed cases in Iran was 250458 and it is striking that Iran, compared to Germany, has not managed to "flatten the curve". Which would be a sign that the restrictions and measures taken are effective. However, compared to Chile, a country with significantly fewer inhabitants, the number of cases did not increase as rapidly.[21]
https://ourworldindata.org/covid-cases

4.1.2 Deaths

Compared to other Asian countries with a comparable population, Iran is relatively hard hit by the coronavirus. Especially the comparison with Thailand is striking, because there only 58 people have died from the virus. In Iran there are already 12305 dead. Compared to the heavily affected countries in Europe, such as France, the number is rather small. [22]
https://ourworldindata.org/covid-deaths, accused on 10.07.2020

4.1.3 Cured

The number of those already recovered is currently around 222530. [23]

4.2 Testing

In general, there is little information about how testing is done and how the numbers are generated. It is generally believed that the number of infected people is up to 10 times higher than the number stated by the government. The number of people who die from the virus is probably about twice as high.[24]
The data on the page Our World in Data also show that there is clearly too little testing in Iran, as over 10 percent of the people tested are infected.
In comparison, Spain tests a lot because although the number of cases is much higher in the country, only 1.5% of the tested persons are also infected with the virus.
The figures are most extreme in Bolivia, where more than 50% of all those tested are also infected with the virus. [25]

4.3 Evaluation Sense-Making

The lack of information on how testing is actually carried out and how the figures are obtained makes a fair evaluation difficult. But even the figures given show that Iran has not succeeded in flattening the curve, which suggests that the measures taken were not strict enough or were not sufficiently followed. The number of tests indicated is also low in relation to the number of people infected.
If the numbers of infected and dead are indeed so much higher than the numbers indicated, the crisis in Iran would be enormous. [26]

5 Decision-Making

Decision-Making and cooridnating is defined as "making critical calls on strategic dilemmas and orchestrating a coherent response to implement those decisions." (Boin et. al. 2017, p 15) [27]

5.1 Timeline

5.2 Government decisions in the context of current events

5.2.1 The first cases

The first cases of the Corona Pandemic were announced in Qom on 19 February. In contrast to most countries, no immediate measures have been taken against the virus. Mohammad Saeedi, deputy head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, even motivated pilgrims to continue to travel to the city and heal themselves from both spiritual and physical illnesses. The government stressed that there is no danger and that enemies would present the danger greater than it really is. Parliamentary elections were held on February 21,  five days later the government confirmed 139 cases and 19 deaths.
However, it is believed that the numbers were underestimated and at this point in time already up to six times as high. [28]
 
When a religious authority was asked to tell the believers to follow hygienic measures, he said: "Put your hands on your chest, speak the Surah Hamd from the Qur'an seven times in the morning and evening, then God will help you". [29]
It was not until 28 February that 21 of the 31 provinces decided to cancel Friday prayers, weddings and funerals. In addition, schools and universities had to close until at least New Year (Noruz, 21 March). [30]
 
The government forbade the population to disseminate " fake news ". Violations were punished by up to three years imprisonment.
President Rouhani repeated that there will be no lockdown and that all shops will be allowed to remain open, within 16 days, the virus had reached all provinces.
Even as the numbers continued to rise, state-controlled television spread the word that the virus was a US "bio-weapon". [31]

5.2.2 Further steps and the "Social Distancing Plan"

The Ministry of Health reported 54 dead and 385 infected on the first of March.  The World Health Organization declared to have sent protective clothing, tests and a team of experts to Iran.
One MEP demanded that cities particularly affected should be closed, but the government decided against it on the basis that one must not give in to the US. 
While France, the UK and Germany had agreed to support Iran in its fight against the virus, Khamenei said that the government had correctly informed the population from the beginning and that other states were covering up the truth.
On March 4th, all Friday prayers were finally cancelled. Also Vice President Masud Peseschkian said that the figures the government had published were not realistic and decisions made so far were not appropriate.
On March 5th, the government demanded to refrain from travelling and, if possible, not to pay with cash.
A few days later, more than 85000 prisoners were temporarily released in order to avoid the spreading in overcrowded prisons.
In early March, the government sent a SMS to the country's inhabitants asking them to install an app to restrict the distribution of Covid-19. With this app, the government was able to collect large amounts of data from its citizens. The app was removed from the Play Store shortly after its release. It's not quite clear why this happened, as the data that was requested was the same as for another common health app. [32]
A crisis management group, headed by President Rohani, was set up on 11th of March. It was decided that mobile hospitals, for example in hotels or sports halls, should provide better medical care. In addition, armed forces are now to be deployed in the fight against the virus. 
For the first time since 1962 on 12th March Iran asked the International Monetary Fund for 5 billion dollars as a result of the Corona crisis. [33]
After numerous members of parliament became infected with the virus, Vice Minister of Health, Resa Maleksadeh, admitted that the urgency of the situation was underestimated and the population had not been sufficiently informed. [34]
The Washington Post published satellite images of mass graves in Qom on March 12. At the same time many extremely religious people did not want to acknowledge the urgency of the situation. It took several weeks before those in charge decided to close the shrine to Fatima Masumeh and the country's others most sacred sites on march 16th, but shortly afterwards the barricades were broken down again to pray. [35]
On the 15th of march, for the first time a truck drove through Tehran and other cities to disinfect the streets. [36]
By March 20 there were already 18000 infected and 1300 dead in Iran. This made it the third most affected country.
Despite the fact that not all patients were accepted and only those who were accepted were recorded as infected and reported to the state. (BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51930856, accessed on 06.07.2020)
Meanwhile, the University of Tehran had developed a computer simulator that can be used to determine how many infected and dead people there will be in various scenarios. Under the conditions prevailing at the time, they reckoned with up to 3.5 million dead. [37]
The government continued to refrain from a quarantine. There was only an appeal to the population to avoid travelling or visiting relatives, but the population did not listen to it.
Due to the crisis, revolutionary leader Ali Khamenei did not give a New Year's speech.
After the New Year celebrations, President Rohani declared that the crisis might continue until 2021, even thogh the case numbers had begun to fall in all 31 provinces.
On 22 March, the government closed all shops in Tehran, except for supermarkets and pharmacies.  [38]
On 26 March a Social distancing plan was published by the Islamic Public News Agency, which said that all contacts should be avoided if possible. Besides all schools and universities, shopping centres, parks, swimming pools and other public places should be closed. Airplanes, trains and busses should be restricted in their use. [39]
A team from the aid organisation Médecins sans Frontières was to set up a mini hospital in Iran in mid-March to support the local authorities. Although all bureaucratic hurdles could be overcome in advance and the team brought along aid material worth 150000 Euros, they had to leave before they could start working.
The Ministry of Health wrote that the team was not needed at the moment. The reason for the quick cancellation was that conservatives suspected spies among the doctors.
A further step of the government was to stop newspapers and magazines to avoid social contacts. This led to the end of the independent press, as only a few right-wing newspapers have the possibility to publish online. [40]

5.2.3 Smart Social Distancing Plan

The second phase started on 7 April with a smart social distancing initiative plan. Health Minister Namaki described the first phase as very successful, with 70 of 83 million people screened. But he did not explain what exactly is meant by screened. He also declared that he was aware of the critical economic situation which is why the government would help those who needed it most.
All those who showed symptoms should be tested in the future, also to make a good impression internationally. [41]
Work should be resumed in economically important businesses to provide basic services for the population.
There were numerous rumours of disagreements between the various governing parties, but all of them were denied by the government itself.
On April 13, Abdolresa Azizi, head of the Social Affairs Committee in the Islamic Parliament, said that the virus can only be defeated by military means, as in China. Everyone should stay at home and be supplied with food instead of having to go shopping. 
At the same time, Khamenei demanded that the armed forces set up another crisis unit which could interfere in the decisions of the crisis unit under Rouhani.
This was criticised above all by the Iranian Medical Association, as it made it even more difficult to implement measures.
In a report by Parliament's research centre, it was stated in a footnote that the number of people infected is currently probably up to ten times higher and the number of dead up to twice as high as the government had stated.
As pressure to reopen mosques increased due to the upcoming month of fasting, Ahmad Marwi, administrator of the Imam Resa mausoleum in Maskhad, declared on April 17th that a plan was being worked out to reopen the pilgrimage mosques. Simultaneously, the secretary of the crisis team Hossein Ghassemi said, that at the moment neither mosques nor mausoleums and shrines may be reopened, which was especially criticized by right-wing extremists.
On Army Day, the military parade took place without padres and rockets. Instead, all soldiers, officers and generals wore protective masks during the ceremony. The armed forces were now fighting against an "invisible enemy".
On 25th of April Rohani explained that the land was divided into three areas: Corona free zones, low-risk zones and high-risk zones. Only in the areas without corona mosques could be reopened.
The supreme command of the Revolutionary Guards, General Hossein Salami told that a device had been built that could detect corona at a distance of up to 100 meters without a blood test. The device was described as very accurate and apparently several other countries had already expressed their interest in the device.
The well-known Iranian physicist, Resa Mansuri, was very critical. The device could not function in this way and the Revolutionary Guard would make a fool of himself. He also added that as the former health minister he knew how dangerous it was to speak out publicly and that there were many other scientists who had to cover up the government's actions. [42]

5.2.4 Further Relaxations

Although Health Minister Namaki warned against further relaxation on 10 May, mosques were allowed to open their doors to visitors on three evenings during the fasting month, leading to a sharp rise in the number of infected people.
Nevertheless, on 16 May, President Rohani announced further easing of restrictions on cafés and mausoleums from 23 May.
In contrast, the governor of Chusestan province, Gholamresa Shariati, called on his people to stay at home, as the medical staff was still overwhelmed.
Police Chief Hossein Ashtari announced on 20 of May that 320 people had been arrested and 1300 websites blocked due to spreading "fear and insecurity" in times of Corona.
In addition, President Rohani said at a cabinet meeting: " we still have a long way to go in the fight against Corona, we should not rely on partial successes, we must be careful. (...) The path we had chosen from the beginning was not that of forced quarantine, we were counting on voluntary cooperation, we asked the citizens for support. And they did. In the past three months, we have achieved success step by step, we have not had to back down and we have had considerable success overall. Now we are at the border and have only one step left to take to get the disease fully under control. (...) The situation would have been even better if the regulations had been better observed in some provinces where there are still problems at present." [43]
 
Since the loosening in mid-April, cases have risen sharply. Meanwhile, for Health Minister Namaki, the health of citizens is the top priority, and even environmental protection and air pollution are put on the back burner. [44]  
In mid-June, there were already over 200000 infected and over 10000 dead [45]  [46] But there is no mention of a second wave in Iran, because the cities now affected did not have to fight the virus at the beginning. [47]
Fight against the coronavirus: Iran fears a second wave Photo: Ebrahim Noroozi/ dpa https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/coronavirus-in-iran-die-doppelte-zweite-welle-a-076ce732-7f36-4bc6-be3d-4a912b5a2aff, accessed on 19.07.2020

5.3 COVID-19: Government Response Stringency Index

The Government Response Stringency Index shows that, compared with France and New Zealand, Iran is relatively late in taking initial measures. The intensity of the measures is also significantly lower. [48]
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/covid-stringency-index?tab=chart&year=2020-05-07&country=IRN~NZL~FRA, accessed on 10.07.2020

5.4 Evaluation Decision-Making

Boin et. al (2017) write that in times of crisis, decisions often have to be made where there is no right answer. Dilemmas arise, and every decision has negative effects. Uncertainties do not allow us to say in advance which path is the right one. [49]
In the corona crisis, Iran decided against a complete lockdown. In that case, a trade-off decision was taken for the economy and against public health. Whether this was the right decision is questionable. At the moment the number of cases shows that the moderate restrictions are not sufficient to contain the virus. On the contrary, the ZDF reported on 18.07. about a study of the Iranian Ministry of Health, which shows that possibly up to 25 million Iranians have already been infected with the virus and that the figures would increase rapidly in the coming months. However, the study has not yet been published. [50]

6 Meaning Making

6.1 Definition

Boin et. al. (2017, p 15) define Meaning making as "offering a situational definition and narrative that is convincing, helpful, and inspiring to citizens and responders." Already in the last section it became partly clear how the government of Iran framed the crisis, how the situation was defined and which informations reached the citizens. I will go into this in more detail below. [51]

6.2 Media in general

Iran is one of the most repressive countries in the world and, according to Reporters Without Borders, ranks 170th out of 190 on the press freedom ranking list.
As the coronavirus is very present in Iran, the government was not able to avoid reporting about it but the coverage was almost exclusively positive.
The fact that at least for a while no printed newspapers were allowed to be sold and only a few newspapers were permitted or willing to publish online further limited the available information. Thus, the government was able to decide very precisely which information reached the citizens and which did not. [52]

6.3 Framing

Druckman (2011) also describes framing by the fact that some topics are highlighted and thematized stronger than others. [53] In Iran it is noticeable that two topics are particularly prominent: First, the blame of the US for the crisis. Ali Khameni stated "there are enemies who are demons, and there are enemies who are humans, and they help one another" [54] to emphasize that the crisis was not caused by the virus but by the US.
Later on, also due to the political situation, the economic consequences of the crisis are in the foreground and correspondingly the decisions that are made are in the interest of the economy.
In order for the decisions of a government to be acknowledged and followed, as many uncertainties as possible should be diminished. It is also important that the population is given the opportunity to comprehend and accept the current situation. Leaders should explain exactly "what the crisis is about: what is at stake, what are its causes, what can be done." (Boin et al, 17, 2017)
The government of Iran did not succeed in this. On the contrary, at the beginning the leaders stressed that it was not a crisis and that everything was under control.
The Iranians could see how there were enormous restrictions in other countries and gradually more and more parliamentarians became infected with the virus. A correspondingly questionable picture emerged and nobody knew what to believe.
It is noticeable that very early on the decisions of the government are questioned and even parliamentarians point out that, for example, the published figures cannot be correct. This makes the situation even more unclear, contradictions arise and the following decisions can hardly be accepted by the population. [55] [56]  
Ali Khameni stated, "We have the forces of the djinn and the humans working together".[57] Shortly afterwards, however, the government tried to make decisions with determination and conviction to create a clearer picture, which was at least partially achieved by closing the holy sites, which are considered places of immunity and healing. [58]
In general, it is noticeable that the many different decision-making instances do not provide a clear picture of the current situation. Besides the revolutionary leader Khamenei, there are two different crisis management groups, led by the president and the army leader. The religious authorities, besides the revolutionary leader, are especially important for the right-wing, conservative people. However, there is room for improvement in the agreement between the individual authorities, as they define the crisis at different times in very different ways. [59]

6.4 Evaluation Meaning Making

In summary, it can be said that the government of Iran is far from presenting the crisis as dramatically as other countries. Since the media are monitored by the state, the government can actually differentiate very well what information is being communicated to the population. In this case, however, a confusing picture emerges, with sometimes contradictory information being shared. This promotes popular discontent and weakens the legitimacy of the government.[60]

7 Legitimacy

Shortly after the first Covid 19 case in Iran, were the elections of the Iranian parliament. These were held anyway to strengthen the legitimacy of the government and little information was released about the first cases. However, if you look at the elections more closely, it is clear that the elections are by no means free. The candidates of the left-wing Islamist People's Mujahedin, religious nationalists and supporters of Islamic democracy were gradually excluded from the parliamentary elections and now, in fact, only candidates from a single camp can be elected. However, even the previous elections could by no means be described as free elections. [61]

In general the Iranian government lacks trust from the population. What Iran's government is failing at the moment, is that people have no confidence in it. This mistrust is due to events such as the shooting down of the Ukrainian plane by Iranian forces in January this year, which left 176 dead and was initially covered up. Or to the protests in November 2019, which were brutally ended. The decisions taken as a result of the elections and the anniversary celebrations of the revolution exacerbated the situation even further. In addition to mismanagement and mistrust, there was a political domestic power struggle. The religious leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, had more or less appointed General Mohammad Bagheri, commander of the armed forces, as crisis chief. In doing so, he circumvented Hassan Rouhani, the president and head of government. Rouhani and Bagheri often sent very different signals. As a result, the majority of the population did not listen to the instructions, which were made too late anyway. Many critics have long regarded the clerical leadership as incompetent and out of date. [62] [63]
Meanwhile, the Iranian government is trying to cover up its own incompetence, using the economic sanctions and the West as a scapegoat. They use the Corona crisis as a springboard to lift sanctions in order to secure its own retention of power. But the Iranians know that it is not the sanctions that are responsible for the approaching humanitarian catastrophe, but the unwillingness of their own government.
International risk analysts estimate that it is only a matter of time before the next riots. Even leading politicians in the state warn of imminent surveys of angry citizens. The rising number of executions and death sentences is intended to act as a deterrent. [64]

Unlike India, on the YouGov site, there are no contributions on the legitimacy of the Iranian government during the Corona Crisis.

8 Overall Evaluation

Thomann (2019) adds some properties to the list of attributes of Policy problems by Hoornbeek and Peters (2017). Based on the full set of properties I want to evaluate the corona crisis in Iran.
The core attributes of policy problems are solutibility, complexity, scale and uncertainty.
The corona crisis cannot be solved easily because there is no vaccination at the moment. For a country like Iran, where the medicine is not as advanced as in Norway, for example, it is even less likely that a vaccine will be developed within a short time, so that the country is indeed dependent on other countries to solve the problem. [65]
Furthermore, the problem is very complex because it affects the whole world and also many different dimensions such as family, economy, education, health, etc. What distinguishes Iran from many other countries is that here, compared to the Netherlands for example, religion plays an important role and probably has the greatest influence on decisions, alongside the economy.[66]
However, unlike e.g. France, the government of Iran does not agree on whether the crisis is a big problem. Despite the constantly increasing number of cases, the government has declared the crisis to be over at an early stage. In the international context, however, one can definitely assume that it is a massive problem, as many countries, such as India, have declared a state of crisis.
Uncertainty definitely exists. [67]  Both in the government and in the population, especially as it is not clear how the virus will develop and what the extent of the situation will be. The program of the university in Tehran is supposed to show how many infected people there are and under which conditions, but nobody can really estimate how the number of cases will develop. [68]
The attributes tied to instruments include divisibility, monetarization, scope, interdependence and traceability.
Since the virus affects the whole country, the solution is only partially divisible. Obviously, distance regulations can only be helpful if everyone adheres to them, so the whole population is part of the solution process. Only dividing the country into different zones makes it possible to relieve some parts. [69]
Regarding monetarization, it can be said that a better economy would definitely ease the situation in Iran. The government would then probably impose stricter restrictions and thus slow down the spread of the virus. Furthermore, the health care system would probably be better developed if the country was richer. [70] At the same time, it can be observed that even in richer countries like France Covid-19 is a big problem and money alone is not enough to solve the problem.
Since Scope refers to how the problem is created, this attribute is not particularly decisive in this case. However, if you see spreading the virus as creating the problem, it is clear that anyone can become part of the creation process.
That is why the interdependence is so high. Iran is dependent on its fellow citizens, but also on other countries that are involved in vaccine research and on international organisations that are supporting the country in the crisis. [71]
Various aspects influence the extent to which the government can achieve its goals, this is called tractability. It should be mentioned that, for example, it is not clear which measures are useful and which are not, thus making it difficult for the government to implement measures. In addition, some steps are very far-reaching and require a major change in the population, which reduces their approval. [72]
Finally, the Political Attributes include Power, Conflict and Salience. Especially since many different areas are affected by the decisions, there are always stakeholders from different sectors who would like to see, for example, the economy allowed to resume in their sector. At the same time, different interests are also at odds with each other, and in Iran there is a conflict between health and economy. [73]
The fact that the virus is a general problem is very clear, because the government in Iran cannot prevent that the news from other countries are also brought into the country. Nevertheless, it is noticeable that the government has long talked the problem down and even if it is an important issue.[74]  [75]  [76]
On the 11th of March 2020 the WHO declared that the Covid 19 virus is a pandemic.[77]
The spread of the corona virus affects the whole world and uncertainty and unpredictability make risky decisions even more difficult. There is a lot of fake news, the stress scratches the mental health of the whole population and gradually more and more people are getting infected with the virus.
To control the virus, a government needs good management and must pay attention to the population and its needs (Zandifar & Badrfam, 2020).[78]  
In Iran, the crisis is further exacerbated by the poor economy. The US sanctions have been weighing on the country for a long time and are now preventing the country from opting for tougher measures simply to prevent the economy from collapsing completely.
Although the health system is more resilient than in most neighboring countries, prevention, testing and treatment are not sufficient and the country has failed to fight the virus. Furthermore, there is a huge lack of medical supplies and despite WHO support, not nearly all patients can be treated (Takian et al., 2020). [79]
In a study, it has now been shown that the different environmental conditions in the country are also responsible for the different rates of virus spread. For example, Covid 19 has spread rapidly, especially in heavily populated regions, with wet weather and little wind.
If the government had adapted its measures to these conditions early on, the spread could possibly have been slowed down. However, it was only later that the government decided to differentiate the measures in the country according to the outbreak rate (Ahmadi et al., 2020). [80]

9 Country's Favourite Stay at Home Song


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