




Universität
Konstanz



Am **Donnerstag, 24.02.2011, 14.15 Uhr**

Findet in **G 307** folgender Vortrag statt:

Dr. Oskari Kuusela

University of East Anglia

"Carnap and the Tractatus' Philosophy of Logic"

Abstract: In this paper I discuss the early Wittgenstein's and Carnap's philosophies of logic and their relation. I argue that Carnap's position in *The Logical Syntax of Language* is much closer to the *Tractatus* than has so far been recognized: a variant of the latter. In Carnapian terms, the *Tractatus*' goal is to introduce, by means of quasi-syntactical sentences, syntactical principles and concepts that constitute a calculus designed for the purpose of philosophical clarification in the formal mode. A distinction corresponding to Carnap's distinction between the material and formal mode is therefore already part of the *Tractatus*' view. Moreover, arguably, a key point of Wittgenstein's saying-showing distinction is to distinguish logico-syntactical determinations from true/false statements, logic being understood as something that is not true/false about either language or reality. Thus construed, however, the saying-showing distinction underlies Carnap's principle of tolerance based on the very idea that logic is not true/false about anything. Similarly, the saying-showing distinction is assumed by Carnap's distinction between object-language and syntax-language. For Wittgenstein's distinction concerns the difference of status between statements in terms of a language and logical determinations concerning that language. This difference is acknowledged rather than rejected when distinguishing between an object- and a syntax-language.

Alle Interessenten, insbesondere auch Studierende, sind herzlich eingeladen.