Can the Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion Support an Emotional-cognitive Balance in Aggressive Juveniles

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Abstract: Making moral decisions in front of social conflicts often overstrains a young person and his/her mental skills. Under stress children are going to show aggressive behavior instead of dealing with conflicts in a reasonable and discursive way. How to protect school-aged children against aggressive behavior? Georg Lind’s Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion (KMDD) seems to be the most efficient educational way in order to reach a mental balance between emotions and cognitive skills in young people. In our paper we refer to the findings of cognitive moral psychology, neurosciences and the developmental-educational psychology by Georg Lind in order to show how moral decision making works and how the KMDD can foster the emotional-cognitive balance in young offenders.

Key Word: KMDD, emotional-cognitive balance, aggressive juveniles.

1. Aggression in the Well-educated Societies

Juvenile aggressive behaviour is observable in modern highly educated societies as well as developing societies. Children today become subjects of autonomous judgments and decisions sooner than in pre-democratic cultures. However, all humans begin to make judgments by following their in-born feelings of rights and justice (Piaget, 1981; Radbruch, 1998, p. 266; Hamlin et al., 2007). Moral affects are relevant for judging. But truly human moral behaviours can only be “driven” (Piaget, 1981) by affects that people can understand, express, exchange with others, and are used to socialize and rationalize (Lind, 2010). The ability to bridge between intuitions and reasoning within interpersonal relationships, by applying right and just rules (Kohlberg, 1964; Apel, 1990; Damasio, 1999), makes people social beings. The question is not, why must education promote...
cognitive abilities like understanding of affects, emotions, moral reasoning, interpersonal perspective taking, dealing with normative conflicts, and deliberating with others respectfully? The question is, “how do people [become] capable of respect and democratic equality?” (Nussbaum 2010: p. 29). In this paper, we would like to consider a “psychological balance,” rather than a political one (p. 29), in order to define the basic work of democratic education. It is basic because democracy cannot be a real lifestyle until people are able to handle their own aggression.

It is not merely that “children who develop a capacity for sympathy or compassion—often through empathetic perspectival experience—understand what their aggression has done to another separate person” (p. 37). According to Nussbaum, “empathy is not [yet] morality” (p. 37) because the latter requires more than feelings and affects. Morality requires a development of cognitive skills which we can support educationally. Immature cognitive structures of moral reasoning in young children can give rise to the formation of aggressive behavioural tendencies.

Affects exist on the pre-reflective level and were defined by Piaget as interests and values (Schiller 2006). They can evoke either positive or negative emotional attitudes. Affects “tune” persons to perceive things, other persons, relationships and social issues. It can be difficult for a child to follow positive affects or rational rules if that child experiences negative emotions within a conflict with peers (especially with peers behaving in a way that is “wrong” in the eyes of the child). As the research demonstrates (Lind, 1993, 1997, 2010a; Oswald, 1996; Ekman, 2003), people with low moral judgment competence and interpersonal perspective taking also have low emotional self-control and decision making ability (especially in front of social controversies). This is a strong reason for early educational fostering of socio-moral skills on the cognitive level. Another reason is that children mostly come from families with unequal educational potential. At five or six years of age, children begin a highly technocratic education in their schools. Of course, humans don’t exist in a purely technical and scientific environment. They exist, first of all, together with other humans and interact with them as moral subjects. Education must promote their socio-moral skills, too. Unfortunately, we are reminded of this human purpose of education when we observe how deeply that interpersonal relationships are destroyed when people lose their affective self-control and begin to behave violently.

In summary, the growth of cognitive competencies seems to have a distinct impact on the growth of emotional self-control (Lind, 2010): both contribute to the development of the key social competencies and, especially, of the competence of solving social conflicts without the use of physical violence.

2. Georg Lind: Aggression as the Lowest Level of Conflict-Solving Competence

Regarding the impact of cognitive competencies on the moral development, the German moral experimental psychologist Georg Lind defines the use of violence as the lowest level of conflict-solving competence (Lind, 1997, 2010, p. 1).

Lind disagrees with the superficial statement that aggression is a lasting “stigmatic” or “devil” attitude of personality. On the contrary, he sees the highest level of conflict-solving competence as a rational and discursive dealing with socio-moral problems in sensu (Habermas e.g.). Rationality is the main control factor in aggressive behaviour. Aggression can result from physiological processes, but there are still “the cognitive processes that decide about how long, how explosive, how strong or how weak the aggressive reaction will be performed” (Lind, 1993, p. 15). Positive correlation between high cognitive competencies and aggression control implies that self-control will increase if moral reasoning is trained using careful didactic with highly stressing sociomoral issues like dilemmas. We would like to examine this didactic implication with reference to some pilot-studies and observations.

In light of the highly authoritarian learning environment in Poland and other countries, we suggest that teachers need to apply a research-based didactic like the Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion (KMDD©) to increase personal aggression control through the development of student’s moral reasoning skills. In this way the “deficient competence of solving problems” (“mangelnde Problemlösfähigkeit”, p. 4) can be educationally strengthened instead of producing “docile citizens who … would follow authority” (Nussbaum, 2010, p. 58) and neither ask questions nor solve social problems together with other-minder persons who are living in the same democratic society.

Aggressive behavioural tendencies among children seem to be additionally stimulated by teachers’ personal authoritarian attributions (applying sanctions, making criticisms, engaging in harassment, etc.). Not having enough aggression-prevention training opportunities, teachers instead contribute to a “spiral of violence” (Lind, 1993, p. 13) and create “a circle of hostile attributions” (p. 13). According to the American psychologist of aggression, Kenneth Dodge, Lind emphasizes that aggressive people stimulate one another to engage in aggressive behaviour. Similar attributional stimulation can take place in child-parent, child-teacher, and peer relationships. However, people can (and should) stimulate one another to engage in rational and discursive behaviour being the highest level of conflict-solving competence (Lind, 2010). Can teachers promote moral and discourse competencies in students’ minds?

Yes, they can use Georg Lind’s professional method, the so-called “Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion” (KMDD©). Lind developed his method 30 years ago. He also constructed the “Moral Judgment Test” (MUT©, N = 1; Lind, 2004) being a highly precise experimental instrument of measuring both affective and cognitive aspect of moral judgmental behaviour. A KMDD-teacher introduces a moral dilemmatic story being a task for participants. Participants have to deal with their emotions getting involved in the individual and collective reflection on dilemmas that the story contains. Step by step they process and re-construct their intuitive judgments on the discourse level. Being confronted with controversial opinions they learn how to deal with their own emotions, and how to respect the emotions of others. An affect regulation will be trained. Participants have to observe two discourse-rules: the “respect-rule” and the “ping-pong rule” (Lind, 2009) which protect them against physical and oral aggression. This is the reason why the KMDD can support personal emotional self-regulation which seems to be crucial in reactive aggression prevention.

3. Reactive Aggression

Lind and Dodge both refer to reactive aggression as the most common aggression type in school-aged children. “Reactive aggression has been conceptualized as a fear-induced, irritable, and hostile affect-laden defensive response to provocation” (Dodge, 1991; see also Meloy, 1988). Further, reactive aggression “involves a lack of inhibitory functions, reduced self-control, and increased impulsivity” (Atkins et al., 1993; see Raine et al., 1998). In contrast to proactive aggression, reactive aggression requires a high level of emotions and a
low level of self-control, resistance to provocation and frustration. It is also characterized by feelings of guilt and outbursts of anger when one is confronted with an interpersonal conflict. As Ekman assumes, “when anger is intense, we may not initially know, or even want to know, that we have become angry.” (Ekman, 2003, p. 121). All the characteristics refer to the law of rational self-control of emotions. However, “it is not that we are unable to take a step back and consider whether we want to go along and act on our anger. Rather, we are not even aware of being angry, even though we are speaking angry words and engaging in angry actions”, as Ekman highlights (p. 121). Strong emotions “drive” (in Piaget’s terms) one’s behaviour immediately, before being reflected or deliberated upon: rational affect regulation doesn’t occur in this situation. In contrast, “the main benefit of being aware of and attentive to our angry feelings is the opportunity to regulate or suppress our reactions, reevaluate the situation, and plan the actions most likely to remove the source of our anger.” (p. 121).

From a viewpoint of Georg Lind’s Dual-Aspect Theory (Lind, 2010), in such an anger evoking situation, the balance between affective and cognitive aspects of one’s judgmental behavior is disturbed. By observing personal reactions and behaviors within interpersonal conflicts and dilemmatic situations, we can assume that this kind of situations mostly arouse strong emotional reactions and especially emotional dissonances in the mind.

Being confronted with social conflicts, under stress, one makes judgments and decisions which are based on one’s internal feelings. They can be positive or negative (Hamlin, 2007). Positive moral feelings are, for example, acceptance, “the feeling of respect” (Piaget, 1981), and the feeling that another person is right in his/her opinion or decision. Negative moral feelings are, for example, anger, feelings of revenge, and the feeling that one’s opponent is wrong in his/her opinion or decision. The moral “sense of rightness” (Radbruch, 1999) and interpersonal “feeling of justice” (Piaget, 1981; Lind, 2009) seem to be strongly connected to the basic structures of moral judging (de Souza, 1980, Solomon, 1983, Nussbaum, 2000) as to the in-born basic moral intuitions (Hamlin, 2007). From the perspective of Lind’s Dual-Aspect Theory moral feelings have a strong effect on our moral decisions. “But because they are at first very vague and undifferentiated, they are scarcely in a position to guide us in dealing with the complicated moral problems … They have to be linked to our understanding. They must be re-constructed at the level of oral … communication so that young people can communicate their moral feelings adequately and understand the feelings of others. … Morality is a product of the human intellect … To this end shared experiences and cooperation are necessary” (Lind, 2010). Being confronted with everyday social conflicts, young people need to be strengthened in their moral judgment competence. Lind warns, “As we have seen, strong moral affects are a necessary precondition for moral behavior, but they are also potentially contrary to reason” (Lind, 2010a).

Reactive aggression prevention requires that people learn to understand and “re-construct” (Lind, 2010a) their emotions and beliefs on the verbal and rational level. If one uses one’s cognitive powers (Kant, 1994, p. 249) in moral decision making, he or she can avoid of to be guided by blind emotions. On the other hand, the contemporary psychologists see a source of aggression in the low emotional level too.

4. Proactive Aggression

Dodge notes that, “Proactive aggression in the human and animal literature has been characterized as instrumental, organized, and ‘cold-blooded’, with little evidence of autonomic arousal” (Dodge 1991, pp. 374-393). In proactive aggression, a low need for social contacts with peers and adults, a low affective level, and a low intrinsic motivation occur together. Proactive aggression is “characterized by … blunted affect, and stimulation seeking tendencies” (pp. 374-393). As Olweus states, proactive aggression seems to be rooted in cognitive and intentional processes (Olweus, 1994, pp. 97-130); it can be an indicator of future delinquent behavior, too.

We agree with Piaget (1981) that the “affective primacy” and “affective exchange” (Piaget 1976, p. 8; 1981, pp. 11-74) with other persons are necessary preconditions of the development of moral judgment competence. With a tendency towards proactive aggression, people don’t experience moral feelings sufficiently. They don’t cultivate “affective exchange” within their reduced interpersonal relationships. Moral affects have no impact on their moral judgments and decisions. On one hand, those people seem to understand the meaning of social rules quite adequately; on the other hand, they cannot evaluate the moral validity of these rules on the affective level. So they “know” the qualifications like “wrong” and “right” in abstract only, without using the “sense of rightness” (Radbruch) or the “feeling of justice” (Piaget). Persons with a low emotional level don’t feel an “affective content” of their moral orientations (Lind, 2010c, p. 33). Evaluational act, that usually begin from inside, is probably reduced in the case of proactive aggression. Of course moral principles and judgments “are to be understood ultimately as universal constructions… rather than… internal emotions” (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 184), however, we can experience their validity in an affective way only. It depends on the feeling, how well we follow our internal principles.

5. Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion and its impact on the moral judgment competence of aggressive persons: A pilot study

Dilemma discussion seems to be recommendable as training for participants with the low affective level, too. In order to protect against the development of intentional (proactive) aggression, it is important to observe the “early starters” (Lösel, 2008, p. 4) such as reduced emotional relationships between a child and other persons, and social exclusion and discrimination. Inclusion in KMDD-sessions can activate moral affects in the child during dilemma presentation and plenary discussion in a way that participants will be confronted with controversial social issues and fully involved in the inter-personal “affective exchange”.

It is truly challenging for the brain to deal with dilemmatic reasoning. Solving conflicts and engaging in dilemmatic reasoning evoke a dissonance in the cerebral cortex. A functional magnetic resonance imaging study by Prehn et al. (2008), for instance, has shown that individual differences in moral judgment competence modulate the brain network involved in moral judgment, and, in particular, that a low moral judgment competence is reflected in enhanced activity of the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. This means that these conflict solving and reasoning activities strengthen the moral judgment ability in the right DLFC where socio-moral emotions and reflections meet. “This finding is also interesting in light of evidence suggesting that patients with right prefrontal lesions are characterized by the inability to behave in normatively appropriate ways despite the fact that they possess the judgmental abilities necessary for normative behavior, supporting the importance of right prefrontal areas for normatively appropriate
how difficult it is to protect the moral judgment of young offenders against diminishing factors during penalization. We would like to remark that the cognitive moral skills of young offenders in the penal and reforming institutions are low (see Figure 1). Offering dilemma-discussion training in a reforming institution (with integrated high school), we have initiated a project “Aggression Prevention with the KMDD” (M. Schillinger, E. Nowak, & A. Urbanska 2009. see Figure 2). We achieved a growth of 10 C-points after six KMDD-sessions (measurement instrument: MJT, Lind, 2004, 2010); aggressive emotions and violent behaviour data were self-reported and observed with the help of the Reactive-Proactive Aggression Questionnaire (Raine & Dodge 2006). However, we collected both reactive and proactive aggressions data together, without making distinction here; violent behaviour observations were reported by class teachers with the help of the Gasteiger-Form.

As a result of (1) this neuroscientific research, (2) the long-standing KMDD-and MJT research, (3) the affective-cognitive parallelism by Piaget and Lind, (Lind 2002, 2010b), and (4) the educational Dual-Aspect Theory (Lind, 2002, 2009, 2010b) we suggest that professional dilemma discussions can strengthen moral judgment competence in both affective and cognitive aspect. Additionally, a higher moral judgment competence seems to be correlated with a low level of reactive and proactive aggression tendencies. Longitudinal studies (Hemmerling & Scharlipp, 2009, 2010) have shown a strong correlation between low moral judgment competence, social rules breaking and delinquency in both juvenile and adult offenders. Hemmerling and Scharlipp also demonstrated how efficient can be the KMDD as an innovative rehabilitation method.

The Authors suggest that the implementation of the Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion at an early school age would be an efficient protection against the development of aggressive behavioural tendencies in children and adolescents because “antisocial behavior is a particularly frequent problem during childhood and a predictor of later criminality” (Lösel & Beelman, 2007, pp. 84-109). Hemmerling’s KMDD-research findings in German penal institutions (Hemmerling, 2010) demonstrate how difficult it is to protect the moral judgment competence of young offenders against diminishing factors during penalization. We would like to remark that the cognitive moral skills of young offenders in the penal and reforming institutions are low (see Figure 1). Offering dilemma-discussion training in a reforming institution (with integrated high school), we have initiated a project “Aggression Prevention with the KMDD” (M. Schillinger, E. Nowak, & A. Urbanska 2009. see Figure 2). We achieved a growth of 10 C-points after six KMDD-sessions (measurement instrument: MJT, Lind, 2004, 2010); aggressive emotions and violent behaviour data were self-reported and observed with the help of the Reactive-Proactive Aggression Questionnaire (Raine & Dodge 2006). However, we collected both reactive and proactive aggressions data together, without making distinction here; violent behaviour observations were reported by class teachers with the help of the Gasteiger-Form.

This diagram (Hemmerling, 2010) demonstrates the relatively low C-scores (C = moral judgment Competence, see Lind 2004, Lind, & Wakenhut, 2010, Lind, 2010a) of juvenile offenders in Germany. In the penal institutions combined with schools the C-score of juvenile offenders is higher. However, Hemmerling has measured a regression of the moral judgment competence in offenders during the penalisation period (Hemmerling, 2010).

In collaboration with Marcia Schillinger (German Psychologist) and Kay Hemmerling (Konstanz – Berlin) the authors have tested the KMDD in one of the Polish reforming houses for juvenile female offenders who can finish their basic education during the penalisation time. We have organized seven KMDD-sessions there (between 2009, October and 2010, May).

This pilot study shows that young delinquent females with higher self-control of reactive aggression effect on their behaviour (blue line) achieve much better results from the training than females with low self-control (red line). Both groups have self-declared strong anxious emotions in everyday situations. Additionally, all females were observed eight months long by three teachers. KMDD-instructors have observed that the “blue group” actively participated in all phases of dilemma-discussions and showed high emotional self-control even when confronted with dilemmatic moral issues and opposite opinions. In contrast, the “red group” often showed anxious emotions and had problems expressing their affects. However, all participants were highly engaged throughout the dilemma-presentations and a few minutes afterwards. They often asked for more dilemma-stories just “to listen”. Expressing and understanding their intuitions was difficult for them.

In a parallel Swiss group (twenty year old students, multiethnic class, learning problems, low German-language competency, reactive aggression and small amount of delinquency reported by class teachers) we observed two different phenomena: after two dilemma-discussions, boys controlled their excessive emotions much better than at the beginning of our intervention. And girls became more and more active in the discussions: their speeches and arguments were noticeably longer and well ordered with time. Girls learned to speak, and boys learned to listen. We never observed anxious behaviour in the classroom. At the end of the KMDD-intervention, both girls and boys appreciated “the different viewpoints because it is really interesting to know them”. Even very shy children and children sitting at corner tables cooperated with others (in contrast to the strong exclusion that we observed earlier). Our research findings (using the same measurement instruments) show growth of moral judgment competence particularly among girls (over 10 C-points). We suggest that dilemma-discussion training at an early school age can help children to understand and “construct” (Lind 2010) their affects, and to strengthen their cognitive skills in this way. Additionally, moral and democratic education would achieve their ends much easier if teachers were encouraged to apply the highly efficient didactic principles of the Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion in other school subjects as well. Dilemmatic thinking and solving of social behaviors.
controversies requires an efficient dealing with dilemmatic affects. “In order to maintain affects at
an optimal level for learning phases of challenge
and support alternate in the KMDD. The course of a
KMDD session is described in detail in the teacher’s
manual. By means of a fine adjustment of these
phases an experienced KMDD teacher can success-
fully maintain the emotional state of the students
in his class at a level which provides an optimal ‘window’
for learning. It has never been observed that students
fall asleep or are inattentive over long periods of time
during KMDD sessions or that they become over-
excited or aggressive, even in the case of difficult
students and in the treatment of difficult dilemmas”
(Lind, 2010). Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discus-
sion (KMDD©) supports both affect regulation and
reflection in the school-aged persons. It seems to be
the most efficient way of how to bring mental skills to
a balance. And this is why we can assume that mor-
mature persons not only show the “high judgment
consistency” but also “the ability to cope with moral
conflicts” (Lind, Sandberger & Bargel, 2010, p. 64) in
a rational and discursive way, without violence and
fears.

Notes:
① Raine & Dodge Questionnaire allowed only for the pilot-use
by M. Schilling and B. Gastiger, Germany.

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