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Georg Lind (Ed.)

MORALITY, COGNITION, EDUCATION


Projekt:
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Georg Lind (Ed.)

MORALITY, COGNITION, EDUCATION


Konstanz, 1984
Epilogue, 36 years later

I am surprised how up-to-date most of the contributions to this event still are. We humbly announced the event as a workshop talk ("Werkstattgespräch"), but it turned out to be a kind of summit of the top experts on the nature, relevance, development and education of moral competence at that time, if I may exempt myself from this praise.

I take advantage of this epilogue to draw the reader’s attention to the many new publications on this topic which are listed on my web-site:
https://www.uni-konstanz.de/ag-moral/

May I especially mention my own book, which has seen its fourth edition in German, and its second edition in English, and also editions in Spanish, Greek, Korean and Chinese:

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Editor's Preface

The papers collected here are based on the presentations and discussions at the Zweite Konstanzer Werkstattgespräch zu Moral und Umwelt at the University of Konstanz, which was this time held jointly with the Fourth MOSAIC conference.

All presentations (position papers) have been thoroughly revised and considerably shortened. The original versions and additional documents can be obtained directly from the authors (see the list of participants in the appendix). To all papers written comments have been invited. The number of comments submitted for this document does not reflect the quantity of discussion allotted to each position paper during the conference, though they reflect excellently the spirit of the lively and fair discussions at the meeting.

Two papers by participants have been added. Uwe Gielen's report on the conference, written for the "Moral Education Forum," introduces into both the MOSAIC group and the position papers. Reinhard Hesse was invited to contribute as an epilogue his paper on "Ethics in the global crisis."

I like to thank all authors for their cooperation, the research project "Hochschulsozialisation" at the University of Konstanz and its director, Professor Hansgert Peisert, for their support, and Leonore Link for her assistance in organizing the conference.

Konstanz, Dec. 1984

G. Lind
Report on the Meeting

Uwe Gielen

More than thirty participants from Belgium, Canada, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Israel, Switzerland and the U.S.A. met from July 17-20, 1984 for the fourth MOSAIC ("Moral and Social Action Colloquium") Conference, held jointly with the Konstanzer Werkstattgespräche zu Moral and Umwelt (Konstanz Workshop Discussions about Morality and Environment). Georg Lind had organized the conference at the University of Konstanz, beautifully situated in Southern Germany near the Lake of Constance.

MOSAIC, an interdisciplinary group of about 75 philosophers, psychologists and social scientists, has traditionally had it's center of activities in England. MOSAIC conferences tend to be small. Before a meeting, a limited number of position papers are circulated among conference participants and discussion papers are elicited. At the conference itself, much time is provided for free wheeling discussions and informal contacts. Discussions are held in the English language.

The papers at the Konstanz meeting included both theoretical papers and research reports. Helen Weinreich-Haste (University of Bath, England) gave a broadly based report on "Moral action, moral responsibility and extraordinary moral responsibility." Basing her paper on real life and fictional case studies she attempted to demonstrate a network of relationships between moral affect, triggering events, reflection, cognitive construction and reconstruction, judgments of responsibility, and action. Tom Wren (Loyola University, USA) gave a philosophical paper on "The metamotivational function of moral ideals." The paper construct a hierarchical model in which ego ideals are seen as second order, reflective self-evaluations that coordinate and judge potentially conflicting first order, "simple" desires and motives.

Fritz Oser and Wolfgang Althof (University of Fribourg, Switzerland) related moral decision making to different life spheres. They ordered life spheres according to the degree of physical, social, and normative pressures impinging on moral actors. Con-
sistency between moral judgment and relevant actions might be expected to be low in situations of great pressures ("one's bare life"), fairly low in social environments with coercive norms, but higher in situations where cooperative norms prevail. The argument is somewhat reminiscent of Maslow's theory of a hierarchy of needs set in relationship to depriving or supportive environments. Georg Lind (University of Konstanz, Germany) claimed in his paper that cognitive developmental models of socialization can better account for changes in university and college students than can traditional models of attitude change. While cognitive-developmental theories treat of successful socialization as reflecting cognitive-affective transformations in students' meaning systems and personalities, attitude theories misinterpret and reduce complex changes in human behavior patterns to quantitative, affective changes in the intensity of attitudes.

Ian Vine (University of Bradford, England) suggested that Kohlberg's principled moral reasoning Stage 5 may be a developmental myth, lacking empirical evidence as well as theoretical "authenticity". He pointed out that in cross-cultural studies only a very few respondents have been scored at Stage 5 using the new scoring manual by Colby et al. This may reflect cultural biases in test construction, lack of ecological validity for typical Kohlbergian dilemmas, etc. At the same time, the paper suggested the possibility of simulation of Stage 5 responses for non-moral or immoral reasons, such as self presentation, Machiavellian disguise of ethnocentrism and egocentrism, etc. No new, cross-cultural data were presented in the paper. Ben Bradley (The Polytechnic, England) advocated a shift away from the individualistic, rationally oriented approach to morality exemplified by formalist philosophy and psychology, towards an analysis of "discursive practices" that emerge from and reproduce society wide power-relations. Following the French historian Foucault, language is here seen as a crucially important regulating device at the intersection between knowledge and ideological-moral justifications of institutionally patterned inequalities.

Lucien Kern, Heinz-Ulrich Kohr and Hans-Georg Räder (Social Scientific Institute of the German Armed Forces) provided
empirical data about the origin of new social movements in Germany. Their paper attempts to link behavior in the prisoner's dilemma, moral judgment levels and perceptions about the future to participation in various new German social movements. Ralph Briechele and Helmut Fend (University of Konstanz) reported results from a large scale study of German adolescents. Moral judgment is shown to be linked to political attitudes, judgments and comprehension of democratic processes in a theoretically meaningful way.
Moral Action, Moral Responsibility and Extraordinary Moral Responsibility

Helen Weinreich-Haste

Affect, Action, and Responsibility

Real-life moral dilemmas involve affect. The individual is engaged emotionally in the situation. The situation is a crisis; some resolution is required, and it impinges cognitively and effectively on the individual until that resolution is achieved. However, affect tends to be treated as an intervening variable; between cognition and action. It energises action, or alternatively, it impedes action - I ought to, but I don't feel like it and/or I fear the consequences to myself.

Cognitivist models have virtually pushed affect off the scene. In Kohlberg's recent statements of the relationship between cognition and action, the intervening (cognitive) variable is responsibility (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984). The higher the individual's moral stage, the more she perceives the responsibility to act consistently with the moral decision made in the situation. Thus the individual a) progressively through the stages sees herself as being more involved in the situation, and b) progressively integrates her perception of the moral issue and her perception of action necessary to deal with it. This model conforms to the cognitive-developmental theoretical framework closely in its delineation of greater differentiation of cognitive understanding (the appreciation that one is an agent in a situation in which one is involved) and greater integration (coming together of deontic judgments and judgments about the responsibility for action). There is no space in this model for dealing with affect as a significant factor in the equation.

This paper presents a tentative model of moral crisis resolution, and tries to look at the role of affect in the dynamics of action, cognition and reflection upon action, and cognition. It focusses on the concept of 'moral responsibility.' There are certain kinds of morality which involve the individual in a
private struggle with his or her conscience; resistance to temptation, acting with integrity in regard to a principle etc., which require moral 'strength,' but which do not imply responsibility. Moral responsibility involves public rather than private morality. The individual exercising it is taking upon herself the task of intervening, acting on behalf of others etc.

Moral responsibility has three components; vision, efficacy and commitment. The individual must, firstly, perceive the situation to be one in which there are problems involving moral issues. The evidence from several studies does seem to indicate that this kind of perception is stage-linked. Efficacy has two parts; believing one can be effective, and knowing how to be effective. Believing that one can be efficacious is more than "knowing how to:" it requires an appreciation of the legitimacy of one's personal action.

Commitment varies. Some people give up much in their lives in order to direct all their energies to the Cause; they feel responsible for putting themselves wholly to the service of those aims. Commitment is thus the action extension of efficacy. In more "ordinary" situations, the commitment is briefer and more limited; the voice raised in protest at the appropriate moment, the regular contribution of time or money.

The Experimental Evidence and Some Comments on Kohlberg's Interpretation

In Kohlberg and Candee's (1984) review of the role of responsibility as the mediating variable between cognition and action, three studies by Haan, Smith and Block (1968), by McNamee (1977), and by Milgram (1965), are discussed. All three studies produced clear evidence of a relationship between moral stage and action - in the case of the Haan et al. study, action meant participating in, and being arrested at, the Free Speech Movement Sit-In of 1964; in the McNamee study, action meant assisting a 'distressed drug-user' who 'interrupted' an experiment (really an accomplice of the experimenter); in the Milgram study, action meant resisting the pressure of the experimenter to inflict electric shocks. They also demonstrated that perception of personal responsibility increased with moral stage (Table 1).
Table 1. Relationship Between Responsibility and Action (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage:</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>3/4</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>4/5</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haan et al. study:</td>
<td>N:</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief that Sitting In was right</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students arrested</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McNamee study:</td>
<td>N:</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thought they were responsible for helping</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helped by referral</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personally helped</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From: Kohlberg and Candee, 1984

This evidence of cognitive processes indicates the importance of perception - or 'vision' - in the way that a problem or situation is conceived as a moral (or political) issue. But perception by itself does not constitute moral responsibility; what is missing is engagement, efficacy, and commitment.

In the biographies of people who have experienced crises and moral responsibility, certain common themes emerge. The first common theme is a crisis or triggering event. This is not necessarily a moral crisis, but an event which changes the role of the individual from being a bystander, an observer, to being a participant, personally touched by the situation. The first biography, "Sandra's" brief account of her conversion to vegetarianism, appears in the following interview.

S: (talking about conscience). I'm a vegetarian. It started when I went to France. I lived in a butcher's for two weeks. It was then that I realised how you kill things and cook things and that was a matter of conscience whether I should eat meat or not. I don't eat any at all now. That's the highest conscience thing I've ever done.

I: What was the situation that made you change your mind?

S: First of all, as I say I was in France; the fact that they cooked meat on the outside and it's burnt and you cut it open and it just sort of bleeds. That put me off for a start and that wasn't really anything to do with conscience it was the actual idea of it.
When I came back to England I still couldn't eat meat because I just couldn't think of actually eating an animal, especially the way in which they are killed. If you're in a survival position then it's slightly different. But like farmers in industry where it just goes through and they're just killing all those animals, then I think that's wrong.

I: Why do you think it's wrong?
S: Because the animals themselves haven't really had a life. We're just breeding them to kill them. I just can't face eating something like that which has been killed in that way and hasn't had its own life.

The triggering event for Sandra was being suddenly in close proximity to the slaughtering of meat while on a French exchange trip. Now obviously Sandra was aware that the meat on the table at home had once been living flesh, but the knowledge had never touched her personally; she had no affective reaction to this knowledge.

Sandra's first response was aesthetic. She felt revolted and sickened - strong affect, but not at that point a moral affect. But the importance of this reaction is that it led to engagement; through her affective response Sandra became involved in thinking about the issue of killing animals for meat.

A number of options were open to her, for example denial - compartmentalising her reaction as "an unpleasant foreign experience." Or affective catharsis - making a joke or horror story out of it. Instead she began to reflect cognitively upon her affect; thus creating a little disequilibrium in her cognition. She began to see it as a) a moral issue, and b) an issue on which she could exercise some personal responsibility.

In consequence of this, the nature of her affect changed. She began to experience moral affect. Her reaction, expressed as 'I just can't face eating something like that which has been killed in that way and hasn't had its own life,' is no longer an aesthetic response, it is a moral feeling, which has clearly a substantive element of moral cognition behind it; she has coordinated the general issues of the right of humans to kill animals, the quality of life and even the exception of the survival situation, in her cognitions about the situation. Out of this has arisen some action; she has consciously decided to take the responsibility not to eat meat herself.

Sandra's current moral stage of thought is 3/4. Becoming affectively engaged in the situation is a significant part of the
progress to action, but only because she could exercise a certain level of moral cognition upon the issue. But I would argue that without the affective engagement she would not have perceived the situation as one in which she had any responsibility at all, even though she did possess all along the knowledge about both the facts and the moral dimensions of meat production.

The second biography is "Jane the Feminist." Jane is a mother of two children. She has begun part-time work again, and is also doing some studying which she hopes will give her better qualifications and increase her job prospects.

Suddenly she finds herself pregnant. She realises that if she carries the baby full term she will set back her career prospects by another five years. She decides to have an abortion, and is surprised that her husband is less keen on the idea, and seems not to understand that having another baby will conflict with her growing independence and work-orientation. Jane seeks an abortion through her own doctor, but quickly discovers that although abortion is legal, as married woman in good health does not qualify for abortion on 'social' grounds. She is referred to a private clinic where she has to put on an act of being "mentally unstable" and unable to cope - effectively a lie.

After the abortion she feels distressed and humiliated, and because of his ambivalence, finds her husband less than sympathetic. She joins a support group of women who have shared the same experience. Jane begins to see her private experience as part of a wider pattern of gender role. She becomes involved in protests, support groups - and also becomes more determined to gain the qualifications which will give her economic independence. Her increasing understanding of practical politics has led to her appreciation of wider social issues.

As with Sandra, Jane had a pre-existing cognitive structure which would enable her to develop a complex moral and political argument about gender role, abortion rights and so forth, but it was not a salient issue for her. The triggering event is her abortion, which gives rise to a number of affects, none of which, again, is strictly 'moral.'

The support group gives her the basis for reflecting on her affect and legitimating it, so that she comes to see her private experience and response as part of an unequal system of sex
roles. So she begins to see the issue in moral and political terms; her anger at the medical profession and her husband becomes more moral affect. She sees them as (albeit unwitting) agents in the system. At the same time, she is beginning to realise that she must take responsibility for her moral and political affect. She is also beginning to take more responsibility for her own life. She is restructuring her cognitions about the moral and political world, not only using her cognitions to inform her moral affect. Gradually, her raised political consciousness alters her view of the parameters involved in the situation. Her cognitive structures expand and decalage occurs. As she becomes involved in more forms of action, she both applies and tests the expansion of her cognitive appreciation.

For many people, a plateau of moral/political affect is reached (see Figure 1). Responsibility and its consequent action implications becomes habitual - maybe even for a lifetime. However, for some people the effect of frustration and the limitations on achievable goals lead to a further redefinition, a further transformation of cognitions and a significant change in the kind of responsibility that the individual feels. This transformation constitutes 'extraordinary' moral responsibility; at this point the individual feels not only 'I must act' but 'only I can do this thing.' This represents a shift in efficacy, the belief that one is peculiarly able (or 'chosen') to perform the necessary task. It is at this point that people make major changes in their lives.

The third case history comes from Kohlberg's longitudinal study. Lenny came from a conservative background but gradually became more liberal in late adolescence. While studying in London for a year, he experienced a transformation in his political thinking which was reflected in the ways that he became committed and responsible for taking action.
Figure 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Variables</th>
<th>Cognition</th>
<th>Affect</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
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<tr>
<td>TRIGGERING EVENT</td>
<td>PERCEPTION OF SITUATION MEDITATED BY EXISTING MORAL/SOCIAL COGNITION</td>
<td>IMMEDIATE NON-MORAL AFFECT: ANGER FEAR ETC.</td>
<td>DENIAL, DIFFUSION</td>
<td>SENSE THAT ONE SHOULD MAKE VOICE HEARD, SUPPORT EXISTING INSTITUTIONS DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE CHANGE</td>
</tr>
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<td>LOCATION OF AFFECTIVE RESPONSE IN EXISTING WORLD VIEW: COGNITIVE RECONSTRUCTURAL LEGITIMATION OF AFFECT</td>
<td>MORAL AFFECT EFFICACY</td>
<td>REFLECTION ON AFFECT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ATTACHMENT TO &quot;YELLOW SUFFERERS&quot;</td>
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FURTHER FRUSTRATION/ ESCALATING EVENT

PERCEPTION THAT ACTION IS EFFECTIVE: CONSIDERATION OF RECONSTRUCTED AND ELABORATED COGNITION

PERCEPTION THAT ACTION IS INEFFECTIVE, EXTENDED RECONSTRUCTION OF COGNITION (STAGE CHANGE)

CONSOLIDATION OF COGNITIVE STRUCTURES RECOGNISING MORAL/POLITICAL IMPERATIVES AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY

MORAL AFFECT AT LEVEL OF COMMITMENT, INCREASED EFFICACY

ESCALATION OF ACTION/INVolVEMENT

CONVICTION OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND EFFICACY "ONLY I CAN DO THIS"

WHOLESALE COMMITMENT AND LIFE CHANGE: "DEDICATION"
Lenny:
I started to come out of the (home suburb) conservative environment and gradually by the time I was a senior I'd become what you would call a contemporary liberal American and before that time I had been a Goldwaterite and very conservative, exhibiting the effects of the community ... when I went away to London ... I really became radicalised, it was a very turbulent year there; LSE (London School of Economics) was closed for 25 days, and the British authorities blamed it on American students. I started to do some work under Professor X in political sociology and all of a sudden I saw things not in terms of being harmonious, but I saw a lot of conflict going on in society and I started to think about it in that perspective. What was violent and what was in terms of being quieter. And then I came back and taught in the inner city for a year, and I was further radicalised.

"Extraordinary" Moral Responsibility

I now want to move on to the case histories of people who show "extraordinary" moral responsibility and commitment.

Helen John is one of the pioneers of the Greenham Common protest against the siting of American Cruise missiles on British soil. In a television interview in November 1983, Helen John talked about the sequence of events in her own life which had led to the change from being a professional midwife, married with five children, to making a total commitment to the Greenham Common protest. The Greenham Common protest began with a march, planned to last ten days, from Cardiff to the airbase. However, the indifference and trivialisation by the Press led to escalation of the final protest at the base, and to the decision by some of the women to make a long-term protest by remaining. The protest camp has subsequently been continually harassed by police and bailiffs. The 'triggering event' for Helen John was a sudden insight, accompanied by strong emotion:

I was driving on my way through beautiful scenery in Wales where I live and it suddenly occurred to me how this would all be altered in a nuclear war. And it just stopped me dead in my tracks. I couldn't keep driving, I had to stop and I felt really physically very unwell. And I was crying. I sat for about three quarters of an hour before I could continue the journey. I was scared sick, really scared. And then I felt terribly angry that any lunatic could put so much fear and pressure on one people. And I knew that the fear I was experiencing was minute compared to so many other people's fears.
Her experience altered her perception of the nuclear issue, she found she could no longer believe in the myth of deterrence. She perceived that the 'defensive' stockpiling of nuclear weapons was in fact preparation for war. This was the immediate effect of her cognitive reconstruction, but she also changed her perception of the role of protest and of efficacy:

I think it was on that particular day that I realised you could actually stop this happening if you put some effort into it. And I think that day changed me a lot.

The process began then continued:

My own understanding of the situation grew daily and my determination to make my contribution to stop it grew daily. You make a decision that you will no longer cooperative with a system that is designed to kill other people.

When she read about the proposed Greenham march she decided to joint it: she saw this as part of her increasing sense of personal efficacy:

Prior to that I had never seen the value of marching anywhere. It didn't seem to achieve anything. But I was sufficiently worried on this particular issue to go on the march, and make my own personal statement. And it was during the course of this march that I changed.

The marchers decided, after arriving at Greenham, to stay there indefinitely.

The moment it was suggested (to stay on) I knew that I wanted to take the initiative. It was completely right for me. And it was also really the very first totally independent decision I had made for myself in twenty years. Because I wasn't going to consult my husband or any other person. It had to be my own decision.

Her conviction of personal responsibility is evident in that quotation, but she elaborated it:

I remember Douglas (husband) saying to me very clearly, there must be other women who haven't got five children who can do what you're doing. But it's not true; there's only one of me. Nobody can do exactly what I'm doing in the way I'm doing it. Only I can do that. Every individual has their own contribution to make in the way they uniquely can make it.

This is a statement of a commitment involving her, not merely a statement of what ought, impartially, to be done. We can see, from even these brief extracts from the interview, a progression from affect in response to the triggering event - fear and then anger. Then she begins to reflect upon her affect and on the situation which has precipitated that effect, and her perception is reconstructed. This leads to a strong moral affect - that the
situation is wrong. She also begins to believe that not only has she personally some responsibility to try to do something about it, but that she can be efficacious in doing so. So she joins a collective protest - action initiated by others but to which she can add her voice. This is of course the point which many people reach, the impetus to legitimated action which provides an expression of moral affect, and which contributes to the possible achievement of some goal.

But the important transformation occurred in Helen at Greenham itself. Suddenly it became her own responsibility to continue the protest; she saw herself as particularly efficacious. She has carried through that responsibility for action over the years, including accepting a prison sentence. Her perceptions of her changing values also indicate re-construction rather than complete change: 'I was very apprehensive about breaking the law because I believe in upholding the law; that's why I'm trying to uphold a moral law.' Consequently, she regards serving a prison sentence as an inevitable part of the protest.

In Helen John we can see the interaction between non-moral affect, cognitive reflection, moral affect arising from that, and eventual cognitive transformation which places her own responsibility for action at the centre rather than the periphery, of the situation.

In the final case history, I am selecting one event in the life of Gandhi (Erikson, 1969). When Gandhi went to South Africa after his training in Britain, to become a practising barrister, he had the expectation of an 'establishment professional life.' However he already had an image of himself as a reformer, arising from his religious convictions and his quest for personal virtue.

The incident with which I am concerned is the well-known train journey through Natal. As a professional he travelled first class on the train - and encountered racism; a white fellow-traveller demanded that Gandhi be ejected from the first class carriage. The conductor told Gandhi to travel in third class, he refused, and was put off the train. Accounts indicate that Gandhi's response to this "triggering" event was, understandably, anger and shock - not at first a moral response, but straightforward ego-related affect. However, he soon turned to a concern for the conditions of Indians in Africa, and he spent the following
year organising the Indians of Southern African into an effective political pressure group, using his lawyer's skills.

What distinguished Gandhi from other reformers and activists, even at the age of twenty three, was that he was convinced that he was the only person equipped to deal with the situation.

Conclusions

In this paper I have proposed a model for the relationship between perceived responsibility for action, action itself, and the consequence of engaging in action for making possible the extension of affective experience and enlargement of the potential for cognitive appraisal. I have tried to give attention to the role of affect as a reaction to experience, in engaging the individual, capturing her attention, and creating a state of disequilibrium which, when reflected upon, both makes the cognitions about the situation more salient to the individual, and more integrated into her personal experience. Moral affect (as opposed to reactive affect) is thus the consequence of cognition, and of reactive affect upon which there has been reflective cognition.

Moral responsibility as I have used it in the model, is, as with Kohlberg's view, an intervening variable between cognition and action. Moral responsibility is a cognitive process as Kohlberg shows even to perceive one's own responsibility requires a certain level of moral complexity. But it is also an affective process: it arises out of the engagement of the individual in the situation, and it depends also on the individual feeling efficacious. Efficacy is a cognitive process also - knowing how I can, and believing that I can - but to feel responsible, to be impelled to act, requires a sense of engagement which is, I argue, an affective consequence of the engagement process.

I will now recap on the model I presented in Figure 1, drawing together the material from the biographies. The first element in the model is the pre-existing moral stage of the individual, her cognitive structures within which she constructs meaning for her experience. The relevance of stage of thinking to the situation of moral crisis emerges clearly from all the available data; a situation is perceived differently depending on
one's moral stage. Other 'baseline' variables which become significant at later stages of the model are the individual's general sense of efficacy. For two of the main components of the model, vision and efficacy, pre-existing characteristics of the individual's view of her relationship to others and the world in general are important.

The triggering event sets the process in motion. Usually outside the individual's control, it is the catalyst of the individual's engagement. It is the fact that the event touches the individual in some way that is significant. The response to the triggering event is, as we have seen, affect, and I have stressed that this affect is "reactive" rather than "moral." The affect engages the individual, makes the individual see herself as a part of the situation. Sandra felt disgust, Helen felt fear and anger, Gandhi felt anger and hurt pride.

The action taken in response to the affect is the next phase of the sequence. The individual may diffuse the affect in various ways, denying, controlling, or defended against it. Or engaging in catharsis of some sort - for example through humour.

The process of translating affect into cognition, making it possible to reflect on the situation and reconstruct one's view of it, depends on some action. Helen joined a march, Jane joined a group in order to heal her wounds, Gandhi came into contact with an unorganised group of Indians. Such 'reactive action' deals with the reactive affect by making the affect legitimate: it is also the beginning of efficacy. Sandra felt that she could stop eating meat - so far, that is the only action Sandra has taken. Helen felt it was possible to do something about her fear and anger through objecting. Lenny felt he could shed his Republican orthodoxy.

The process of cognitive reflection change the way the affect is experienced, but cognition itself is also changed because now that the issue is salient, the individual needs to make sense of her reaction, to give it meaning and validity. The consequence of this process is that new affect arises, a moral affect deriving from the individual's understanding that what made her disturbed is worth being disturbed about, that it is a general issue not simply a personal one. But she is also personally involved, engaged by the initial affect and also now by the legitimation of
that affect. She feels responsible. At this point people become involved in collective activity; Lenny became involved in teaching in an inner city school, Helen went on the march to Greenham from Cardiff.

If the actions performed accord with the individuals' level of engagement and efficacy, and appear on reflection to achieve satisfactory consequences, then there may be little further change. But if there is a disjunction between desired and actual goals, or if other events occur which change the situation then a further process of transformation occurs.

Jane and Lenny, for example, never really made the transition that Helen John and Gandhi did, of feeling that they were personally responsible for making changes. For Helen John, the transformation in her perspective came when she saw the limitations of an action which she had made a considerable investment in - the ten-day march from Cardiff - and for her this led to a conviction that the task was paramount, and that she must make a total commitment to it.

In this paper I have proposed a model which tries to bring affect into the cognition-action equation in a way which does not submerge it into being only an experience upon which cognition operates, nor as an energising intervening variable between cognition and action. I have argued that responsibility is not just an affective response of empathy or attachment, nor is it just a particular sophisticated cognitive perspective in which the individual sees her role as an agent. Responsibility is a cognitive appreciation, but one which arises from personal engagement in the situation, itself consequent upon the individual reacting affectively and becoming involved.

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Moral Responsibility and Personal Commitment: Comments on Helen Weinreich Haste's Paper

Brenda Cohen

Helen Weinreich-Haste's interesting paper traces certain stages in a particular kind of moral experience which lead to the generation of a personal sense of moral responsibility together with commitment to a cause, a moral position or an ideal. These stages lead from a pre-existing moral stage of simple perception of a situation, through a triggering event or catalyst—an event which 'touches' the individual in some significant way—via response and cognitive reflection to the personal sense of responsibility which is the main focus of her paper.

In a purely philosophical context the phrase 'moral responsibility' would more commonly be used to refer to freedom of the will as against determinism, but in the context of this paper it is given the force of a sense of one's own responsibility as opposed to other people's responsibility for a state of affairs.

Used in this sense, it generates duties of supererogation—not universalisable moral requirements but the kind of special demands made of the saint, the martyr, the enthusiast for a cause.

The paper makes its point by the use of examples. The use of examples to make points about morality has been under challenge recently as ethical texts have tended to over-use examples which are either fictitious or frivolous or both, but the use of examples here, both fictional and real, is genuinely illuminating. The frivolous is avoided and where examples are fictitious it is obvious that factual examples with precisely the same implications would not be difficult to find. The moral point which the examples are used to make is that there is a stage between the purely cognitive and the purely affective in a person's response to a situation—a stage, that is, between the intellectual appraisal of a situation in its moral aspects and the disposition to behave in the way judged morally appropriate.
In the paper this is linked to the fact that the situations in question - which involve such matters as vegetarianism, feminism, abortion, conscription, nuclear defence and civil disobedience - are 'real life' situations rather than contrived problems. But that this is not the crux of the matter is clear if the reverse phenomenon to the one described is considered. This is the phenomenon of detachment, indifference, or being morally 'switched-off.' There are a number of situations where this 'switched-off' response can be found in what many would consider inappropriate circumstances, and the fact that real issues are involved is simply unrecognised.

i) The position of the technician in an animal experimentation laboratory.

ii) The occupation of the butcher.

iii) The position of the military torturer in a regime where the use of torture is routine in the questioning of suspects.

iv) The Kitty Genovese case, in which the longdrawn-out murder of a woman - Kitty Genovese - was witnessed by the residents of a number of apartments, none of whom made any attempt to intervene, even to the extent of placing an anonymous phone-call to the police.

v) The 'Good Samaritan' experiment, in which theology students asked to prepare a talk on the Good Samaritan were obliged to step over the writhing body of a fellow human-being in order to reach the place where they would deliver their lecture - something most of them did without pausing to help.

The first three of these cases are particularly relevant to what the paper calls 'perception,' the fourth to what it calls 'efficacy' but all involve to some degree the general issues of perception, efficacy and commitment. Light is thrown on many of these negative cases by the Milgram experiments, the most significant fact about which is that no-one refused absolutely to administer electric shocks to others. The Milgram experiments, though, were concerned with the issue of obedience to authority, rather than with the issue of dissociation which is so clearly present in the case of institutionalised torture, murder and so on.

Nevertheless, where a positive response is at issue, as in the examples in Weinreich-Haste's paper, it is necessary to bear
in mind that it is impossible to react other than selectively to such a range of issues. Total immersion in the anti-nuclear movement, for example, leaves little room for full-time involvement with the animal rights movement or feminist campaigns. People may espouse all these positions simultaneously, but they must select which is to have their dedicated activist support. In other words, partial commitment on multiple issues is possible, but not the sort of total commitment which is the subject of the paper. Nevertheless, the paradox is that total commitment is the rational response on certain issues, for example, if one believes there is a danger of all-out nuclear war or if one has accepted the Christian doctrine of eternal damnation as the destiny of the unbeliever.

The last point suggests the strong relation which I am sure exists between the cases discussed in the paper and the more familiar case of the experience of religious conversion. It also seems worth considering whether as a matter of fact certain people may be more predisposed to have such experiences than others, and whether, if so, these particular people may not experience a number of such seminal turning points through life. Other such 'triggering' experiences, for example, would be:

i) religious conversion (the paradigm example being that of St. Paul on the road to Damascus, but also including the experiences of mystics and the phenomenon of evangelical gospel-meetings as discussed in Sargent's Battle for the Mind),

ii) political conversion (to extremist causes of left or right),

iii) sexual first experiences of various kinds,

iv) childbirth,

v) bereavement,

vi) being the witness of acute or long-term illness of family-member or friend,

vii) war,

viii) maiming.

No doubt there are others, but it is significant to note that these experiences are the very stuff of literature, poetry and culture.

This discussion, then, can do no more than endorse the fertility and fruitfulness of the ideas implicit in the paper, to
suggest that the kind of experiences described there are of enormous significance both in the moral life of the individual and also as practical phenomena in society - it is, after all, these people, shaped by such experiences who change the face of society - but to suggest, as well, that they are not necessarily universal or common experiences, while the reverse phenomenon, of detachment, is all too common. This would make the central point of the paper less an observation about moral development and more an illuminating observation of a (comparatively) rare phenomenon. The developmental point is that intervening between cognitive understanding and action is the feeling of personal involvement; that personal involvement is neither of these things exclusively, but that it is affective, i.e., it carries the disposition to act with it. This may be correct, but I would like to suggest that this affective stage is special rather than universal and the question of why only some of the moral situations in which we find ourselves provoke a concerned or involved response is itself worthy of investigation.
The Effect of Affect:  
A Comment on Helen Weinreich-Haste's Paper  

Don Locke

Helen Weinreich-Haste's paper is an important and useful discussion of the role of moral crises in moral change. It is in moral development. But this aspect of her paper is, I think, less successful, largely because the notion of affect is not itself explained. In particular I'm not sure I understand what moral, as opposed to non-moral, affect might be.

But Helen personally is not to blame for this. Despite being used almost solely as a technical term within psychology, 'affect' is in fact multiply ambiguous. A good example of the confusion caused by this is the debate between Zajonc (1980) and Lazarus (1982), where since Zajonc's idiosyncratic use of 'affect' seems to count as what Lazarus would call cognition, it is not clear that there is really any disagreement between them.

A more common source of confusion is that 'affect' is sometimes used as a synonym for emotion as such, and sometimes used to refer to a particular ingredient in emotion, the element of subjective emotional feeling. The latter is the sense defined as 'psychological' by Webster's 20th Century: 'the conscious subjective aspect of emotion considered apart from the bodily changes.' And according to any cognitive - or for that matter physiological - theory of emotion, affect in this sense will be only one part of an emotional state. Cognitive theories of emotion are typically two-factor theories (for example Arnold, Mandler, Lyons, Peters) in which both cognition and physiological disturbances, as a source of affect in the narrow sense, have a role to play.

This ambiguity is important when it comes to assessing Helen's attempt to provide a less cognitive, more 'affective,' account of moral change. For if by 'affect' she means emotion in general, including any cognitive component, then it is not clear that this is an alternative to the more explicitly cognitive accounts of moral change: it may be the cognitive element in
emotion, not the element of subjective feeling, which is responsible for the change in moral outlook, in which case it is not clear that the standard cognitive-developmental position is in need of any revision. The orthodox cognitive-developmental position needs revising, to take account of 'moral' affect, only if what produces moral change in these crisis situations is affect in the narrow sense, i.e. the element of subjective emotional feeling, and not some more cognitive component in emotion.

What Helen needs to show, in other words, is that it is the element specifically of emotional feeling, and not the element of emotional thought, which plays the crucial role in the moral crises she discusses. But so long as 'affect' remains ambiguous between emotion in general, including any cognitive component, and some distinctively non-cognitive component in emotion, it will not be clear whether cognitive-developmental accounts of moral change need broadening in the way she suggests. Perhaps she would be better off without the word altogether!

References

I have chosen a more practical and less dramatic field of moral development than Helen Weinreich-Haste did in her inspiring case-studies on extraordinary moral responsibility. I would like to present here some results of a study of mine on value orientation.

To begin with, I must acknowledge that the model of moral development proposed by Weinreich-Haste has numerous advantages compared to its predominantly cognitivistic approach. Among these advantages I would like to point out the importance of the emphasis given by this model to the role of affect within the moral development. The proposed model contributes to the better understanding of the relationship between the moral reasoning and the moral action (e.g. it shows how the pre-existing cognitive structures have become more unstable under the stress of affects, how these latter ones force the person to re-interpret the situation or the context of the triggering event which have evoked these affects, how the new information have helped to legitimate the newly developed reasoning and commitment, etc.). I think, it is sufficient to remind of these components of the model in order to understand why this can be regarded as a dynamic model indeed.

I agree with this model and with the reasoning behind which is based on the distinction between the real life and hypothetical moral dilemma situations and on the rather axiomatic insight that the moral reasoning is only a subset of social reasoning. However I would like to argue for the further elaboration of the role of affect. According to this model "affect energizes the cognition and predisposes to action" (Weinreich-Haste). This energizing role of affects has been largely proven by the attitude-research, but this knowledge was a bit somewhat neglected by the research of moral development.
The affects can also block the cognition, inhibit the acceptance of new information, they can make the whole perception of the situations or groups into a one-way process. Prejudice can influence the perception of situations and they may also evoke affects (anger, upset, etc.) which in their turn may again strengthen prejudice. This circular process is based on the subject's maintenance of illusory correlations. Let us reconsider Gandhi's journey on the train to Natal. As Weinreich-Haste pointed out, what happened to him there can be considered a triggering event for Gandhi upsetting him in a great deal. Presumably not only in Gandhi but also in those on the opposite side there were strong affects, but affects which played a blocking and ego-defensive role, thus helping to bring into effect their racial behaviour. This negative impact of affects is demonstrated by the well-known studies on illusory correlations and their role in group conflicts by Allport (1954) and Hamilton (1981). Following Breakwell (1983) who urges us to bring together the research on moral development and on group-conflicts, we can also observe a blocking role in the persons with high level of moral reasoning who do not really understand the existing contexts and the dilemmas of everyday life. They are the persons who apply moral and social norms in a rather rigid - almost inhuman - way. Extreme examples for this style of moral reasoning are the bigots who are unable to understand other value orientations than their own.

Now I would like to show different types of moral reasoning depending on the accompanying dominant value motive. I hope I can show both - the positive and the negative - impacts of affect within the moral reasoning although these phenomena were not directly observed in the study of values on issue. They could be recognized only as a result of a secondary analysis conducted just from this point of view.

This study of values was carried out as a part of a longitudinal study of young professionals (among them architects). The sample of this particular study consisted of 26 female and 42 male architects. They were at the end of their second year at work. Participation was voluntary. The research procedure involved modeling critical situations and judgments of desirability on alternative courses of behaviour. A set of
conflict situations were presented to the subject in a semi-formalized questionnaire (8 stories). We selected the core of these situations from previous in-depth interviews according to the following criteria: they should be characteristic of architects' profession, they should represent the existing hierarchical interpersonal relations at their place of work, and they should present alternatives to the merely frustrating situation. The questionnaire and the method of eliciting and analysing the answers were pretested. The respondents were required to judge (a) the frequency of the given conflict situation, and the solution chosen by the hero of the story, (b) the degree the subject agreed with this solution, and (c) the reasons for his agreement, disagreement, or abstaining. The attitude - objective or defensive - toward this procedure was also identified. Only the subjects with objective attitude were included into the study of values.

This method resembles the Kohlberg method (using conflict situations as material for eliciting judgments), but it also has some unique features: It allows to assess the subjects' involvement in the resolution of conflicts; and it makes possible to assess the subjects' attitude toward the research procedure, and to exclude those with defensive attitude. Instead using rare conflicts we have used common conflict situations. As our home conditions with an "experimenting economy" are rather open, these do not elicit socially desirable answers.

The content-analysis of the subjects' value motives as they were reflected in their answers proceeded along three main value dimensions: professional work-activity (identification), independence, and adaptation. Additionally, the value motives of moral and social relation were also identified. The ratings were made independently by two rater (they coincided in 85% of the cases). The categorization of the types of value orientation was based on the dominant value motive(s) that came up constantly in the answers. As a result of this, five types were identified: the work- and independence centered or Ideal type (N = 26), the work- and adaptation centered or Realist type, the adaptation centered or Conformist type (N = 8), and the Independent type of value orientation (N = 8). A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA, 5 x 5 design, 5 types and 5 value motives) shows to what extent
it is possible to differentiate the suggested value orientations on the basis of the applied value motives. They demonstrate unambiguously that the value motives differ significantly for the 5 types of value orientation: The F-ratio was 19.96 (p. = .01). The results of the independently executed F-tests show that, except the social relation motive, all value motive appear in a significantly different proportion in the answers of the 5 types (p = .05).

The results of MANOVA show also that choosing from among the existing major value dimensions proved suitable for detecting the types of personal value orientations within the world of professional work. They support our assumption that neither the moral motive nor the work-motive taken in isolation are capable to distinguish the actual types of value orientation and of moral reasoning. In regard to their moral motives the Ethical type persons had the highest scores (mean = 0.52); followed by the Independent (0.36), and the Ideal type subjects (0.32). The Realist (0.17) and the Conformist subjects (0.21) had the lowest scores. The particular deficit in morals of these subjects could be observed even in the perception of the conflict situations: they simply did not pay any attention to the moral aspect of the situations (though these were "morally challenging"). Their enhanced need for adaptation and fear of failure in the "difficult" situations did influence their perception: they acted as if they had not noticed the moral dilemmas in them, contrary to the Ethical individuals who were oversensitive to this aspect of them.

The picture is even more interesting if we take the results of the content analysis of their moral arguments. In spite of their having the highest mean-score, the Ethical type exhibited a lower moral responsibility. They recognized the moral aspect of a situation only in cases when these were already clearly regulated by social norms. In spite of their sensitivity to moral questions, they hesitated (needed the most time to fill in the questionnaire) and showed the highest uncertainty in deciding on the dilemmas. Contrary to the Ideal persons, they were not ready to widen their responsibility for new fields of professional activity. They insist on the realization of the existing norms not because of the lack of work-identification but because of the
lack of independence in understanding the modern society. The Ideal persons showed seem to be more creative even in the questions of morality. They were also morally sensitive but at the same time they considered the question of responsibility in a considerably larger social and political context than the Ethical persons did. For the Ideal type the responsibility of an architect begins with the giving all the kind of appropriate information on the possibilities of recent architecture and building industry to the persons or institutions giving the orders. The architect should realize that the information is power. He is able to design well, more responsibly only in case if the whole procedure of planning will become more democratic. He or she is involved in widening their scope of responsibility to new fields of professional and non-professional activity such as the reduction of the injuries by urbanization, of housing estates, as saving the natural surroundings and the remainder of folk and of historical architecture, etc. Ideals type subjects showed indeed a high preference for collective actions in this respect. They also emphasized their responsibility for their own development instead of shifting this upon the shoulders of others (in spite of the fact that they experienced more difficulties than others at their start). Compared to this type, the Independent persons were more ready to shift their responsibility to others even for their own development. They may have seen new fields of responsibility but they were not involved in taking them. They were more pessimistic in judging the outcome of any efforts in this regard. Their more individualistic attitude was correlated to a lack of commitment to an architect's work and a lack of positive affects gained from it.

In conclusion, the assumption that moral values can be more reliably followed and understood when they are studied together with other forms of value orientation seems to be supported by our findings. We could see that the actual meaning of a moral norm may vary to a great extent with the degree of work-identification and with the significance of motives for independence and adaptation. We could also observe that the dominant value motives influenced the actual moral reasoning that produced its different types.
In the case of the Ideal type most of the characteristics could be observed (such as the more durable and public commitment, as going far beyond the existing moral norms, the large personal investment of energy, time and action) whereas in the case of the Ethical type we are faced with the signs of a more conventional understanding of morals.

Notes

1 Parts of this longitudinal study were carried out in three subsequent graduating classes of the Faculty of Architecture of the Technical University of Budapest, between 1971-75. During the first phase, when the subjects (N = 198) were still at the university, their anticipated professional image, aspirations, and initial professional attitudes were assessed till at the university, their anticipated professional image, aspirations, and initial professional attitudes were followed up for at least two and a half years at the subjects' places of work (N = 100). The results of this study have been summarized in the monograph "Fiatal ertelmiségiek a pályán" (Young professionals at their start), Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1981 (in Hungarian).


References

This may be the only conference in the world where one does not have to apologize for a paper that is as nonchalant as mine is about the boundaries between psychology and philosophy. I know that I should apologize for other things, such as its length, and I do indeed apologize for those things. I was tempted to apologize also for seeming to belabor the obvious, since for anyone who comes to a MOSAIC conference it must seem a little excessive to spend so much time insisting on the importance of the internal dimension of moral behavior.

But this last apology would be carrying guilt too far. I don't think I am in the ridiculous position of the preacher who berates his congregation because it is so small, since though we all know morality is much more than pieces of overt behavior, the structure of moral motivation is not only problematic but virtually unexplored as well. I have addressed the problem in terms of moral ideals and moral virtues, rather than moral rules and principles, since I think that the former, so-called aretaic categories are primary and the latter, so-called deontic categories derive their intellectual significance as well as their motivational efficacy from aretaic ones. (On the distinction between aretaic and deontic ethics, see Frankena's Ethics, 1971, or better, Brandt's article on Frankena's virtue ethics, 1982.) But I have not tried to argue this in the present paper, preferring instead to propose my thesis as a thesis about how moral ideals motivate, with only a few rather heavy hints to the effect that the purchase which moral rules have on us can ultimately be accounted for in similar terms.

The thesis in question is both metaethical (in a broad sense) and methodological, and is the following: Whatever motivational constructs a theorist employs to account for moral behavior,
including the relatively covert behaviors of moral reasoning and decision-taking, they should contain a self-evaluative aspect or component whereby the moral agent is conceived as taking a point of view on his own motivation.

In Part I of the paper I unpack the notion of self-evaluation or self-regulation by recalling Harry Frankfurt's postulate of what he calls "second order desires." This is the idea that, whereas the object of an ordinary, first order desire is some thing or state of affairs in the world, these ordinary desires can be - and, I would add, usually if not always are - themselves the objects of second order motivations. I have sorted out the second order motivations (including both desires and aversions) into two main groups, the first and most prominent of which comprises what I have called economic evaluations, which correspond to the sorts of self-regulation that are discussed in the psychological literature on delay of gratification, tolerance of pain, etc. The second, and for us much more relevant group of second order motivations comprises what I am calling aretaic evaluations, in which the subject promotes or resists his first order inclinations on moral grounds.

Thus in economic evaluation I wish, for instance, that I were not so fond of chocolate because the outcome of my hoovering up chocolates is at odds with many of my other desires, say for a clear complexion or a calm gastro-intestinal track. Contrariwise, in moral (i.e., aretaic) evaluation I look not at the outcome but at the worth of my first order desires. In this case I would not want to be a chocoholic even if the unpleasant outcome of such first-level binging could be avoided by taking some kind of pill or, in the sad but apparently common cases of boulemic personalities, self-induced regurgitation. (A side note: This distinction between the outcome and the worth of an first order desire is a relative one, since in most cases one cannot characterize the worth of a desire (or the desire itself) without some reference to its intended outcome, and vice versa. Human action is a continuum, mediating between motivation - which is focused on for its own sake in aretaic motivation - and outcome - which is focused on in economic evaluation.)
II.

It should be fairly obvious at this point that aretaic evaluation presupposes some criterion for assessing the worth of one's first order motivations and the actions embodying those motivations. This criterion, which I have taken the liberty of calling an ego ideal even though I am not sure about its relation to the Freudian construct of that name, is the theme of Part II of the paper. I must confess that in the paper itself it takes me a very long time to get into an explicit discussion of this theme, since I thought it necessary to do a lot of preliminary work that recapitulates the distinction between economic and aretaic evaluation by means of some flow charts that need not be described here.

In other words, the theme of Part II is the source of that familiar but mysterious authority which our ideals have over us. Why, I wonder, doesn't a person who is faced with a discrepancy between what wants to do here and now (the first order desires) and his ideals (the criteria in whose service second order desires proceed) simply jettison the ideals? This form of conflict resolution would seem to be a lot simpler, to say the last, than the self-intervention which I have discussed under the rubric of second order desire. Of course people often do dump burdensome ideals, though not as frequently or abruptly as one might think from reading cognitive dissonance and attribution theorists. But when they don't, why don't they? Why, in short, are ideal not only semantic vehicles but motivational ones as well?

My answer to this query begins with the claim that ideals are themselves articulations of a certain otherwise fairly inchoate set of desires. These desires, which are themselves first order desires, are not just a bunch of strong though rather blurry longings. They are what I have called constitutive desires, because they involve projects or attachments wherein my life has meaning. As Bernard Williams puts it, these are the desires which keep us going on, and without which we would have no point, no hopes, no self. Exactly how constitutive desires transmute into ego ideals is a developmental question that I leave to Erikson, Allport, and others.
I conclude the essay with the following caveat. The foregoing remarks about possible commonalities in our constitutive desires are intended as illustrations of how the psychology of personality can be related to the philosophizing of the previous pages. However, it would be a mistake to forget that any such discussion (mine included) invariably distorts the motivational base of the moral agent's ideals and second order evaluations, since it treats his deep-level desires and aspirations as simply given. The reality is otherwise: their efficacy as psychic forces is inextricably tied to the interpretation which the agent puts on them - and so on himself - in the articulative process referred to a few paragraphs back. As Taylor (1977, p. 126) has pointed out, to articulate what I have called constitutive desires is not to describe them the way one describes a table as brown or a line of mountains as jagged, but rather "to shape our sense of what we desire or what we hold in a certain way." A reinterpretation of, say, the second order desire to be in control of one's self (such that it is now understood as a prudential strategy instead of as a matter of honor or dignity) alters the desire itself as well as its moral significance, even though its immediate objective, self-control, remains the same.

References
Moral Functioning and Ego Ideal
Comments on T. Wren's Paper

Augusto Blasi

Professor Wren's paper is concerned with an issue which is both very important and strangely neglected by psychologists. I say "strangely," because his approach to morality is much closer to traditional psychological concerns with behavior, motivation, and personality than the relatively recent emphasis on understanding and cognitive structures. As I suggested elsewhere (Blasi, 1984, in press), cognitive-developmentalism must eventually come to terms with the personality context of moral cognition.

However, as much as I agree with Wren's aims and with his relying on the distinction between first and second order desires, the solution that he is beginning to sketch raises a number of serious questions and ultimately appears unsatisfactory. This is so, not so much because the philosophical and psychological details have not yet been worked out, but because the elements already present (a) do not seem to satisfy some important requirements of a philosophical theory of morality and (b) appear to lack internal coherence. I will only mention some of these questions.

1. Wren suggests that ego ideals, on which morality is established, are based on a subcategory of first order desires, which he calls "constitutive." It is not clear how "constitutive" should be precisely defined; more fundamentally, one may ask whether all first order desires could be constitutive, at least for some people. A positive answer would not only lead to uncontrolled moral relativism, but also to quasi absurd consequences. A negative answer would then raise a further question: why, on what basis, can some first order desires be or become constitutive while others cannot?

2. It seems to me that Wren would be led to assume some concept of human nature, perhaps similar to that implied by Erikson's theory of personality, according to which "humanity" is psychologically defined by the potential for, and the development
of, eight basic "virtues" (trust, initiative, identity, etc.). I do not have serious objections to a similar project (most philosophers, less metaphysically inclined, would). But the question still remains, for Wren as well as for Erikson, of what makes certain desires constitutive. It cannot be the fact that they are desires. Could it be that such desires are in fact universally shared by human beings?

3. This brings up the question of the relations between first and second order desires. If I understand the distinction, there is an intrinsic relation between the two, such that, by definition, first order desires can be evaluated and can become themselves object of desires. If I am correct, this would also be true of those first order constitutive desires on which ego ideals are established. But on what grounds can such fundamental desires, as ego ideals are, be evaluated? Wouldn't the desires and the criteria grounding the evaluation, then, be ego ideals rather than the first order desires that are being evaluated?

4. My final point is that, when one begins to establish ego ideals on second order desires, it becomes almost impossible to avoid cognitive criteria in the construction of ego ideals and of the moral personality. While first order desires can order themselves according to such vectors as strength and prepotency, any other kind of ordering seems to require reasons, either of the economic or of the aretaic kind, as Wren points out. In sum, Wren's attempt to establish morality on desires rather than on understanding and reason ends up by bringing in rational criteria by the back door. This result may be contradictory with Wren's intentions; in my view, however, it is wholly desirable as may provide us with a handle for understanding how desires and rationality become integrated in the construction of morality.

References

Context-Related Aspects in Real Life Moral Judgment and Action
A Pilot Study and Some Conceptual Considerations

Wolfgang Althof

This chapter reports on a work in progress, both on the conceptual and the empirical level, carried out at the Fribourg University Institute of Pedagogy by Detlef Garz, Fritz Oser and myself. This work concerns the relationships between social and moral judgment and action. Regarding the empirical level we are interested, among other things, in how people actually do act with regard to various moral issues and how they rationally bring into play their fundamental moral reasoning structures. On the conceptual level we started out using the competence-performance distinction common to most cognitive developmentalists, but are trying to emphasize the sociological side of the road more heavily than is usually done (cf. Damon, 1984).

We are somewhat dissatisfied with the usual practice of isolating manifold variables presumably serving as "performance determining factors" (cf. Döbert & Nunner-Winkler, 1978; 1980). We suggest that a theory of socio-cognitive competence at the same time should provide us with explanations concerning performance. In addition, this theory should also be an interactionist theory. If we presuppose that cognition is not the result of self-reflective efforts, but from the beginning is attained inside a net of interpersonal relations, is co-constructed, and insofar is genuinely social (cf. Youniss, 1980), we must no longer treat social-structural, or - in a more concrete sense - contextual, phenomena as factors only relevant to stimulation of competence development, but have to focus on their genuinely constructive relevance. Moreover, we will find essentially the same ecological variables to be "responsible" for structural formation and for creating stable contexts of meaning which guide performance in a broad scope of social situations.

If we try to make the interactionist assumption more vivid and suggest a life-practical cross bracing of moral and socio-cognitive structures on the one hand and contextual structures on
the other, two methodologically relevant conclusions ensue:

(1) Any understanding is simplifying, or even false, which
reduces performance (and, ultimately, moral action) to mere ap-
plication of reasoning competence to situational circumstances.
This dichotomous notion of structure and situation neglects the
developmentally important fact that both formerly and presently
experienced situations (the first of which are the root of
structure, to the extent structure is the interiorization of
action) have essential features in common. Moreover, the "ap-
plication" processes cannot be fully understood by a model of
successively concrete steps in transforming ideal reasons (i.e.
structure) into action decision and actual conduct. Those models
have been proposed for instance by Rest (1984a,b) and Kohlberg &
Candee (1984). The difficulty with them is twofold: First, they
introduce context-related considerations at one place or the
other in the course of "translating" ideal reasoning to action;
they thus imply that there is such thing as subjectively
accessible "pure structure," at least serving as a starting point
for processes of implementation. But is this the case? People are
not aware of the operational rules guiding their reasoning;
structuralistic abstraction is at the core of "reconstruction
methodology" in developmental psychology, but on the level of a
subject's thinking we would be misguided to give way to the
assumption, moral judgments could ever be free of context and
content. If they are not, we have to account for the context
related features of every concretely conducted judgment, be it
(moral judgment) meant to be as basic as it may. The second, and
related, difficulty with the moral/non-moral components models is
that they analytically isolate elements - and seem to suggest
their actual separateness - which ultimately are psychologically
inseparable. In fact the interconnectedness of individuals'
normative, descriptive, and evaluative systems creates particular
moral qualities that tend to be seriously neglected by these
models.

(2) The notion of ontogenetic interpenetration of subjective
and social-environmental structures implies recognizing the in-
terweaving of conceptions of the morally right and of the
personally "good life," or of identity, i.e. the interconnected-
ness of the respective evaluative standards.
Habermas (1983; 1984) has emphasized the point that ethical universalization constitutes a necessity to formalize and decontextualize judgments in order to make rational negotiations and abstraction from particular interests possible. A main implication of this is that you have to get into a specific kind of distance to your personal conditions of life, your life style, life goals, habits, even to your biography - not reject them, but divest them of their self-evident validity for moral decisions. Postconventionalism means dispensing the normative power of the facts, separating between what is justifiable by moral principles and what is just factually valid (but nonetheless valid) in a social or personal sense.

Mordecai Nisan's (1984) moral balance model helps us to make further use of Habermas' argument by shifting the question. What, then, is the appropriate way to describe moral decisions made by pre-principled "ordinary" people? Assessing the moral weight of an action, deciding for certain courses of action in terms of a moral balance between ideal morality and personal interests (as Nisan puts it: keeping inside the acceptable limits of morality) - all this takes place inside the horizon of subjects' material experiences and patterns of meaning making. Educational projects carried out in Fribourg (cf. Schläfli, 1984) were aimed at educationally ensuring a reflected of life-practical claims to moral reasoning and vice versa, aimed at taking context into account without letting the subject be caught in it. But typically, the subject is "caught" in context.

Questioning of patterns of moral reasoning means questioning the coherence and continuity of identity, insofar there is a life practical fusion of evaluative standards for both of them. Thus a "praxeological" perspective (Bourdieu, 1979; 1982) would take account of functional relationships between moral reasoning structures and the netting of identity and Lebenswelt (life world). This implies that Lebenswelt should not be understood as subjectively constructed reality sui generis; practical taxonomies, representations and symbolic systems are, on the other hand, no sheer reflexions of objective relations: they are attempts to establish practical coherence in dealing with given circumstances - be them of a moral or nonmoral nature.
Whereas much of our educationally oriented research has indirect implications for the issues of context-relevance and moral action (cf. Oser & Althof, 1984), our work directly focused on action still is scarce. Nonetheless we believe that our approach is kind of special, compared to the empirical mainstream in the exploration of moral action. This is for two reasons. First, we both confront the classical hypothetical Kohlberg dilemmas for purpose of assessing stage scores and pose questions concerning actually experienced moral problems and the solutions to them (in terms of actions carried out). Second, as part of the interview we bind the answers to these real life questions back to the argumentation employed with respect to the hypothetical dilemma—a procedure that serves as deliberate "moralization" of the real life circumstances reported. This successive approach to life-practical matters and meaning aims at revealing types of reactions (concrete judgments and action tendencies) which are considered individually valid under aspects of contextual integrity (Lebenswelt).

The main methodical problem here is how to measure the judgments and their assumed validity that actually guide action, i.e., how to distinguish reason from rationalization. If we assume that large parts of everyday behavior is determined not by thorough reasoning but rather by mere inferences of the intuitively right thing to do, if we further assume that this also may hold true for certain kinds of morally relevant behavior, we must expect that the sheer question "why" may lead to rhetorical reasoning—reasoning as if the behavior in question has had a rational and consistent base (cf. Bubner, 1976). Our interpretative problems can be mitigated however if we consequently bring into use the potential of clinical (in-depth) interviewing technique.

We concentrated our interviews on a particular facet of the moral life: "weak norms" and the respective transgressions, which Nisan calls "petty crimes" (Nisan 1984, p. 9). This implies a twofold specification:

(1) If we rely on the Kantian notion of perfect and imperfect duties, that has been reintroduced into the developmental debate by Gertrud Nunner-Winkler (1984), we are concerned with perfect duties only. Perfect duties are negatively defined, duties of
 omission, which normally can be "-followed strictly by everybody at any time and location and with regard to everybody" (Nunner-Winkler, 1984, p. 349; with reference to Gert, 1973). Imperfect duties are positively defined, they are duties of commission (e.g. practicing charity), which give maxims for moral action, but allow exceptions: you cannot practice charity towards everyone and at any time. Kohlberg's approach focuses on principles of justice, i.e. reciprocity of rights and duties. If we want to test the relationship between action tendencies and reasoning structures assessed in a Kohlbergian way, it is obviously preferable (in a pilot study) to focus on conflicts where a perfect duty is at stake.

(2) Once the focus is on perfect duties, we have got to be more precise as to which aspects of the moral life we should reasonably assess. If we are interested in referring the judgment-action issue to life practical involvements (the contextual horizon discussed earlier), we should be prepared to find different features of argumentation and action with respect to distinct subjects of moral decision. Turiel (1983) offers a suggestion relevant to this which I find convincing: "Indeed, researches could spend many years conducting studies that would undoubtedly show a high consistency between behavior and verbally expressed evaluations or judgments ... Consider a few obvious examples. Suppose a study were designed to deal with the following specific behaviors: robbing money from a bank, stealing money from a friend, killing another person, running over a person with one's car, driving through red lights, setting fire to a house. ... One can only conjecture why these kinds of studies have not been conducted. In the first place, there are logistical problems in systematically observing such behaviors in naturalistic settings. Perhaps just as important the anticipated results may seem so obvious that, in this sense, the study is considered a trivial one to conduct. The self-evident nature of the research stems from the assumption that people's judgments do correspond closely with these behaviors" (pp. 192-93).

We can say that in the cases Turiel mentioned, behavior is likely to correlate closely to individuals' relevant judgments; in these sense there is consistency. However, when we look from a developmental point of view another kind of "consistency" seems
to be widely missing: the correspondence between moral judgment maturity and the tendency to act in a moral way. In terms of practical everyday life there are no differences across ages and stages as to these acts. One could argue now, that in the course of progressing through stages the motivational sources of acting in a certain way change qualitatively with the transformations of the overall reasoning structure. Admitting the fact that the Kohlberg stages do not discriminate between action tendencies relevant here thus would not mean irrelevance of the stage model for explaining behavior. I am not sure how satisfying this argument really is. Whereas there can be no uncertainty about the fact, that the relevant moral principles are reconstructed at each stage, new understanding of validity and justification must not necessarily be connected to a reworking of action motives. Average life does not establish a need to reflect consciously upon why it is wrong to set fire to houses. It is wrong, and intuitively so, for almost everyone. Motivationally, this seems to be more a matter of early acquired empathy than of stepwise construction of cognitive references. Note, however, that we don't consider extreme situations here. It is well-known that shift from life-protecting norms to the order to kill in war times can be perceived in critically different ways - ways which possibly reflect not only distinct degrees of empathy arousal, but differences in moral reasoning maturity.

Let us now turn to the scope of perfect duties Turiel's considerations did not imply, which we find a promising issue for investigation. Especially noteworthy here are infringements of property rights by way of either direct theft or fraud (e.g. tax evasion, deceptive insurance claims, dodging the customs regulations, private telephone calls from work etc.). Surveys show that more than half of the population in western countries at least tolerates minor unlawful acts of this kind (see e.g. Rossbroich, 1984). Common evaluative criteria seem to be the apparent fact that these deeds do not inflict severe harm on concrete others, that they do not cause damage to the well-being of anyone. Justification strategies imply the reference to white collar criminality of whole other dimensions, to organizational calculations balancing this sort of loss by regulation of prices and taxes.
This is the type of transgression we began to study in the way described above. By interviewing people about their every day morality we hoped to find illuminating hints to stage related properties in the domain of moral action. We did not suppose to find very clearly marked stage differences; it is obvious that a number of intervening variables will water down correlations. But still there are definite laws and (in the abstract) widely accepted norms against these transgressions; so we did expect differences. We can only judge from a small pilot study, but our impression is: no such thing! We don't just find every single subject (ranging from Stage 2 through 5) tolerates "petty crimes" to a degree and that literally everyone has to tell his/her own adventurous story of experiences in active transgression; moreover, there is not much indication of significant changes in justification qualities throughout development, aside from growing sophistication. The only remarkable difference between subjects reasoning at lower and at higher stages is in the capability of the latter to integrate justification strategies into their more general conception of society. Take for example the subject who excuses evasion of duty by referring to the times of removal of frontiers and customs-barriers to come in Europe.

Whereas from a certain perspective this class of moral phenomena fits well intra-personal balance models (either of the traditional social psychological sort or of the more cognitively oriented type represented by Nisan), from a different angle there is good reason to suggest a "praxeological" approach in research and interpretation. I would like to make this plausible by comparing some aspects of the two approaches:

(1) Nisan's (1984) model implies awareness of the blameworthiness of acts; otherwise there would be no subjective necessity to balance certain action tendencies against a moral ideal. However, this does not account for phenomena of shared demoralized practice, where large parts of social interaction are taken out of moral evaluation. The more distant and anonymous the institutions people have to deal with, the more subjects refuse to consider these relations in terms of moral duties and responsibilities.

(2) Nisan's model focuses on individual components of moral "budgets." However, assessing the weight of different courses of
moral action strongly resorts to patterns of meaning making which ontogenetically and situationally are derived from (conscious or unconscious) perceptions of the usual practice (as opposed to mediated reflections on practice; cf. Bourdieu, 1979) of social interaction. Thus the "get-it-while-you-can" mentality cannot be explained by individual pathology alone; we also have to pay attention to its sociological counterparts constituting features of demoralization and segmentation.

(3) Starting from dialectical Lebenswelt-aspects permits consistent interpretation of findings on the important role of "concernedness." Rest (1984a) suggests "that the comprehension of justice concepts is not tantamount to using them to define what is morally right" (p. 34) and introduces a utilizer/nonutilizer distinction. The fact that whoever is concerned by a moral conflict is more sensitive to the obligations and costs implied (Döbert & Nunner-Winkler, 1984) indicates that processes of moral balancing presumably will include more than a weighting of justice claims and personal interests, but rather will affect one's identity balancing in pertaining to the complex weaving of cultural motives one is tied into, of behavioral habits and general patterns of social interpretation. For example, in a study with farming apprentices (cf. Schläfli, 1981, for a summary report) a very strong tendency of this kind were found when discussing the issue of using chemical aids in agriculture and stock-breeding. Intra-personal differences in moral judgment level were also found when dilemmas with distinct closeness to the subjects' lives were introduced (Baumgartner, 1981; cf. Oser & Althof, 1984); but I don't think this is the whole story. Context-relatedness tends to activate an evaluative frame of reference which is constituted amidst life practice and which only incidentally is the same particular frame utilized in reasoning about clear and weighty justice conflicts.

It should be clear by now why I doubt the immediate significance of Kohlberg's stages for predicting action in the discussed "spheres" of moral life. I feel in accordance with Jim Rest's attempt to deal with the judgment-action relationship in his four-component-model (Rest, 1984a,b). Rest accepts the notion of universal features in moral reasoning, but he suggests that moral reasoning structure is not the only and possibly not even
the main determinant of moral action, and that there is no univariate relationship between judgment and action. Whereas Rest's model cautiously refrains from strong explanation claims however, my consideration results in stronger, though still speculative, assertions. I believe there are life-practical interweavings which typically accounts for rule-conformity in the "sphere" discussed first and for active and/or passive demoralization with regard to weak norms. However, there may be a zone of blending and historical transition, in which the binding (moral) character of certain concrete norms becomes dubious and gradually gets lost. Thus some subject's defense is not false from the start. We unduly moralize acts which have no moral quality but solely concern matters of societal or interpersonal regulation. But it is one thing, to question the binding nature of the norms we addressed, and something else, to categorically presuppose the merely personal character of the respective action decisions.

Evidently my discussion did not encompass all morally relevant behavior. When I introduce the term (moral) "life spheres" (or, with another emphasis, normative expressions of life spheres) I neither imply distinct sectors of society or social life nor a distinct logical or ethical status of each of the conceivable spheres. Rather, the term "sphere" refers to different types of situation and respective normative implications one may encounter. The division tries to allow for what I believe are distinct (although connected and overlapping) systems of evaluation for different constellations of moral claims, personal needs and life-practical patterns of social understanding (Habitus in Bourdieu's terminology). I am quite sure that there are other "spheres" where (because of this individual-environment dialectic, and not in spite of it) structural properties of reasoning will show through rather clearly on the action dimension. I guess this will be the case whenever concernedness is more typical than exceptional and whenever there is a genuine option for deliberate decision. Perception of this option and action choice will, I assume, vary in a structure-related way in communicative or cooperative dealings with concrete persons, in attempts to participate in (exercise an influence on) central societal decision making processes or institutions, including the
issue of civil disobedience Helen Weinreich-Haste's paper is concerned with.

Notes

1 This paper considerably extends Fritz Oser's and mine presentation at the Konstanz conference. It draws heavily on ideas of Detlef Garz (1984), without claiming that it actually represents his ideas in a way he would find appropriate.
2 Actually Detlef Garz conducted the interviews. A detailed report of this study is in preparation (Garz, 1985).

References


In this paper I shall try to explain why there is a gap between the expectations concerning the socialization effects of university and the respective empirical findings.

On the basis of common sense, many people would expect that university or college education should "make a difference" not only in regard to specialized vocational skills but also generally, in regard to such supra-vocational "skills" as critical thinking, judgment ability, and social responsibility. Contrary to this normative expectation, however, research on the impact of college and university has come to the conclusion that university socialization has no effect on acquiring such skills, or at least no general and lasting effect.

Two basically different explanations for this gap seem possible: Either university education in fact fails to reach its proclaimed aims or the "university-makes-no-difference" finding is due to our inability to actually "see" those supra-vocational effects, i.e., it results from shortcomings of the concepts and instruments which are employed in most of these studies. The first explanation can only be contested indirectly, e.g. by providing a measurement methodology which improves our ability to assess the effects of socialization. If the results still remain the same we would then have to accept as a matter of fact that university education fails to reach its aims. However, if we could demonstrate a general socialization effects of university education when using better methods, we could refute the implicit assumptions of the research methods which have produced these "no-difference" findings.

It seems indeed that the concepts of attitude and attitude change, which are the core concepts of impact of college research, have been defined too narrowly as to be able to adequately assess such effects of university education. Without a doubt, the development of classical attitude tests represented a
major step forward in impact-of-college research (Feldman & Newcomb, 1970; Cloetta, 1975), primarily because in comparison to casuistic research such tests are more transparent and applicable to large scale surveys. This means they are objective and can be easily criticized - and improved. However, the classical concepts of attitude and attitude change delimit the possible outcomes of socialization in two ways, (1) in regard to the evaluative aspect of attitudes and (2) in regard to those attitudes which differentiate among persons. In doing so, attitude research ignores a central aspect of educational outcomes, namely the cognitive aspect of attitudes and its structural transformation. Consequently, this approach reduces the process of socialization to one-dimensional changes in affective magnitudes. That is, the process of socialization is perceived only in the narrow categories of either "adaptation" or "deviation."

The cognitive-developmental approach (see, e.g. Kohlberg, 1973) offers a conceptual and methodological alternative for higher education research. From this point of view, the general, democratizing effect of university education is conceived of, and assessed as, the development of both affective and cognitive aspects of personality. Accordingly, the effects of socialization are not reduced to changes in affective magnitudes but are construed as more complex processes of integration and differentiation. By viewing the process of socialization through the wider conceptual "lens" of cognitive developmental theory we are able to "see" effects of university education which have hitherto been invisible to the researcher. From this point of view we have obtained indications of a sequential, irreversible development of supra-vocational competences in university students even in using classical attitude research. On this basis we conclude that, contrary to the findings of classical attitude research, university education in fact facilitates, or even stimulates, the development of moral and democratic competences of students in general.
Socialization as 'Attitude Change'

Until recently, the concept of attitude has predominated in research on the effects of university socialization (for extensive references cf. Lind, 1985a). This proposition is not invalidated by the fact that only a few studies contain an explicit definition of their research subject. Their theoretical assumptions can only be perceived in their concrete research methods which define in operational terms the constructs being employed. There are many variants in research methods. However, there are some core features of attitude testing which are common to nearly all studies and which are based on classical testing theory. This makes it possible to speak of a unique paradigm: the "classical attitude concept." The concept and its measurement contain, as we will see below, certain psychological assumptions about the nature of the human mind. The central question is thus whether these assumptions are compatible with the research hypotheses which they are being used to test.

One major focus of research into university socialization deals with its hypothesized democratizing effect, i.e., with the democratic personality it is supposed to shape. This includes attributes such as innovative competence, critical judgment ability, moral autonomy, willingness to assume social responsibility, and general liberal attitudes. Of particular interest in research has been the dimension of " conservatism," which is considered to be a kind of antipode to the democratic attitudes (liberalism) expected of university and college graduates (cf. Cloetta, 1975). The hypothesis to be tested is: Is the university capable of instilling democratic attitudes in the student? Or is it appropriate to resign ourselves to the conclusion that the university has no or no lasting influence on attitude change?

Up until now research results seem to have been surprisingly clear - and negative. When asked what college does for the individual, the college researcher Theodore Newcomb (1974) answered: "Frankly, very little that is demonstrable" (p. 73). The findings of impact-of-college research confirm this conclusion insofar as they are concerned with the prediction of non-vocational effects of college education. With only a few exceptions, research either does not show any of the anticipated
attitude changes or it shows that such changes are revised again either at the end of college studies or in the initial phase of the individuals' professional life.

If one considers the democratizing effect in particular, some consistent changes were observed in the first years of study. According to Feldman and Newcomb (1970) and other surveys in this field there is a slight but general turning away from conservative, authoritarian, non-democratic attitudes during the college years. This trend could also be shown in an extensive longitudinal study carried out by the research project "Teachers' Attitudes" (Cloetta, 1975; Dann et al., 1978). Students who were studying to become elementary and secondary school teachers developed increasingly democratic (liberal) attitudes during their studies. However, in this and in other studies it was also shown that the democratizing effect again abated at the end of college and in the initial phase of starting work. The authors refer to a "practice shock," which cancels out the effect of college.

Problems of Interpretation

Must we then repudiate the idea that college graduates gain supra-vocational abilities? Are the findings so evident that one can consider colleges and universities to be ineffective in fostering democratic competences? We will see that these questions can in no way be answered with an unambiguous "yes." First of all, these findings are influenced by the methods used and hence are theory-impregnated interpretations which are debatable. Of course, these findings are not produced completely independent of reality, however, they are restricted through the methods of assessment and data evaluation. Therefore, because no effect of higher education was ascertained does not necessarily mean that there was no effect.

Indeed the findings of attitude research give rise to several problems of interpretation. Concept and measurement of attitudes has long been criticized. There have been attempts to find a satisfactory explanation for empirical findings by introducing auxiliary assumptions without abandoning the classical attitude paradigm. As far as we can see, however, most of these attempts
have created new, unsolved problems. For example, to solve the reliability-change dilemma, the suggestion was made to require not only the stability of attitude scores (more exactly: their rank order for all persons in a group studied), but also the stability of change rates (i.e., to determine "reliable" types of changes). However, since both demands contradict each other, attitude scales that meet the new criterion would have to be eliminated according to the old criterion and vice versa. This dilemma is especially evident in the conservatism scores which have a comparatively high level of rank reliability, however, whose reliability of change is on the average close to zero (for a summary of findings, see Figure 3 in Lind, 1985a).

Equally paradoxical are practical suggestions associated with this interpretative framework. If one retains the attitude paradigm, one would have to demand that the socialisand adapt to democratic values and at the same time resist them (see Fend, 1971). Many authors then evade normative questions and hesitate to precisely determine the direction and intensity of the attitude which is required to achieve the goal of socialization. To understand these paradoxes and ambiguities it seems necessary to revisit the classical concept and method of attitude research more thoroughly.

Critique of Attitude Concept and Measurement

An "attitude" is defined as the "degree of positive or negative affect associated with some psychological object" (Thurstone). This definition is the starting point and a basic part of most methods of attitude measurement (cf. Scott, 1968), even if some researchers do not strictly adhere to it and include in their attitude scales, in addition to affective statements, purely descriptive ones. Thus, in classical terms attitudes are distinguished only by their direction and by their intensity. This already creates a problem. If attitudes can only be either positive or negative, there is no conceptual tool for distinguishing between average, neutral, or cognitively differentiated attitudes. When a person gets a medium score on an attitude scale, our interpretation must remain ambivalent because it could always mean that he or she either has (a) no attitude, (b) a con-
flicting attitude, or (c) a highly differentiated attitude (cf. Shaw & Wright, 1967, pp. 7ff). Neutral answers are considered uninteresting, or as the expression of a tendency on the part of the subject to hide his or her attitude. Within the framework of this paradigm the researcher therefore attempts to force the subjects to express an attitude by "forced choice items."

Furthermore, in attitudes testing it is implied that the affective tendencies under investigation, are in one way or another characteristic for everyone. Classical attitude measurement is based on testing groups of people instead of individuals. A "reliable" and "valid" attitude measurement is only spoken of when the subjects of a particular group under study meet two requirements: (a) the subjects must differ considerably from one another regarding the direction and intensity of this attitude: "The object of attitude must be controversial in the investigated group" (Cloetta, 1975, p. 37). (b) At the same time, however, the subjects must be similar to one another in regard to their attitude structure, i.e., the particular attitude must be present in all persons and must determine the same set of responses to the same degree. A violation of any of these assumptions leads to charges that the research instrument is "unreliable" and "invalid." Thus paradoxically, in the moment in which the group's attitudes become either similar in direction and intensity or structurally heterogeneous, the particular "attitude" disappears or becomes inaccessible. Attitudes common to all members of a group and attitudes associated with individually varying forms of cognitive structure are eliminated from the analysis allegedly on the grounds of purely methodological criteria, even though these attitudes are essential to the socialization process.

However, in focusing on the affective components of attitudes (direction and intensity), psychology limits itself to cases where the attitude in question is already completely integrated but is at the same time not yet differentiated according to higher values and ideas. This occurs rarely and, therefore, is only of limited interest. If taken seriously, these assumptions would prevent all attitudes from being tested, since there is nary an instrument of attitude measurement that achieves "reliability" or "validity" indexes which agree perfectly with the basic model. Moreover, because they are restricted to affective
aspects, the effects of socialization are limited to simple, one-dimensional changes in the affective components of attitudes. This elimination reduces the process of university socialization to a mere contrast between deviation from, and conformity with, given norms.

What can be done? If one keeps the attitude paradigm, one could simply admit nonconformists behavior as a necessary element of socialization. That would necessarily lead to successful socialization being defined both as adaptation and as deviation and would thus broaden the realm of desirable educational effects so much that only trivial expectations could be derived from it: they would be fulfilled anyway to begin with. However, if one defines the area of desirable socialization results to be the narrow, almost imaginary margin between conformity and autonomy, then this margin becomes, as Fend (1971, p. 39) pointed out, "very narrow," possibly too narrow to at all be examined empirically.

The dilemma of socialization research is thus plain to see: The things that we can study with the concept of attitude allow socialization theory to formulate only empirically empty hypotheses, and the things we really want to examine lie outside its conceptualization. Thus, the simplicity and explicitness of the attitude concept indeed "render its inadequacies obvious" (Scott, 1968, p. 208). Its major inadequacy is its failure to account for the structural aspect of attitudes in addition to the affective aspect. This should imply that neither the behavioral structure of a particular group of subjects nor a specific kind of behavioral content (so-called "cognitive beliefs") are separate from affective content. Rather, the structural aspect refers to the relational properties of an individual's responses, properties which are ontologically inseparable from the affective aspects. This "non-separability-axiom" and its implications for research and practice I have outlined on several occasions; for a recent treatment cf. Lind (1985c).
Socialization as Moral-Cognitive Development

With their methodical elaboration of the concept of cognitive-moral development, Lawrence Kohlberg and William Perry have introduced a new approach to research on higher education which has acted as an alternative to the classical paradigm of attitude change. Aside from its sometimes fashionable use, the term "development" provides an alternative conceptual and methodological framework for the study of socialization processes in the following respects:

- Individuality. The subject of the analysis of moral competence is above all the individual as well as the structure of his behavior and judgment, and not a comparison of persons in a group in regard to isolated character variables. Thus the assessment methods which are based on this approach assure that the traits of an individual are defined independently of other individuals in a group.

- Manifest judgment behavior. Moral attitudes are conceived of as the content and structure of a person's manifest judgment behavior rather than as a hidden, or "latent," trait. Competence in moral judgment can only be observed in the concrete interaction of a person with his or her environment. In terms of psychological assessment it is "a construct rather than an inference, and is warranted only on the grounds of 'intelligible' ordering of the manifest items" (Kohlberg, 1979, p. 14).

- Affect and cognition. In contrast to the classical theory of attitude and the multi-component theory of attitude (cf. Rosenberg & Hovland, 1963), the cognitive theory of development insists that "a moral act or attitude cannot be defined either by purely 'cognitive' or by purely 'motivational' criteria" (Kohlberg, 1958, p. 16). Incomplete integration of behavior in a normative orientation as well as a highly differentiated value posture are not, as in the attitude paradigm, indiscriminately designated as "inconsistencies." Accordingly, we do not attribute "unreliability" to the measuring instrument. Instead we understand it to be at least partly an expression of the cognitive aspect of judgment behavior (cf. Lind, 1985b).

- Development. With the dual concept of affective-cognitive personality traits, it is possible to conceptualize socialization
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- Development. With the dual concept of affective-cognitive personality traits, it is possible to conceptualize socialization
within the wider framework of a developmental theory. "Development" is defined as "changes in the form of reorganization of responses over time as contrasted with the change in the strength or accuracy of the responses ... Thus, the developmentalist focuses upon structural changes in the response" (Zigler, 1963, p. 345). These structural or cognitive changes of an individual's attitude system are integration and differentiation.

This wider concept of structural change allows us to present the role of the university in the educational process in a more adequate way. Socialization is not, as the theories of adaptation assume, simply a change in behavior due to altered environmental conditions, but rather a differentiation and hierarchical integration of attitudes and norms as a consequence of the "interaction between the structure of the organism and the structure of environment" (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 348). In regard to the area of social-moral abilities, development is a process of continual transformation of individuals' moral-cognitive systems.

The Two-Sided Process of Development

The two above-mentioned paradigms of simple "change" and structural change or "development" can be compared empirically in regard to different hypotheses about the course and result of university socialization. As we have seen, the most important difference consists in the fact that, in addition to a change in direction and intensity, the idea of development also implies a structural change of an individual's attitude system. Development is thus to be regarded as an integral, two-dimensional change that cannot be reduced to only one dimension (or two ontologically separate dimensions) of change without the loss of essential information.

The position of cognitive-developmental theory can be illustrated in the concept of the "conservative attitude," which as we noted above is generally viewed as a central indicator for the democratizing effect of college education. Whereas the classical attitude theory describes socialization one dimensionally as the acquisition and loss of "affective quantities" in time, the developmental model also takes into account the cognitive-structural dimension. In such a two-dimensional developmental
model, phases of integration and differentiation can also be distinguished, in addition to changes in direction and intensity.

Using this conceptual framework, we may hypothesize that attitudes in people undergo a developmental process. As long as the individual has not yet (not even unconsciously) developed a concept of "conservatism," he or she will not be able to respond consistently to conservative or progressive statements. The scientifically construed concept of "conservatism" is not yet "represented" in the individual and thus not measurable by an conservatism scale. Only as the person becomes more and more acquainted with this concept will he or she respond with increasing consistency (whether positively or negatively) to conservative statements - something that we call the "phase of integration." Only after this takes place will the attitude of conservatism become measurable.

In a second phase, the same statements are no longer judged solely according to this one category, but also in regard to other judgment criteria which compete with it or even cancel it out. In this phase of attitude differentiation we can observe an increasing preoccupation with context, which leads to a greater distrust of general statements ("slogans"). On the surface, i.e. in regard to the criteria of classical attitude testing, the attitude behavior again becomes "inconsistent" or "unreliable" and thus non-measurable. However, whereas in the beginning inconsistency means lack of judgment competence, it can later be evidence of a highly developed cognitive structure.

This "two-sided" development process of integration and differentiation implied by cognitive-developmental theory is contrasted with the one-dimensional process of "change" in the two-dimensional process diagram in Figure 1.
We expect to obtain firm evidence for one or the other based on findings from the longitudinal studies on university socialization which we are carrying out in order to clarify this question. The research that has been carried out up to now, however, offers important indications which already make an empirical contrast of the two paradigms possible. Three sources are at our disposal: (a) Traditional attitude studies, insofar as their results indicate that cognitive processes are involved in socialization, (b) cognitive-developmental research by Kohlberg and his collaborators and (c) initial findings of our own ongoing study.

The findings of this research are summarized in detail in Lind (1985a). Regardless of the type of study, all data unanimously indicate that, in addition to a change in direction and intensity of affective reactions during the course of socializa-
tion, dramatic transformations take place regarding the cognitive aspects of the individual's attitude system. The system of attitudes, values, and norms becomes more integrated and differentiated, implying that the affective tendencies (as measured by an attitude test) undergo a transformation of meaning, i.e. that even when students hold the same attitude toward democracy and democratic institutions at the beginning and at the end of university study this attitude means something quite different each time.

Conclusion

Thus attitudes and their development cannot be adequately understood when we concentrate only on the affective aspect of judgment behavior, or when we conceive the cognitive aspect just as an entity that is separate from its affective content. Hitherto supra-professional outcomes of college and university socialization - such as critical rationality, sense of responsibility, and democratic orientations - have been mostly classified as "affective" goals and contrasted with "cognitive" goals of education such as vocational qualifications or general belief. However, as we have argued elsewhere (see Lind, 1985c) this ontological separation of the two basic aspects of human behavior is inadmissible. So-called "affective" attitudes have their own cognitive structure which is distinguishable but not separable from their affective contents. Thus both the affective and the cognitive aspects of attitudes have to be researched as a whole.

This conceptual problem has significant consequences for the methods and results of socialization research. Whereas in the research on the basis of classical attitude research - which reduces attitudes to its affective aspects - no general supra-professional outcome of higher education could be detected, the more comprehensive cognitive-structural approach makes discernible the transformation of students' personalities as could be expected from the educational goals that the university sets for itself. The university apparently contributes its share to the evolution of the individual personality, and thus also to the evolution of social forms of existence, although this may be viewed as not enough in view of the social problems which the
university graduates will be faced when taking over responsible positions in our society.

From this finding we can conclude that even for "initial purposes" it is not advisable to confine research to "varying degrees of favorableness and unfavorableness" and thus discard the structure of attitudes, as eminent scholars have suggested, but to acknowledge structural change or development. Cognitive-developmental theory and research has provided methods with which one can assess such a reordering and reorganization of individual attitude systems in the course of the socialization process but which are not as clear cut and as suitable for large scale research as are classical attitudes tests. Our research demonstrates that the assessment of structural change is indeed not bound to interview methods but can also make use of attitude measurement if, however, this is adequately designed and interpreted.

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Level of Moral Judgment and Political Attitudes of Adolescents

Ralf Briechle

In the following contribution we shall present theoretical and empirical results which were obtained within the scope of the project "Entwicklung im Jugendalter" ("Development in Adolescence") which is supported by the "Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft" (DFG) and directed by Helmut Fend. The general topic of this longitudinal project deals with the development of social competence and self-competence and with their promotive or obstructive socio-cultural conditions as well as their consequences. The project concentrates on the adolescent phase of 12 to 16 year old youth. Approximately 2,000 adolescents from both urban and rural areas in Hessen were submitted to a longitudinal inquiry and were questioned in classes at school between 1979 and 1983, mainly by means of fully standardized questionnaires.

The Problem

Since the publication of the study of Haan et al. in 1968, dealing with the level of moral judgment of adolescents within the scope of the students' protest movement, one may find in both American and German literature much evidence for the connection between level of moral judgment (see Kohlberg) and political attitudes (among others Haan et al. 1968; Ackermann, 1976; Keniston, 1969; Fishkin et al., 1973; Ijzendoorn, 1979) which, however, has not yet been satisfactorily explained.

Although connections between moral level and structural components of the political development of competences (showing social-cognitive degrees of development) can be theoretically anticipated from the outset within Kohlberg's approach - and thus could be convincingly demonstrated (Tapp & Kohlberg, 1971, Adelson, 1971; Furth, 1978; Merelman, 1971) - it appears that possible connections between political attitudes and moral stage are in this theory more difficult to interpret.
A central question within the scope of the analysis of possible connections between level of moral judgment and political attitudes leads us back to the problem of ascertaining whether - and occasionally how - philosophical and political representations of values are a part of Kohlberg's moral philosophy and of his stage description. Kohlberg et al. (1983) make clear in their discussion with Sullivan (1977) that Kohlberg's theory is much indebted to a liberal tradition of thinking and thus refers to such philosophical approaches as the "contrat social" and the emphasis of human rights, as well as to the notion of the rational human being. This very tradition is also reflected in Kohlberg's early stage definitions. Kohlberg himself has come to admit that such aspects as those concerning both structure and contents are confounded in his stage definitions of moral stages (Kohlberg, 1958) and the research based on the 1958 method of scoring moral reasoning (summarized in Kohlberg, 1969) assessed stages in terms of chosen content. From this, structure was inferred as an ideal type which connected the normative content favored by the stage. Thus, our earlier stage definitions and assessment procedures partially confounded content and form" (Kohlberg et al., 1983, p. 42).

Even on the basis of the reviewed stage criteria, one would have to expect connections between political attitudes and moral stage in the cases where an interfering variable influences both dimensions. Such a background variable for moral judgment and political attitudes could be, among other things, the cognitive level or the educational level of the individual. (see e.g. Rest, 1979; Kaase, 1976).

There is yet another logical connection between level of moral judgment and political attitudes which is little dealt with in books, if not completely overlooked: Politics as well as morals refer to the question of equality and justice. Thus, claims, such as equality of rights for women at work, workers' co-partnership, protection of the interests of minorities, tolerance with regards to other races or religions, are all themes which are tackled in both fields. Thus it is clear that - due to the common cognitive basis and the partly common topic - there is a connection between moral level and political attitudes and this is irrespective of contents.
This test (Briechle, 1981) consists of a standardized questionnaire meant as a survey of the level of moral judgment of adolescents between the age of 12 and 16. It comprises 20 moral arguments and 5 degrees of moral judgment according to Kohlberg and proposes a dilemma connected with the everyday life of the pupils: The pupil must choose between either lying to the teacher in a given situation in order to prevent one of his class-mates from staying down ("pro" decision) or else refusing to help by being sincere with the teacher ("con" decision). Depending on this decision, various moral judgments are submitted to the adolescents.

Results

According to us, the connection which we would establish on several occasions between moral stage and political attitudes (which refer to the notions of equality and authority is to be explained as follows: The cognitive competences determine the socio-cognitive competences which, in turn, determine political attitudes. In the path-model represented in Figure 1 we check up on our assumptions by means of the indicators for cognitive and socio-cognitive competences and political attitudes which are at our disposal. In particular, it appears that socio-cognitive competences are closely connected with authoritarian and/or egalitarian attitudes, whereas in the same model connections between cognitive indicators of competence and political attitudes obviously come into existence through the socio-cognitive aspects of competence. The path running from the cognitive competences to the political attitudes should actually be neglected (i.e. while taking the socio-cognitive competence indicators into consideration) since the beta-coefficients are too low. Altogether, the coefficients given in Figure 1 confirm empirically the plausibility of our structure model.
Political Attitudes and Level of Moral Judgment

We proceeded from the fact that, as we expected, adolescents at a different moral stage should also show differences in relation to such political attitudes as those which bring to effect norms of equality and justice. We assume now, from these general expectations, that adolescents at a higher moral stage should also differ from one another as far as their attitude towards democracy is concerned.

Figure 2 shows that both pre-conventional and conventional adolescents differ from one another (this systematically and each time in the expected direction) in relation to their political attitude towards various topics. Conventional adolescents are more critical in their judgment of our society as far as the actual application of the equality of opportunities and the judgment of individuals according to their capacity is concerned; they would rather demonstrate or protest against armament (within the scope of the pacifist movement) or the building of new nuclear power plants and show more involvement for the equality of women at work, demand more often equal opportunities in education for all pupils.
On all but one single topic (namely the equality of opportunities in education) the differences between pre-conventional and conventional adolescents (determined by means of the chi-square-test) are highly significant of the 1% level. Altogether, conventional adolescents turn out to be more critical, more willing to protest and more oriented towards norms of equality than pre-conventional youth (this within the scope of the above-mentioned topics).

Figure 2
Attitude Towards Political Aspects of Equality and Justice Among Adolescents with Different Moral Levels (10th grade, 15-16 years)

Moral Decision and Readiness to Protest

We shall now analyze in what way the decision concerning the dilemma (within the scope of the preference test) is connected with both political attitude and readiness to protest. Different decisions with regard to the moral dilemma we mentioned earlier also imply different political opinions; subsequently, adoles-
cents who favor sincerity with their teacher are less willing to protest than those who would lie. In conformity with the results of Haan, Keniston and others, adolescents (9th grade, aged 14) at a post-conventional moral stage would seem to be more willing to protest than conventional or pre-conventional adolescents.

One aspect bears particular importance as far as the post-conventional group is concerned (cf. Figure 3): depending on their decision in relation to the moral dilemma, the adolescents would show extreme differences in their behavior in the case of demonstrations organized against the expansion of an airport. Whereas 30.6% of the pupils who favor sincerity would take part in such demonstrations (which could eventually lead to clashes between demonstrators and the police), 54.4% of the pupils who would support their class-mate, say they would take part in such actions.

Figure 3
Readiness to Protest and Moral Level of Judgment in Decisions Either for Solidarity with Classmates (Pro) or Sincerity with Teachers (Con) (9th grade, 14 years, N = 66, percentages).
The same structure applies to the problem of squatting. As a conclusion, post-conventional adolescents who adopt the principle of sincerity are less likely to take part in demonstrations which either violate existing laws or imply the use of violence. Within the Kohlberg tradition, the reasons for these differences in the decision on a moral dilemma have been insufficiently investigated.

Summary

We tried, in the first place to explain theoretically the connections existing between both moral level of judgment (according to Kohlberg) and political attitudes (liberalism, conservatism, etc.) which have been established by various authors. According to us, the common topic of moral and political statements, together with the cognitive level (i.e. education), plays a major role within the scope of the comprehension of these correlations; in both fields, namely moral and politics, the notions of equality and justice are actualized. Moreover, Kohlberg's early stage definitions show aspects of contents which are in no neutral relationship with liberal and conservative attitudes. Thus, logical correlations on the one hand and correlations determined by definitions on the other are to be found between moral level and (given) political attitudes, the latter being however since, 1978 no longer included in Kohlberg's modified stage definitions.

The second part of this paper illustrates empirical results concerning the question of the possible connections between the level of moral judgment and political attitudes. The most evident connections are to be found between moral stage and (socio-cognitive) political aspects of competence; quite important positive correlations also exist with regard to critical forms of political attitude which concentrate on the domains of social equality and justice. On the contrary, both concrete political behavior as well as aspects of motivation (political involvement or interest) play a secondary role.

Conventional or post-conventional adolescents (stage 3 to 5) are characterized not only by a higher stage of political competence, but also by a stronger support for the equality of
women at work, for more participation of the workers in industrial affairs and for equal opportunities in education. Such a political attitude also implies a greater readiness to protest. These adolescents, at a higher moral stage, are more likely to take part in demonstrations or similar actions against the deployment of more missiles and against the planning of further nuclear power plants.

The decision opted for in relation to the moral dilemma (see preference test), together with level of moral judgment (as a sociocognitive variable), happens to be a major factor for the prognostic of political attitudes: thus, peer-oriented adolescents display other forms of readiness to protest than those who would opt for sincerity.

The level of moral judgment of adolescents (measured by means of the preference test MUP) emerges as a significant factor for the prognostic of political attitudes relating to norms of equality and justice.

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Is Kohlberg's 'Principled' Moral Reasoning
a Developmental Myth?

Ian Vine

Despite widespread criticisms of his theory of moral development, Kohlberg continues to claim that he has identified an invariant and ideology-free sequence of cognitive-structural levels and stages, by which the individual reaches maturity of rational moral judgment (Kohlberg, Levine & Hewer, 1983a). His major reaction to a variety of objections has been to revise the scoring system used to assess responses to the moral dilemmas presented in the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI). One consequence has been that Stage 6 - the fully equilibrated end-point of structural advances during development of moral thought - has become so empirically elusive as not to figure within the current Standard Form scoring system (Kohlberg, Colby, Gibbs, Speicher-Dubin & Power, 1977).

Much of the controversy has centered upon the final 'post-conventional' or 'principled' level, at which universal moral rights, duties, and principles of justice are held to take precedence over the actual norms of one's society. Although this level is now only represented empirically by Stage 5 - which is acknowledged as being attained only during adulthood and by a small minority - Kohlberg insists that it is a 'hard' or Piagetian structural shift towards greater moral rationality. In contrast, I shall argue that both the empirical and theoretical support for this claim are unpersuasive. On the one hand, the capacity to give Stage 5 answers in the MJI need not signify the genuinely impartial and fully universalized moral thinking that Kohlberg purports to measure. On the other hand, Stage 5 cannot convincingly be seen as a 'natural' advance upon the 'conventional' morality of Stage 4, once social and motivational influences upon moral discourse and commitment are admitted and Kohlberg's individualism and rationalism are challenged.
The Empirical Standing of Stage 5

It is now accepted that earlier scoring criteria gave many subjects spuriously high scores, mis-classified as Stages 5 and 6. Until such data is reassessed it cannot be used to support claims about the 'principled' level of moral reasoning. Very little data based upon the new system has been reported as yet; but it is clear that even partial performance at Stage 5 is rare: "8 subjects in the United States ... 18 kibbutz founders in Israel ... 1 subject in Turkey ... and 3 kibbutz youth" (Kohlberg, Snarey & Reimer, 1983b, p. 22). Were it not for the kibbutz founders, it might seem that "those socio-environmental conditions that impede or facilitate the emergence of principled reasoning" (Kohlberg et al., 1983a, p. 199) are such as virtually to preclude the attainment of Stage 5 outside the USA. Yet Kohlberg confidently rejects any suggestion that the stage has he defines it might "simply express Western values" (p. 202).

Elsewhere I have reviewed the evidence from cross-cultural research in some detail (Vine, 1984a), concluding that cultural bias cannot be ruled out from either the definition or measurement of Kohlbergian moral maturity - particularly at the post-conventional level. It appears that Stage 5 is only readily attained among groups most likely to have been influenced by Western ideologies - particularly liberalism - through higher education and privileged social positions. In the absence of good evidence for Stage 5 scores amongst non-Westernized persons, Kohlberg cannot claim to have shown empirically that it is the one universally valid, structural advance upon conventional moral reasoning.

In any case, there are serious flaws in the nature of the MJI dilemmas. Neither these, nor their 'probe' questions, are able to assess moral ethnocentrism which involves departures from strictly impartial and fully universalized judgments. Yet Kohlberg (e.g. 1977, Part I) makes it clear that, at least with regard to the most basic rights like life and liberty, Stage 5 moralists must uphold their principles even when these conflict with in-group loyalties. Only the most strongly prejudiced subjects are likely to reveal spontaneously during the MJI that they are responding with just a restricted group of moral equals
in mind. Failure to check for ethnocentrism in an explicit way may well mean that some subjects are scored as Stage 5 inappropriately. Indeed, this methodological omission may call into question the strongest cross-cultural data in favour of Stage 5—namely that from Israeli kibbutz founders and youth. As I argue elsewhere, an ideological commitment to Zionism must make it extremely difficult for a Jew to avoid ethnocentric preferences which militate against truly equal consideration of Jewish and Arab interests. Stage 5 principles may be verbally espoused in all sincerity; but if this is done with only a limited moral in-group in mind, that ought to disqualify the person from being scored as Stage 5. Unresolved doubts on this score must thus leave some uncertainty about the frequency with which kibbutzniks show true Stage 5 reasoning (Vine, 1984b).

The same ambiguity arises when we consider the other major empirical problem which Kohlberg neglects to take seriously and check for—that of false responding. Hopefully, Machiavellians who simply 'fake good' to produce socially desirable responses have been rare amongst subjects of Kohlbergian research. But only an irreversible change in basic cognitive structures would preclude being able to view moral issues from a 'principled' perspective while failing to adopt that mode of thought in one's own practical reasoning. It begs the question just to assume that because Stage 5 is a 'hard' one this is impossible, and thus that deceptive attempts to simulate such answers would be evident to MJl scores. In any case, self-deception can be expected to bridge the extremes of conscious and unconscious rhetorical moralizing which departs from the authentic expression of one's actual moral commitments. Self-deception may play a much more substantial role in our everyday moral evaluations than we like to think, as it can both protect self-esteem and facilitate deceiving others to avoid moral blame (Vine, 1983a). Habitual self-deception—say, concerning one's latent moral ethnocentrism—may well mean that some subjects give answers which are undeservedly scored as Stage 5.

As soon as questions are raised about the authenticity of Stage 5 discourse, it becomes clear that there is a fundamental conceptual issue over which Kohlberg is ambivalent, if not actually inconsistent. This concerns the substance of his stages
- or what it actually means to be 'at' a given stage. I shall argue that once this ambiguity is clarified in such a way as to make the theory properly coherent, it becomes clear that Stage 5 cannot possibly be a 'hard' Piagetian one if it refers to prescriptive commitments.

The Theoretical Nature of Stage 5

A Piagetian developmental stage must represent some irreversible transformation of a cognitive structure. And for Kohlberg's theory the structures are "modes of moral judgment ... or decision" (Kohlberg et al., 1977, Part I, p. 6). These judgments refer in turn to "prescriptive valuing of the socially good and right" (p. 10). In explaining discrepancies between moral judgment and action, he has recently distinguished prescriptions of the form 'X ought to be done' from those which say 'I ought to do X' - which he identifies as judgments of personal responsibility, likely to generate an intention to act unless non-moral factors intervene (Kohlberg et al., 1983a). But it is evident that each type of judgment presupposes or embodies moral motivation, which I shall refer to as general commitment and active commitment respectively. To act in accordance with one's principles in a given situation, one must make an active commitment. At Stage 5 this entails upholding personally a general commitment to universalized individual rights and justice.

Although Kohlberg defines his 'principled' level in terms of making particular commitments, he has given no adequate account of how they are made or acquire the prescriptive force that can motivate action. He appears to be forced to rely upon the highly problematic assumption that reasoning can in itself yield a sense of obligation to other persons, rather than building upon pre-existing social sympathies (Vine, 1983b). This theoretical weakness is constantly obscured by the fact that he confounds procedural reasoning from premises to conclusions with judgments or decisions, and with commitments or prescriptive beliefs. Thus he does not consistently distinguish between understanding a principle, or being cognitively competent at making inferences from it, and being personally committed to it. But in strict
terms moral reasoning concerns only processes of inference from moral premises to conclusions, whether or not there is any personal general commitment to those premises. Prescriptive conclusions remain simply hypothetical unless commitment is present - and only then to they become moral judgments in a categorical sense.

Of course in the MJI subjects are asked to make judgments, and these are presumed to reflect authentic general commitments. How verbal prescriptions are justified with reference to the latter will determine which stage they are assigned to. But in that case it must be the form of reasoning which specifies the stage. Kohlberg gives us no reason to expect that the underlying cognitive structures and processes of a given stage will be any different if actual commitment is or is not present. And he constantly insists that 'hard' stages, in contrast to 'soft' ones, must be purely cognitive in nature. In that case they must be stages of reasoning rather than of judgments; and the Machiavellian who produces insincere Stage 5 pseudo-judgments must be deemed just as mature in cognitive terms as the authentic Stage 5 moralist. So long as persons whose actual commitments consciously or unconsciously fall short of Stage 5 principles can reason exactly as if they held them, there can be no theoretical warrant for denying them Stage 5 status. If Kohlberg does insist upon defining a stage in terms of authentic judgments, this must take it beyond the Piagetian paradigm into the realm of affective, existential, ego-involved, 'soft' stages.

A Functionalist Approach to 'Principled' Discourse

There may be a distinctive type of cognitive structure that is associated with competence for post-conventional moral reasoning, and meets Piagetian criteria. If so there is room for considerable dispute about whether its form is specific to values of justice and rights, instead of more collectivist values (Vine, 1984a). But in any case, research with the MJI cannot settle this question, as it does not properly explore reasoning of the latter kind. And formal operations reasoning of any type is highly abstract, and geared to utilizing hypothetical premises in argument. Moreover, general moral principles like those invoked
at Stage 5 are necessarily vague ones. So even if persons only capable of conventional reasoning usually answer MJI questions in close accordance with their actual moral commitments, the same may not be true of post-conventional subjects. With a morality of abstract principles it will be that much easier to claim moral commitments, and deploy them logically in argument, without even realizing that they are not in fact held in a fully authentic way. In particular, it will be that much easier to fail to recognize when self-interest leads to them being applied in distorted and selective fashion. Verbal moralization may express general commitments, yet be motivated by desires for social approval or other personal or in-group gains, and it may be easy to disguise the fact that they are at variance with one's self-prescriptive active commitments, and so are inauthentic in a second sense.

The primary social function of verbal moralization is a persuasive one, and ideally it minimizes potential social disruptions that would be caused by unregulated pursuit of individuals' desires (Vine, 1983b). But it can be used as a "weapon of intergroup conflict" (Breakwell, 1983, p. 243). Shared in-group codes strengthen collective identity - but can also support the denigration of out-groups with different codes. And moral rhetoric which invokes more inclusive principles may be almost the only defence which powerless persons have if powerful ones violate their interests. The appeal of Stage 5 justice-and-rights rhetoric is important in this respect, as it defines the moral in-group within which life and liberty must be upheld impartially as including all human beings - including oneself.

A simplified model of how moralization which takes a Stage 5 form could gain currency within modern liberal democracies can finally be outlined, without making the dubious assumptions required by Kohlberg's own analysis. For many purposes the 'ruling class' of a large, complex, hierarchically stratified society can be regarded as an elite, or in-group of leaders with disproportionate power (Parry, 1969). Their persuasive moralization direction at the lower classes of their society will predominantly be couched in Stage 3 or 4 rationalistic terms. It may be consciously sincere; but in fact they stand to make disproportionate personal gains from the sacrifices which others
make 'in the national interest', so they have a powerful non-moral inducement to promote these. However, their power is largely contingent upon the co-operation of sub-elitist groups - predominantly administrative and managerial, professional specialists whose loyalty to the social system is vital.

Yet that loyalty may also be fragile, as the sub-elitist must be highly educated and is likely to develop the formal capacity for postconventional moral reasoning. Its members will also often be privy to the exploitative and self-serving activities of the elite, and thus aware of discrepancies between its moral rhetoric and its practice. Some, as a result of atypical socialization conditions which are as yet poorly understood, may develop genuinely principled commitments, extending aspects of conventional morality in the direction of liberal or even socialist ideals. But most, having attained their social position through a competitive struggle for self-advancement, will be more likely to develop inauthentic liberal 'principles.' Stage 5 morality is well-suited for self-deceived or cynical selective usage, when one stands to gain personally from its application to situations in which one's own position is inequitable. Because it can outbid the spurious rhetoric of the elite, an insistence on individual rights and justice can help the sub-elitist to protect and advance its own interests - backed by the unstated threat of withdrawal of co-operation with the elite. And of course the elite itself will be obliged to adopt the same mode of moral discourse in some contexts, whether or not members acquire any degree of general or active commitment to its principles.

The model indicates, in outline, how we might explain the general pattern of results suggested by the Kohlbergian data on the social distribution of Stage 5 scores, as measured by responses to MJI dilemmas - without assuming that it is a 'hard' stage.

If coming to espouse a morality of abstract principles of rights and justice, at least in rhetorical discourse, depends upon exposure to liberal ideology and upon one's social position - rather than just achieving cognitive sophistication in procedural reasoning about moral issues - then major social changes are likely to be required before universal attainment of Stage 5 morality is feasible. And whether it, rather than a more
collectivist morality, is ethically superior is a highly controversial matter. But in either case, if our concern is with authentic moral commitments rather than the capacity for rhetoric, it seems likely that modes of social organization involving the division of humanity into classes and nation-states must be inimical to the development of truly universalized moral commitments. These are issues which moral educators can avoid, so long as they are only concerned with factors which promote the formal reasoning skills required for principled thought. But whether we attain real commitments to such moralities must surely depend upon how society structures our social identifications and relationships, and thus constrains our social sympathies and loyalties.

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At the heart of Kohlberg's theory of moral thinking is his contention that moral judgments and reasoning structures can be ordered in a universal developmental sequence of preconventional, conventional and principled levels. In part, this sequence is said to reflect an underlying developmental logic of differentiation, integration and hierarchical subordination of earlier stages and levels. This logic may be traced out regardless of the empirical existence of the stages. But Kohlberg also claims that ontogenetic development everywhere follows his postulated sequence. Ian's paper attacks both claims made for his principled stages, with specific reference to Stage 5. If Ian's criticisms are correct, an important part of Kohlberg's theory would have to be reformulated or replaced.

Ian's paper outlines three major arguments that appear to me to be distinct from each other, if not contradictory. First, he claims that Stage 5 is a developmental myth lacking empirical cross-cultural verification. Subsequently, he submits that often Stage 5 statements are consciously or unconsciously "faked" and, finally, he proposes that privileged minorities in modern, liberal societies are most likely to engage in Stage 5 discourse (and the faking thereof). Yet, if Stage 5 is so very rarely produced in interviews, how can it be so easily and frequently faked?

This paper addresses itself initially to some cross-cultural work on Kohlberg's theory. Subsequently, it will touch upon some of the broader issues that are implied, but not always clearly raised by Ian's remarks on faking. To gain a better understanding of his point of view, references are made to his work on cross-cultural research (Vine, in press) and on political uses of Kohlbergian moral rhetoric (Vine, 1984).

My own cross-cultural research has attempted to investigate sociomoral and religious conceptions in the Tibetan culture of
Ladakh (India), among the Garinagu of Belize (Gielen & Johnston, 1984; Gielen et al., 1984), Haiti (Gielen, 1983), Trinidad, Germany (Gielen, in press) and the USA. Only a very limited amount of this work has so far been published in detail, but my experiences in mainstream Western cultures (Germany, USA), hybrid African-Western cultures (Belize, Haiti, Trinidad) and in one truly Non-Western culture (Ladakh) have led me to theoretical and methodological positions quite different from many critics of Kohlberg's theory (i.e., Sullivan, 1977; Vine, in press). The critics often assert that Kohlberg's theory reflects ethnocentric bias because it takes "the rationalistic, individualistic, 'liberal-democratic' values of the white, male, American intellectual as distinctively "mature" (Vine, in press) and because it uses Western testing procedures inappropriately in non-Western societies unused to these testing procedures. I will call this general "suspicion" (it really is no more than that) potential for methodological and theoretical imperialism in developmental approaches.

Because of space limitations, I will use only one example to suggest how vague and misleading such general criticism can become, and to suggest that the critics often lack first hand experience with relevant cross-cultural research. The example is taken from my use of the famous Heinz dilemma in a small Haitian village. For the illiterate, desperately poor respondents (both women and men), this dilemma was far more realistic and "ecologically valid" than it has been for my German or American middle class respondents. The large majority of Haitian villagers firmly rejected stealing as a valid alternative in the Heinz dilemma, though in a comparable, real life situation it would have been in their (or their wife's) "naked self-interest" to steal. Most Haitian villagers apparently reasoned at Stages 2 and (early) 3 (see also White, 1984). In real life, stealing in the villages occurred fairly infrequently, especially given the extreme need- fulness of the villagers. For the Ladakhi villagers, the (adopted) Heinz dilemma was much less realistic because in Ladakh the story's doctor-druggist would in real life typically be hard pressed to sustain his greed in the face of community and religious disapproval. Yet the Ladakhis were quite able ad willing to reason about stealing, the value of life, punishment,
etc. Since they live in a firmly Buddhist society, the value of
life was quite salient to them. Some advocated stealing in the
dilemma, others did not. In real life, stealing was said to be
extremely rare in Ladakh's villages. Moral judgment scores varied
between Stages 1-3, and women received higher scores that did
men.

These as well as many other experiences have led to the
following conclusions concerning Kohlberg's methods and theories
that are at variance with those of Ian and other critics. (1) It
makes little difference whether members of a given society are
"test-wise" or not. Almost none of my more than 190 respondents
in Belize, Haiti, and Ladakh had ever been interviewed before,
yet most of them readily reasoned and judged in response to
various dilemmas or other open-ended questions. Personality
factors such as shyness, the atmosphere surrounding the inter­
view, etc., are more important than the degree of Westernization
on the part of respondents, their exposure to testing, etc. (2)
Some dilemmas used by Kohlberg and others may be more realistic
in some semi-Western or non-Western cultures than in some Western
cultures. New dilemmas appropriate to a given culture can readily
be developed. The usefulness of the dilemmas and related methodo­
logies varies in response to specific cultural and personal cir­
cumstances. (2) The commonly drawn distinction between Western
and non-Western cultures is misleading for moral judgment
research. Moral judgment scores are much more influenced by the
complexity and institutional integration of societies, by educa­
tional levels and by the influence of rigorous ethical systems,
(i.e., Confucianism) than by degrees of Westernization
(Elfenbein, 1973). (4) There are no general, cross-culturally
stable structural sex differences, nor is Kohlberg's theory
simply a "male" theory. For example, numerous studies using the
DIT show either no sex differences or small sex differences
favoring females as long as males and females are equated for age
and education (Thomas, 1984). (5) In the moral judgment liter­
ature too much concern is shown for structural considerations and
too little attention is paid to content and function. (Perhaps,
Ian would agree to this?) (6) Relationships between structures,
content and behaviors outside the testing situations are complex,
often non-obvious, and perhaps quite different from what is now
imagined. For instance, in my research, Ladakhi villagers were more likely to advocate stealing in the Heinz dilemma than were Haitian villagers; yet in real life the Ladakhis apparently stole less frequently. Such complexities may also be expected to make their appearance with principled subjects. Such complexities may also be expected to make their appearance with principled subjects. Ian's assumption that Stage 5 respondents should consistently show actual commitment to universalized moral prescriptions in almost all situations seem to me to be quite unrealistic, nor is it demanded by Kohlberg's theory. (7) Postconventional thinking is very rare and probably appears in most cases only under the following conditions: a) Most individuals exhibiting principled reasoning live in a structurally complex society; b) they have attained formal schooling at least through late adolescence whether it be "Western" or not; c) they exhibit high level formal or post-formal operations (Commons et al., 1984); d) they display ideological awareness and have been exposed to competing, complex value systems; e) they have been exposed to highly generalized and abstract role taking opportunities and have acquired corresponding competences.

Kohlberg's characterization of Stage 5 may in fact be incomplete or even misleading in some ways. One might expect this because a) his data base for higher stages is insufficient; b) at higher stages, culture and society and mind interpenetrate in especially complex ways; and c) higher stages are inherently more complex and difficult to understand than are lower stages (Rest, 1979). However, while Kohlberg's delineation of Stage 5 may be in need of revision and more detailed specification, Ian's decision to completely dismiss evidence from the more than 500 DIT studies and the earlier interview studies appears to be arbitrary. For instance, in some DIT studies, respondents such as conscientious objectors, moral philosophers, political scientists, and others, received average P-scores (principled choices) of 60 and higher. While the DIT employs more lenient definitions of principled stages than does the revised Colby et al. scoring system, and while recognition data yield higher stage estimates than do production data, these results are not insignificant for a discussion of the nature of principled thinking. Such data are compatible with Kohlberg's Platonic theorizing and may imply that
intuitions about and preferences for principled thinking are rather common, though a full understanding of and consistent commitment to principled moral decisions may be quite rare. Data from the DIT and other sources suggest that the search for a more precise and comprehensive delineation of principled modes of thinking may ultimately be successful.

Ian's comments regarding the functional use of Stage 5 discourse and the relationships between reasoning, judging, commitment and action are far too extensive to receive an adequate response here, but some short summary questions may be raised about his arguments: (1) Where are all those "Stage 5 reasoners" he so freely speculates about? If it's so easy to present oneself (for whatever reasons) as a fully principled person, why are there so very few respondents receiving Stage 5 scores in the new interview procedure? (2) Ian is far too ready to include rhetorical and other usages of the language of human rights, dignity, freedom, etc. in the Stage 5 category. Consistent Stage 5 scores in interviews are assigned to the few who consistently employ principled reasoning in response to specific moral action dilemmas and in response to extensive follow-up questions, not to the many who selectively use politicized code words and phrases whenever convenient. (3) Why does Ian expect closer links between moral reasoning and commitment at lower stages rather than at higher stages when the (admittedly sparse) evidence shows just the opposite pattern (Blasi, 1980; Kohlberg & Candee, 1984; Gielen, in press)? (4) There is a consistent disregard for the competence-performance distinction in his paper. Perhaps a parallel from Piagetian theory may be appropriate here. Persons fully capable of formal operations will spend much of their days employing very little of it. The competence probably comes into play only when necessary, and even then a given person will often fail to use it! Similarly, a person capable of principled thinking will apply little of it much of the time, because it is not necessary to do so. In addition, one may fail to use it because of ego-defensive reasons, emotional or situational pressures, etc. The same is equally as true for other stages of moral thought, if not more so. Kohlberg probably overestimates the pervasiveness of his stage structures and underestimates the degree of compartmentalization or segmentation.
occurring in moral thinking at any stage. While this limits the scope of his theory, it does not make it invalid. (5) Each stage may lead to potential blindesses or "moral perversions," especially when a person is under cultural, political, economic and situational pressures. At Stage 5, for instance, a person may limit his or her role taking to those with whom she or he imagines to have a social contract, leading sometimes to ethnocentrism, disregard for the life of animals, etc. Politically motivated discourse may then act as a veil for moral actors.

Kohlberg's theory has a distinctively idealistic and "Apollonian" cast with its emphasis on balance, rationality, order and restraint. His version of the social contract has lost the themes of pervasive greed, power and violence that characterized Hobbes' version of the social contract. Ian's paper goes back to a long tradition of European pessimism and scepticism (Machiavelli, Hobbes, Marx, Freud, Pareto, Foucault). This tradition may serve as a necessary and useful counterpoint to the excessively optimistic and rationalistic preoccupations of formalist philosophers and psychologists. What this tradition lacks at present is a convincing methodology for the investigation of the darker side of human life.

References


Public Bads, Moral Judgments and Expectations of Future:  
The Case of the New Social Movements in Germany

Lucian Kern, Heinz-Ulrich Kohl & Hans-Georg Räder

Introduction

Drawing on survey data from Germany and arguments from social choice theory, we propose to take a fresh look at the rise of social movements as exemplified by the emergence of the New Social Movements (NSM), e.g. the peace movement or the ecological movement.

Our thesis starts with the observation that public choice theory explains the continued existence of social movements already established, but not why the movements have arisen. We then analyze the rise of social movements in analogy to the creation of public goods as a Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) problem. The conclusion is that social movements will not arise if the individuals follow their myopic interests, viz. choose the dominant strategy in the PD game. But, following Sen, we argue that the co-operative solution to the PD problem may well be achieved if the persons involved follow a moral rule. This establishes the hypothesis that co-operative behavior, leading to the rise of social movements, will depend on the strength of individual moral views.

We have used Kohlberg's level of moral reasoning as an instrument to measure strength of individual moral views. This has meant an adaptation of the Kohlbergian instrument in order to make it applicable to survey data.

In this context we additionally introduce a variable which we have called 'prosocial behavior' and which supplements the moral judgment by adding the element of positive action towards social ends. In a sense one may interpret it as a measure of altruism. We hypothesize that people scoring high on 'prosocial behavior' will be more likely to co-operate in PD-like situations.

A high level of individual moral reasoning and/or a high score on 'prosocial behavior' is necessary for co-operative
behavior in PD-like situations. But it is not necessary and sufficient. We have to take into account another variable, viz. the utility difference between the co-operative and the non-co-operative solution to the PD problem, which in our case means the difference between the existence and the non-existence of some social movement (considered to be conducive to the removal of specific public goods). Now, it is known from experimental game theory, that the higher the difference (in terms of payoffs to the players), the more probable it is that the persons involved will behave co-operatively. A good indicator for a growing difference, which also points to the salience of a PD problem, seems to be the growing pessimism about future developments in highly industrialized societies (especially with respect to the spreading of public goods such as environmental pollution). Hence our hypothesis: the more pessimistic the view, the more co-operative the behavior.

Drawing on the results of an earlier study, we then argue that the NSM in Germany can be analyzed in terms of the shift from the formerly prevailing paradigm of distribution, viz. the economic growth option, to the paradigm of life-style, viz. the ecology option. Being the most general description of problems dealt with by the NSM, we hypothesize that adherence to the paradigms will separate supporters of the NSM (co-operators) from indifferents and opponents (free riders and others).

Prisoners' Dilemma

Riker and Ordeshook have convincingly argued, that the problem of supplying a public good basically is a PD problem. This applies also to social movements. Assuming that the public good in question has a positive value to each of the persons involved and that the value can be expressed as payoffs in a PD game with $a > b > c > d$, then the 2-person version of the game (which can be easily extended to a n-person version) has the following payoff matrix:
If \( C \) is the co-operative strategy of contributing to the supply of the public good or the emergence of the social movement and \( NC \) the non-co-operative strategy of not contributing, it is easily seen, that the public good will not be supplied (or the social movement will not emerge), since for both players, 1 and 2, \( NC \) is the dominant strategy, because it guarantees a higher payoff irrespective of the other's choice of strategy. Hence, the outcome will be \((c,c)\), which is pareto-inferior to \((b,b)\).

Thus, the explanation of the emergence of social movements must be sought elsewhere. According to our hypotheses we argue that the rise of the NSM will depend, among others, on the following variables: individual level of moral reasoning, prosocial behavior, pessimism about future development and acceptance of specific political paradigms.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: The higher the level of moral reasoning a person can be associated with, the more likely he (or she) is to co-operate in PD-like situations.

Hypothesis 2: The higher a person scores on the variable 'prosocial behavior,' the more likely it is that he/she co-operates in PD-like situations.

Hypothesis 3: The more pessimistic the individual image of the future implying the enduring existence of public bads, the more likely it is that individuals will co-operate in order to remove the bads.

Hypothesis 4: The more a person accepts the paradigm of lifestyle and rejects the paradigm of distribution, the more likely he/she is to co-operate in the NSM.
The Operationalization

We have operationalized co-operative and free riding behavior with regard to the NSM in the following way:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Rejection of 'classical' and rightist interest groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSM*</td>
<td>Identification with one or more NSM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Active or potentially active in NSM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question: Activity</td>
<td>Active in political or social groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Readiness for activity</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types:</td>
<td>ACTIVISTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognition of problem</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Item list: Peace movement, anti-nuclear power plant movement, ecological movement, women's liberation movement, groups initiating alternative ways of life (for example agricultural communes), activists groups of union members, groups actively engaged for the interests of industry, anti-communist front or comparable groups, 'Foreigners Out'-movements.

Respondents were asked to rate movements on the list on the following scale: (1) I belong to this group/ I act in the same way (identification), (2) I don't belong to this group, but I agree with them (sympathy), (3) I am not interested in this group/ Makes no difference to me (no sympathy), (4) I don't like this group (rejection/ no sympathy), (5) I am strongly opposed to this group (rejection/ no sympathy), (6) Don't know/Never heard of this group (no sympathy).
Empirical Results

Table 1: Moral Judgment of Different Groups (cf. text)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Moral Judgment</th>
<th>Co-operators</th>
<th>Free Riders</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Sum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-conventional</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-conventional</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n | 81 | 390 | 85 | 556 |

Column Pct. | 14.7 | 70.0 | 15.3 | 100.0 |

Missing: 13. \( \text{Chi}^2 = 29.3 \) (6 df), \( p = .001 \).

Table 2: Pro-social Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of approval</th>
<th>Co-operators</th>
<th>Free Riders</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Sum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n | 81 | 392 | 88 | 561 |

Column Pct. | 14.5 | 69.9 | 15.6 | 100.0 |

Missing: 8 persons. \( \text{Chi}^2 = 75.8 \) (4 df), \( p = .001 \).

Pearson's R = 0.34, \( p = .001 \).

*Low level: 0 to 4 out of 9 examples implying prosocial behavior were approved of by respondents (reaction to item: 'I would act in the same way'). Medium level: 5 to 7 out of 9 examples were approved of. High level: 8 to 9 out of 9 examples were approved of.
Table 3: Expectations of Future

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expectations*</th>
<th>Co-operators</th>
<th>Free Riders</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Sum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relatively optimistic</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pessimistic</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>45.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very pessimistic</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Pct.</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Missing: 271 (question was only asked half of the sample).

$\chi^2 = 12.4$ (4 df), $p = .01$. Pearson's $R = -0.19$, $p = .001$.

*Relatively optimistic: Respondents react negatively toward 1 to 5 out of 10 examples of future developments (reaction to items: 'certain' or 'probable' to negative examples, 'certainly not' or 'probably not' to positive examples). Pessimistic: Negative reactions toward 6 to 8 out of 10 examples. Very pessimistic: Negative reaction toward 9 or all examples.

Table 4: Political Paradigms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paradigms*</th>
<th>Co-operators</th>
<th>Free Riders</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Sum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life-Style</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Pct.</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Distribution: Statement describing paradigm of distribution is evaluated by respondents more positively than statement describing paradigm of life-style. Mixed: Paradigm of life-style is evaluated exactly like paradigm of distribution. Life-style: Paradigm of life-style is evaluated more positively than paradigm of distribution.
Hypotheses 2 through 4 are well corroborated by the data, but not hypothesis 1. The predicted relation between level of moral reasoning and co-operative behavior seems to be disturbed by two intervening effects: First, among the free riders, there is a subgroup, the 'potential activists' with a much higher percentage on the post-conventional level than both co-operators and free riders (this explains the low difference between co-operators and free riders on the post-conventional level); second, the countercurrent tendency at the pre-conventional level seems to be caused by the 'Raskolnikoff syndrome:' people having passed the conventional level may use the pre-conventional level to express their protest against a conventional morality. In sum, there is a relation between level of moral reasoning and co-operative behavior, but it is more complex than predicted.

Conclusion

Summarizing our results, we think we have uncovered several important factors which may explain the rise of social movements, but which are usually not considered by public choice theory. These factors are: moral sensitivity together with prosocial behavior, sensitivity to new problems arising in a society and the awareness that hitherto unquestioned public goods may turn into public bads by the price we have to pay for them.
Individuality and Conflicts in Commitment

Ben Sylvester-Bradley

I.

This chapter is conceived partly as a commentary upon the preceding ones and partly as a condensation of the paper I read at Konstanz entitled "Language and the Dissolution of Individuality." My change of title is a consequence of discussions during the conference. With a closer understanding of the foregoing papers I now see that I should focus my remarks more upon the implications of a discursive analysis of language for the development of individuality than on the characteristics of discursive analysis itself.

My founding argument is that the maintenance and development of (im)morality is essentially social not individual in character. Morality centrally involves forms of life which embrace many persons. Whilst I agree with Tom Wren that "the justificatory discourse which goes on within the internal forum of the agent's conscience" plays an important part in moral life, it must be recognized that such discourses and fora are processes of social construction which depend upon the specific circumstances within which an agent lives and has lived (see Freud, 1923; Mead, 1934; Vygotsky, 1978 for classic statements of this argument). I doubt that "the ability to evaluate desires" (Tom), if this is viewed solely as an "internal process," is rightly put at the heart of morality. It would seem better to focus on the construction of moral practices, something which may involve the introspective evaluation of desires but also involves social processes of discussion, joint action, criticism, identification, imitation and opposition (abilities which Tom's approach makes marginal).

What is "individuality?" And what is its importance for discussions of morality? Is there really a "conflict-free zone" (Tom's words) at the core of every individual? And, if so, is it that zone which should provide the focus for moral psychology?
I want to approach answers to these questions by posing my own viewpoint as an argument against Tom's. I choose to do this advisedly as I share Tom's central concern, his desire to develop a serious moral psychology. I want to illustrate that more is at stake in academic proceedings than the demarcation of theoretical differences. For example, to evaluate the thinking which led to "the construct of the ego as a conflict-free zone" is to elicit a series of discourses (traditionally connected sets of statements) which have as their objects more important things than the formulation of different research designs or academic controversies. And I am not only concerned here with the motives for the American bowdlerization of conflict from Freud. Thus one can hardly pay attention to the phrase "conflict-free zone" for long before realizing its metaphorical dependence on war and, by association, with nuclear holocausts and all their attendant moral questions, fears and desires, overt and covert. A "moral psychology" which does not centrally concern this and other such social issues is not worthy of the name (though whether the current boom in experiments on "stress before the holocaust" fits this bill is doubtful).

It is a fact that moral debates tend to become "heated" as soon as their content changes from the abstract to the concrete, from eternal virtues to current ones. Political currents are always implicit in the language philosophers and scientists use, although their debates can be insulated from the serious discussion of contentious public issues. For example, there is a crucial difference between ways of discussing consciousness such that one is nor is not moved closer to a resolved view of the nature of foetal life and its relation to the abortion issue. I argue that if we are to develop our individualities, our moral coherences, as professionals and as domestic people, we must focus explicitly on public goods and public goods. As soon as we do this, we are faced with "pros and cons," the conflicts in articulations of common sense, without which there would be no moral problems. The question is whether such conflicts, and conflict always has a moral-political aspect, should be overt or covert. I argue that it should be overt, that philosophical and scientific language should be explicitly committed and exhort. For example, scientists argue that it is "natural" for mothers to
be housebound women because the psychology of women and babies are evolutionarily designed for such an arrangement. But they might argue overtly that it is morally preferable for women to mother as this is an arrangement that has worked well in the past and a good way (for men) to avoid domestic obligations. I distrust academic discourses which allow us to ignore or merely allude to such obligations and issues. Moral philosophy should be concrete, particular and future-looking in its conclusions. The question is not Lenin's "what is to be done?," but what is to be done about x, y and z? The role of moral psychology is thus to describe and define the public goods and bads, "x, y and z," the contents of which are constantly changing.

How are we publicly to account for and evaluate philosophy and psychology as moral exercises? How are our performances as MOSAIC members to be judged, by others and by ourselves?

My first criticisms are of my own contribution in Konstanz. While I still "want to explore how moral discussions might be affected by a change from taking individuals as the ultimate foundation of human subjectivity to considering and subjectivity as non-unitary, non-rational, contradictory and not causal," I no longer maintain that the primary focus of our attention should be "discourses" or "discursive practices" (Henriques et al. 1984). Our focus should rather concern the development of individuality and its suppression for economic, military, political, sexual and other social causes. The main value of the paper I gave in Konstanz is to summarize the ways in which moral psychologists are, to use Nietzsche's (1967) idea, "seduced" in their language "(and the fundamental errors of reason that are petrified in it) which conceives and misconceives all effects as conditioned by something that causes effects, by a 'subject'."

II.

Scientists and philosophers are seduced by language to believe in an undivided "subject" by the equation of the pronoun "I" with oneness. This assumption leads to what has been criticized as moral individualism (Lukes, 1973; Emler, 1983). Below I discuss seven key features of individualism.
(i) The cornerstone of individualism is the assumption that subjectivity is the quality of individuals who are unitary, identifiable and describable in non-contradictory terms, as having for example, one personality, one intelligence and one sexual identity. We have already seen that even the moral judgments of what is biologically "the same individual" have contrasting psychological implications. Fritz Oser and Wolfgang Althof showed that the same interviewee may respond to the "Heinz" dilemma at Kohlberg's "Stage five" of moral reasoning and to questions about shop-lifting at "Stage two." And Ian Vine has shown how the same politician draws on both universalist ("Stage Five") and nationalist ("Stage Four") reasoning to make the same point in the same speech. And if multiplicity is the rule for peoples' moral judgments, how much more multiple are our plans, desires, fears, memories and other subjective qualities! Only by positing the subject as a conflict-free unit can the cosmos be kept clean and unpolitical for academic philosophers and scientists who wish to observe and pronounce upon it.

Picture how conflicted may be the ego of the woman who works as a professional scientist and participates daily in practices which define her as ambitious and talented, as the passive object of male sexual drives, as a(n un)dependable controller of household matters, as the unimaginative drudge who only holds down her job through long hours of slog and as the flibberty-gibbet with no serious professional intentions other than to find a man (Selby, 1984). Picture the egos of fathers who set the highest store by family life and yet are workobsessed, who believe in equality for women but never clean the toilet (Holly, 1984). Such examples confirm the view that subjective multiplicity is the rule for most human beings. But, as I argue further below (v), this is not to deny that human beings may dislike multiplicity or that moral development may be correctly conceived as towards unity and coherency (though of responsibility and commitment rather than of cognition, see next section) (cf. James, 1902).

(ii) Like Helen Weinreich-Haste, I am critical of Kohlberg who, in the Cartesian tradition, encourages us to conceive of individuality as philosophers like to think of themselves, as essentially reasonable and primarily concerned with thought. This assumption is the focus of the psychological critique of philo-
sophy which Lacan (e.g. 1975) has derived from Freud. Emotion and agency are not merely consequences of or obstacles to individual thought, they can be shared and are constitutive of subjectivity. As the life of any saint or genius will show the test of truly law-abiding citizens is not that they should behave "reasonably" (which can mean that they should be adult, white, male and, as John Locke argued, own property; Lukes, 1973).

At Konstanz I argued against what Nick Emler (1983) describes as the "rationalism" of post-Kohlbergian moral theory on the grounds "that moral practice is not primarily a phenomenon of cognition but of motivations to acquire positions of power." In response to Helen's argument I would now add to this statement that moral power is exercised responsibly, by commitment. Discourses are moral in that, whether implicitly or explicitly, they all depend on commitments to causes or to other people, commitments which can of course conflict. I conclude that an analytic emphasis on commitment is likely to be more productive than an analytic emphasis on relations of power, although commitments are clearly expressions of and conducive to exercising power. Our efforts as moral psychologists must primarily be put into the explication of otherwise implicit social commitments and responsibilities.

(iii) Perhaps as a consequence of setting so much store by "scientific methods," many psychologist appear to assume that individuality or subjectivity are transparent ("accessible" in Tom's paper) to themselves by means of introspection or, at least, to experts trained in modern techniques of interview, observation and experimentation. The idea is that certain measurements register the heart or core of personality, intelligence, moral "stage" or whatever. The approach I am advocating suggests that moral psychologists cannot successfully adopt such a cavalier attitude to the look of the world, to the complexities and contradictions of social life or to the difficulties of psychological description. Thus, as Peter Heymans pointed out in discussion of Fritz Oser and Wolfgang Althof's paper, the "same" social event may appear diversely in different descriptions using different discourses with different moral values. Thus what to the shop-owner and lawyer is "theft" may be "proletarian shopping" or the "liberation" of expropriated labor to the socialist.
Particularly pertinent to Kohlbergian studies of moral development is the problematization of the relationship between language and moral significance in this alternative approach. Language is not simply a passive, methodologically neutral means of assessing stages of moral development, as assumed in judging the rationalizations of fictional choices made by subjects in Kohlbergian surveys. The forms of language in which these choices are set have particular moral commitments, independently of any individual reader. Thus the most famous of Kohlberg's tests for judging "stages" of moral development is based on "Heinz's dilemma:" whether Heinz should rob a mercenary doctor who refuses him the drug which may cure his wife of her otherwise-fatal illness because Heinz is unable to raise the large sum of money demanded by the doctor for the drug. But this story would have different moral connotations if it were part of a Marxist analysis of property or an article in a right-wing newspaper, or if the drug were to facilitate an abortion.

A corollary of this critique of the neutrality of language-use is that one can begin to investigate how the same moral discourse may be related to different moral practices - how one may be able to sound good without having good effects - and vice versa. For example, a man with an ailing parent might argue that she or he should be nursed in his own home by quoting "honour the father and mother" whilst assuming his wife should do all the nursing.

(iv) It is often assumed in discussions of morality that individuals are causally autonomous, the originators of their own actions and hence completely responsible and accountable for these actions. For example, the authors of novels are often viewed as the sole origins of their texts. But, as Marx argued, although human beings make their own history, they do not make it in conditions of their own choosing. We are born into a world which exists before us and which no one of us is able to control. Language and laws pre-exist us, as do opposing discourses, styles, intellectual contradictions, conflicting industrial practices, beliefs and social structures, racial and sexual prejudice, international antipathies and religious differences.

Although I do not think that a de-emphasis of moral agency as autonomous amounts to "abolishing the whole enterprise of moral
philosophy" (Tom), such a de-emphasis will inevitably lead to a recognition of the centrality of the processes of imitation and identification in moral life as well as the ability to reason. In this way the appeal of such books as Thomas and Kempis' "The Imitation of Christ" (one of the most continuously read books in the world since the fifteenth century) must be seen as central to the concerns of moral psychology.

(v) As Lukes (1973) shows, individualism assumes that "individuals" develop themselves. The full flowering of human being is achieved through the cultivation and realization of the individual's own personal potential. Thus human development becomes synonymous with the personal development of individuals, whether it be through genetically controlled brain-growth (Eysenck), progress through a series of moral or cognitive "stages" (Kohlberg, Piaget), eight life-crisis (Erikson), or unpredictable existential epiphanies (Sartre).

Moral development or change? The question posed by Georg Lind about socialization in adulthood cannot be taken too seriously, although I am not sure that the and thus in his conclusion that university "contributes its part to the evolution of the individual personality, and thus also to the evolution of social forms of existence" should be taken as implying simple causality.

Change or development? Or both? If subjectivity can be multiple it follows that people will change their moral positions frequently. At one moment they may loftily discourse upon the virtues of philosophic detachment and, at the next, snub someone solely on grounds of prejudice. Nevertheless, moral development may be towards a kind of coherency-in-multiplicity, a sense of mission in or reconciliation to one's life, however diverse that life may be. Such development will not be attained by individuals in isolation but by mutual influence amongst peers.

Perhaps, following Melanie Klein's introduction of the word "position" to replace "stage" in psychoanalytic theory, we can suggest that individuals may hold a variety of moral positions, positions which are transformed by the ebb and flow of social movements. A position or commitment should not be seen as a step on a ladder for ever left behind on the attainment of the next "stage" in progress towards maturity, but as a site for dramas which can be variously re-enacted at any time of life. Then, as
academics, our question must become not "how do we grade individuals on a moral scale" but how to develop hortatory descriptions of currently available moral positions or dramas. The traditions of feminism, socialism and radical religion provide us with many examples of such descriptions.

(vi) Individualism assumes that "individuals" have and should have a private existence in an otherwise public world, "an area within which the individual should be left alone by others and able to think whatever s/he chooses" (Lukes, 1973).

Gilbert Ryle (1949, p. 29) finds this assumption to be central to psychology's traditional conception of itself: as expected to deal with "internal" processes such that the mind is taken to be a hidden site within which the most essential aspects of the "individual's" life take place (cf. Tom's and Helen's flow-diagrams of "internal processes"). Privacy is also central to the way many people conceive of morality. Moral dilemmas occur "in private," particularly for those who have power to affect the lives of others by their decisions (for civil servants in Britain, such privacy is enforced by the Official Secrets Act).

One of the most telling feminist critiques of political practice is summed up in the slogan "the personal is political." For example, Carol Gilligan questions that Gandhi can be taken as the epitome of the morally developed personality when the oppressive domestic regime he maintained is considered alongside his unorthodox political views. Other feminists have described how domestic heterosexual arrangements between long-term couples consistently position women disadvantageously to men (e.g. Hollway, 1984). Thus, because men are given better facilities for remuneration in modern society, it seems rational and desirable for women to give up work and care for children in the nuclear family. Such work shows that "private" conflicts between husband and wife or adult and child are as much parts of political practices as wars, strikes and insurrections. The women's movement has shown that even the most personal practices are socially structured in ways of which we can become conscious, which can be resisted and changed.

(vii) Finally there is the tendency for us to write and speak as if there were a normal, abstract, moral individual which can be distinguished from the "abnormal" people who need special
treatment and correction (the poor, the "mentally ill," foreigners, women, children, etc.).

"According to this conception, individuals are pictured abstractly as given, with given interests, wants, purposes, needs etc., while society and the state are pictured as sets of actual or possible social arrangements which respond more or less adequately to those individuals' requirements" (Lukes, 1973). They exist independently of and prior to any specific situation.

Such a conception ignores or views ethnocentrically evidence of the contemporaneous cultural and sub-cultural differences between people as well as evidence of historical changes. It also neglects evidence from studies of childhood socialization (e.g. the acquisition of language) which suggests that subjectivity is socially and circumstantially constituted (Henriques et al., 1984). We only become persons or individuals insofar as we are integrated into historically conditioned forms of life which endow us with the qualities deemed essential to personhood and being "an individual."

III.

What would a truly socialized approach to morality look like? And where are we most likely to find examples of it?

The nub of my argument is that it is essential for moral psychologists and philosophers to recognize that individualities are multiple and constituted in conflict. By focusing our attention on an "individual" which is abstracted from social conditions, we are able to ignore current moral issues and avoid stressing the contradictory positions from which people must face up to their moral dilemmas.

In this context I find it valuable to compare Tom Wren's viewpoint with the image of morality implicit in social religions such as "post-Christian" Christianity (Cupitt, 1984). It seems to me that Tom's argument that morality "is a reflexive evaluation in terms of ideals that articulate the agent's deepest sense of what is important" leading to the formula "the greatest moral struggle is that of self-interpretation" is not only so abstract as to put the self-evaluations of Jack the ripper in the same moral bracket as those of Buddha or Christ but inevitably leads
one to believe that the hallmark of morality is introspection rather than action. What marks the moral agent are deeds not self-evaluations. Selves are regulated not simply by introspection but by incorporation in a way of life including rituals, work, practice, beliefs and expectations which are socially ordained and generated. Concern "with the congruence between one's first-order motivational system and some ideal picture of how to live" (Tom) is not merely an "internal" physical process but shared with others who also share or oppose one's "ideal picture of how to live".

Suppose that "God" rather than one's "ego ideal" is, "the sum of our values, representing to us their ideal unity, their claims upon us and their creative power" (Cupitt, 1984). The significant difference here is that, unlike the "ego ideal", the religious life is, as Don Cupitt argues, in part a constant communal criticism and reinterpretation of God. Religious, political and moral values and their regulation of our lives are primarily social not intrapsychic phenomena. Such values only move and motivate us because people move and motivate us as we should move and motivate them.

Whilst I realize that it might be more acceptable in scientific circles to illustrate my arguments with a rigorous experiment or two than with reference to religion, a stress on the social power and potential of religion usefully highlights much that modern individualistic tendencies lead us to forget. Religion is or should be centrally concerned with the language in which we formulate our ideals, the evaluation of desires and action, the righting of wrongs, "supervenience" (Tom), intervention in conflicts and the contents of human beliefs and actions. Yet religion is clearly socially conditioned and socially regulated. It is true that, however poorly articulated, the most valuable social movements of our time (e.g. the peace movement, the women's movement) also manifest these concerns. If we, as a group of psychologists, sociologists and philosophers, do not then it is time we reappraised our own practice, and together, not just in our heads, which are in any case, veritable Babels of conflict.
Notes

1 Here I am challenging the possibility of discussing virtues and ideals independently from the discussion of social obligations, Tom Wren's most basic assumption.
2 I use the word individuality to represent what is morally essential to human beings because I feel that it catches the sense in which each of us can be morally unique.
3 For example, I am committed to the equalization of power between the sexes, redressing the abuse of science, disestablishing the Church of England and ending colonialism although I am certain to have other commitments, at least unconsciously, which conflict with my furtherance of these causes.
4 This is a cryptic reference to Lacan's "la stade du miroir" and stress on the centrality of narcissism to human subjectivity. Appearances have positive values in their own rights and are not simply veils to be torn away in the search for essences (Sylvester-Bradley, 1984).

References


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Ethics in the Global Crisis

Reinhard Hesse

We are living in an exceptional time in world history: unexpectedly, the thousand-year old question as to the ultimate goal of human endeavor has received an answer that is as remorseless as it is banal. Perversely enough, through the possibility of total atomic self-destruction that has existed for the last two decades ethics has for the first time been placed in the "agreeable" position of being able to formulate its questions (and to a certain extent also its answers) in the form of an irresistible argument, i.e. one capable of finding universal consensus. The rationalistically disguised fetishism which long viewed science and technology as ends in themselves has created a situation in which the end of mankind is not only an acute possibility, but even a probability. And, above and beyond all ideology, there is for the first time an objectively valid common goal shared by all people: to preserve life on earth. Only after this has been accomplished can man carry on with his multifarious attempts to define the "how" of living and to search for the individual and culturally specific content which gives life its broader meaning. The ultimate goal of all people is thus to secure human survival; this is something that can be easily formulated and understood. Answers can now be formulated clearly and understandably for all people, and the methods needed to gradually realize this goal are simple to stipulate (successive elimination of nuclear weapons, reduction of the civilian use of atomic energy, management of depletable natural resources etc.).

Until now, Kant's basic ethical question of "what should I do" has either been answered in formal terms by constructing systems of ethical rules or in terms of content by justifying values. In doing so, the decision for or against the one or the other of these two possibilities and for or against particular ethical rules or values within them has been, as Max Weber put it, dependent on a previously fixed position in the "struggle of world views" which itself cannot be provided with an ultimate
ethical justification. Accordingly, the decision for one or the other system of ethics has always been a cultural variable.

In the intervening time we have come to lie in a new situation. Military technology and the destruction of the environment have made these practical ethical controversies obsolete: life has so to speak caught up with — and passed — philosophy. I have the impression that the philosophers have as yet not noticed this, or at least have not accorded it the proper attention and discussion that it deserves. There have been exceptions — Karl-Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Albert Schweizer or Günther Anders have for example all insistently warned of the dangers of nuclear war. Karl Jaspers, too, has commented on this subject. However, there has been no really systematic analysis of the consequences that the present global crisis has had for the inner structure of ethics. Moreover, with the exception of Jaspers, the above-mentioned thinkers are not entirely representative of the academic discipline of philosophy. Academic philosophers have in this regard hardly touched upon this topic — something that appears to me as incomprehensible as it is irresponsible. The avoidance or marginalization of the most decisive problem confronting modern man makes "established philosophy" a tacit participant in (and also politically responsible for) the threatening catastrophes before us. The supposed resistance to the Nazi regime as practiced in "inner emigration" — the turning to questions of scholarly detail in a time of dictatorship — not only did not save the life of a single victim of Nazi terror, but could quite the contrary be interpreted by the ruling powers as a sign of willingness to engage in mutual toleration. If the philosophical and in particular the ethical discussions of our time do not as a rule thematize these basic threats to our existence, if the new consciousness of imminent destruction does not spring up at least now and then in the background of scholarly articles on ethics, then this is a sign that their authors have not properly grasped the nature of the world in which they live.

If labels were to play a role here I would no longer even wish to designate such authors as "philosophers." They are, if one may, "intellectualists" — people engaged in intellectual gamesmanship. These games may be logically correct, but in
The new situation can be described quite simply: the objective existence of potential global self-destruction has either made the traditional cultural variables uninteresting or has at least caused them to recede into a state of secondary importance. There is a new global interest now: that of collective self-preservation. This interest is a cultural constant. The decision for life comes prior to the decision for particular ideologies or cultural paradigms. In earlier times it was still possible to "die for an ideal," i.e. with the hope or even with the conviction that one's own death would contribute to the attainment of a "higher goal." This was based on the simple fact that even after one's own death there would be survivors and thus actual or potential bearers of the "higher ideal" in question.

Today such self-sacrifice would - if worse came to worse - be completely senseless, for our death would be a collective one. In this fashion history itself has forced a common interest upon the various conflicting ideologies. The question of "what should I do?" has been altered and extended to read "what should we do in order to survive?" The Kantian "I" has been irrevocably transformed into a "we," and there is also now the assurance that the answer to this basic existential question can or must be based on a common human interest.

Whether one wishes to conceive of this global interest as a problem of content, (i.e. life itself as a value) or as a problem of form (life as something to be filled with value) is in this case a less salient, indeed purely terminological question. Be that as it may, for ethics (and for politics) the fully new situation has meant that at the very least, irrefutable substantive postulates arise out of this global interest in self-preservation. I shall name only a few examples.

If we wish to survive, we must be for the preservation of the Amazon jungle, because that is where great amounts of life-giving oxygen are produced. We must be against the storing of radioactive plutonium in the sea floor?, because the pollution of ocean
waters will lead to a radioactive contamination of the food chain with unforeseeable consequences, and we must see to it that basic energy resources and raw materials are not depleted. Finally, we must do everything we can to bring the existing nuclear capacity for destruction under control; the powers disposing over these concentrations of military and technological might must remain in constant contact with one another, and all parties involved must have a minimum of trust in the predictability and rationality of the others.

As these examples show, these are postulates that do not assume the need for a "new type of man," as is often called for, or for a "basic change in our way of thinking." That people must be alive in the first place before they can begin to order the details of their lives is something that can be made clear to a wholly conventional "type of man"; it does not require any basic change in his structure of thought. Even in traditional terms, the egoism of the individual or of individual groups never went so far as to sacrifice their own existence for the sake of the individual interests that the group or person in question was pursuing, for that would have led to a contradiction in terms, i.e. to the total loss of all chances of satisfying their own interests. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, as the example of someone sacrificing his life for a higher ideal shows: the resigned suicide of an individual, a hero's death for honor or for the purity of his beliefs, collective suicide, etc. Precisely these exceptions should make clear that we cannot rule out the demise of humanity as an objective possibility. The fact that there exists a global interest in survival and that this results in a necessity to make compromises for the sake of our own interests is no guarantee that we will survive. There is no mechanism that would justify such a hope. On the other hand, though, we are not dependent on the creation of a new "ethical man."

The above-mentioned global interest of humanity in self-preservation has resulted in a situation which allows all people interested in survival to formulate concrete decisions and take specific actions. The global crisis in which humanity has existed for the last 20 years (and of which it has been growing increasingly more conscious) will with all certainty not be solved
through the moral bettering of man *per se* - if only for the simple reason that such a step would come far too late to be able to do any good.

If at all, the global crisis will be solved (or more accurately, be kept under control) in the manner in which it came about in the first place, namely through technological means. The ecological and military threat to mankind is a product of the cumulative consequences arising from the indiscriminate technological application of scientific knowledge. For this reason the terms "technology" and "technocracy" have rightly come to have negative connotations; technology as the "know-how" and technocracy as the rule of those who have the "know-how" and "know how" to apply it. The negative connotations have arisen because originally, no one thought about justifying and taking responsibility for the end to which know-how was actually being used. Put more precisely, the goal of technocracy was from the very beginning tacitly based on satisfying an undirected human desire to invent, develop, construct, and apply. The triumph of technocracy was the triumph of an unfettered *homo faber*, whether as the market-oriented individual in the capitalist West or as collective man in the socialist East.

In the process, the technology of *homo faber* has entered into a new phase in which it will not become obsolete, but in which it must formulate a new imperative if it is to guarantee its own survival. If man is to survive, he will have to take into consideration the limits of his own resources and his own intrinsic potential for self-destruction. Thus the decisive question of *techne* - of "knowing how" - has not been rendered invalid, but rather remains essential for attaining the (new) goal of self-preservation. Since this goal is a global, universally human one resting upon a common, basic interest in collective survival, it can - if one still insists on using this expression - be considered a "moral" or "ethically justified" goal.

It goes without saying that responsible, discerning people have always reflected upon this goal and how to reach it. The point here is simply that such small groups of morally responsible people are no longer the sole disseminators of this basic insight; instead, modern history has given this goal an objective basis whose inner logic - while both tragic and dangerous - still
allows hope for the possibility of a non-utopian solution.

If the goal of mankind lies in the mere preservation of life, then this still does not provide a direct answer to the question as to life's content or meaning. However, one should keep in mind that even after several thousand years of philosophy and religion, man has still not found a definitive, universally valid answer to this question, and indeed it could be said that this lack of success rests on a systematic principle: namely that it is practically impossible for man to definitively recognize "what is good and what is bad." Thus it seems evident that the very least (and the very most) that can be done to define value and meaning is to leave their definitions open and to continue on with the search for answers that appear more or less acceptable. To be a philosopher means to be a friend of wisdom, not its sole possessor. To keep a friendship alive means to be engaged in an active endeavor: unlike material possessions, friendship cannot be chartered and must continually be exposed to new tests. In the same way, "wisdom" cannot be treated as chattel but rather only as the object of a continuing, active search. In concise form one could say that the meaning of life is not something already "given" but is rather something that we ourselves must discover. This can come about only if we are aware of our own potential for error and the limits of our knowledge; for this reason we must always proceed with due caution and modesty and must be constantly on the watch for better solutions and open to answers provided by other individuals and cultures. Thus the assurance of our future ability to search for meaning represents both the minimum basic condition for all human endeavor and also the maximum that we can actually achieve in regard to answering the question of life's meaning.

The new global situation thus does not provide an answer to the question of life's meaning in terms of values or content. It merely makes evident in new fashion man's elementary anthropological need to engage in a search for truth: today, economy, politics, and in particular ecology and military technology are - tragically enough - the "materialistic" guarantees that man can no longer avoid dealing with this basic spiritus movens behind his own existence by reverting to dogma or cynicism.
I believe that a number of leading politicians have recognized the basic structures of this new historical situation or at least have some notion of what they are. In the field in which the collective danger has up to now been the greatest, namely in weapons technology and military strategy, there have existed for some time a number of decisions and actions which would allow for such a conclusion. The SALT I and SALT II talks, the Helsinki conference and its follow-up conferences, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the ban on the atmospheric testing of atomic weapons are examples of strategies in which the new state of affairs has been explicitly treated. This situation is expressed less openly in the implicit agreements of the superpowers to have their military "chess moves" carried out by smaller allies or at least to confine them to geopolitical peripheries (Vietnam, Afghanistan).

In two further areas which are also of existential importance - ecological agreements and transcultural communication - there have up to now unfortunately not been any comparable results.

The tasks which I have outlined here represent only the beginning, so to speak only the ABC's of today's ethics and politics. Jonathan Schell writes at the end of his book The Fate of the Earth: "Mankind is now faced with the task of creating a political world order free of violence and aggression. This task is twofold: first, man must save the world from destruction by eliminating all nuclear weapons. His second goal, and the only one that can provide a secure basis for the first, is the creation of a political authority with whose help the world could make those decisions which sovereign states previously arrived at only through war."

Let me summarize: Man has already left the era of ideological struggle behind and has reached an objective, common goal that has been set as it were by the course of history. This in turn has led to a revolution in ethics. Until now, ethics could never live up to its theoretical claim to universalism. However, now that the imminent demise of the world is a viable political option, the traditional ethical questions have been made obsolete. The universalistic postulate of our time has developed not through theoretical reflection, but as a negative side effect of an objectively existing situation: the technological develop-
ment which was once mistakenly seen as a source of value in itself now threatens both the environment and the continued physical existence of man and has come to contradict its original purpose. The universal quality of the threat to man's existence is an argument both for a different conception of technology and a different practical application of it.

Precisely this seems to me the most important point: ethics now has objective, irrefutable arguments at its disposal and no longer needs to draw its final premises from the battleground of ideology.

Philosophers who still believe in the ideological basis of ethics have not learned the lesson of Hiroshima. Politicians who still believe this have become a threat to humanity's survival. Intellectuals who still hide their heads in the sand in this regard are failures in terms of their own higher responsibility and thus work to betray the human cause. I would go even further and state that the person who does nothing in this situation, the person who believes that he can continue to live as before, takes upon himself the guilt for the suffering of all those who will become (or are already) the victims of the impending (or already progressing) catastrophes. That such a person has a good chance himself of becoming a victim does not free him of his responsibility, it only makes his attitude more macabre.

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MORALITY, COGNITION, EDUCATION

Zweites Konstanzer Werkstattgespräch 'Moral und Umwelt'
& 4th MOSAIC Conference on Aspects of Morality

July 17 - 20, 1984

Universität Konstanz, West-Germany

Program

July 17, Tuesday (Day of arrival)
17:00 - 19:00 Reception at the university building
19:00 Joint dinner, Ermatingen

July 18, Wednesday Open discussion session
9:00 - 11:00 H. Weinreich-Haste: "Moral action, moral responsibility, and extraordinary moral responsibility"
11:30 - 13:00 T. Wren: "Moral motivation and moral action"
14:30 - 16:00 F. Oser & W. Althof: "Life space and moral discussion: Moral decision under constraint."
16:30 - 18:00 G. Lind: "Change or development? A comparison of two paradigms of conceiving the outcome of education."

July 19, Thursday Paper sessions
9:00 - 10:30 R. Briechle & H. Fend: "Moral judgment and political attitudes in adolescents."
11:00 - 12:30 I. Vine: "Is Kohlberg's 'principled' moral reasoning a developmental myth?"
14:00 - 15:30 L. Kern, H.-U. Kohr & G. Räder: "Public bads, moral judgments and expectations of future: The case of the new social movements in Germany."
16:00 - 17:30 Ben Bradley: "Language and the dissolution of individuality."

July 20, Friday (Day of departure)
10:00 - 12:00 MOSAIC business meeting
Afternoon Excursion to Meersburg (Bodensee)