Crime & Culture

Crime as a Cultural Problem
The Relevance of Perceptions of Corruption to Crime Prevention. A Comparative Cultural Study in the EU-Accession States Bulgaria and Romania, the EU-Candidate States Turkey and Croatia and the EU-States Germany, Greece and United Kingdom

Zeynep Sarlak, Besim Bulent Bali
Corruption in Turkey: Why Cannot an Urgent Problem Be a Main Concern?

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RESEARCH PROJECT: CRIME AND CULTURE

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Introduction

The main objective of this research is to reveal how corruption and tools to fight corruption have been used as means of propaganda among political actors in 2007, which was a politically active year due to the general elections. We also aim to show whether these means of propaganda had any influence on the decision making process of the voters. In the first part of the study, the datasets from Transparency International, the World Bank and Milken Institute will be presented shortly to exemplify the perception and evaluation of corruption in Turkey and its fight against it by globally operating western institutions. In the second part, an overview on the country’s legal and political agenda related to corruption in 2007 will be given. In the third part, the public perception of corruption as a problem will be investigated by using previously conducted polls and field surveys. Then in the same chapter, concrete examples will be given of how allegations of corruption and anti-corruption strategies have been operationalized both by the government and the opposition during the 2007 General Election process in the context of election competition. Also in this chapter, a discussion about the effects of these corruption claims on the results of general elections will be given on the basis of concrete examples. The conclusions will be presented in the last chapter.

I. International Assessments

In this chapter, the corruption assessments of Turkey through the indices and indicators developed by international institutions will be briefly introduced. The above mentioned indices and indicators are the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) and Opacity Index respectively.

1.1. Transparency International: CPI

According to Transparency International’s CPI for 2007, Turkey is ranked 64 of 179 with a score of 4.1 of 10. Similar figures were presented for the period 2000-2006. This places Turkey among the group of countries perceived as most corrupt in Europe.

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1 The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).
Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER of COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE SURVEY</th>
<th>TURKEY’S RANK</th>
<th>TURKEY’S CPI SCORE (OF 10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: <http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi>

1.2. World Bank: WGI

The comparative table below shows the assessment of the control of the corruption phenomenon in Turkey on the basis of Worldwide Governance Indicators\(^2\), which are a scheme of indicators prepared by a group of experts within the World Bank.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control of Corruption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As is seen in the table, except for the years 1996 and 2006, the value of the assessment is negative. In other words, significant deficiencies continue in the attempts to control corruption in Turkey and no significant progress has been made in the 10 years time which is clearly visible from table 2.

\(^2\) The indicators measure six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. They cover 212 countries and territories for 1996, 1998, 2000, and annually for 2002-2006. The indicators are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 33 separate data sources constructed by 30 different organizations.

\(^3\) The units in which governance is measured follow a normal distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in each period. This implies that virtually all scores lie between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes.
All these findings support the World Bank’s and the EBRD’s (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) evaluation in 2005 regarding the high level of organized crime and corruption in the business sector in Turkey.

1.3. Milken Institute: Opacity Index

It is also possible to draw the same conclusions by following Turkey’s “Opacity Index” values.⁴

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>L</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>Opacity Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although Turkey’s opacity score has obviously improved in the period between 2001 and 2008, it should be attributed to the improved components in other domains that are not related to the control of corruption. Unfortunately no improvement related to corruption can be observed so far in the tables.

II. Internal Developments

The agenda for fighting corruption constituted a significant part of the overall agenda of the 2nd Erdogan Government (as was the case in the 1st Erdogan Government), that received its vote of confidence from the parliament on 7 September, 2007. Corruption, in the latest government program, was defined as “a fundamental problem that damages the trust relationship between state and its citizens and that by reason of extortion of public resources, has cost Turkey its huge resources for years”. It was also stated that “in the previous government, significant measures were taken to prevent corruption and the responsible parties were called to account for being involved in malpractices”. Moreover, the program declared

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⁴ The Opacity Index ranges from 1 to 100. The higher a country’s score, the greater is opacity. For each component of opacity -(C) corruption, (L) legal systems, (E) enforcement policies, (A) accounting and disclosure standards, and (R) regulatory quality- is rated separately and contributes to the country’s overall opacity rating.
that the 60th government would go on waging an all-out war against corruption without concession. The government program also emphasized the use of technological developments in the provision of efficient public service and its contribution to downsizing bureaucratic processes “which cause a waste of a huge amount of time and energy”. The concepts such as e-Government, e-Transformation, and the plans like “Single Card Project” were implicitly highlighted as tools for fighting corruption. At this point, the current government considers the lengthy bureaucratic process as one of the main reasons for corruption.\(^5\)

But the events throughout the year did not quite progress to verify these anti-corruption declarations of AKP. The most significant progress that has been achieved fighting against corruption in the legal sphere in 2007 was the enactment of the Witness Protection Law, (no: 5726) on December 27, 2007.\(^6\)

The European Union, which is an important external anchor for the economical, social and political well-being of Turkey, has published a Progress Report on Turkey on November 6, 2007. In the chapters “Democracy and the Rule of Law”, “Judiciary and Fundamental Rights” and “The Existence of a Functioning Market Economy”, the failures of the current government were summarized respectively as follows:

- “No progress has been made regarding the adoption of the law on the Court of Auditors. Moreover, the Parliament does not exercise effective oversight over public expenditure because of the lack of a public accounts committee in the Parliament. Limiting the extensive immunities granted to parliamentarians and public officials providing improved legislation and transparency on political party and election campaign financing remain key issues. As for the extension of the Code of ethical principles to parliamentarians, academics, the military or the judiciary, no progress has been made. There was no progress on the development of an anti-corruption strategy. Institutions involved in the fight against corruption, such as inspection boards, have not been strengthened. No public body is in charge of collecting data and statistics on corruption”.\(^7\)

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\(^6\) Official Gazette, no: 26747, 05.01.2008 The article 3 of the law lists crimes that require witness protection as follows:
- Crimes that require heavy life imprisonment, life imprisonment and imprisonment of minimum 10 years and over, stated in Turkish Penal Code and in penal statues.
- Crimes that require a minimum of 2 or more years imprisonment, due to joining an organization established in order to commit crimes stated as acts of guilt by law and of crimes of terror.

“No progress has been made in strengthening the legal framework and institutional set up to combat corruption. Weaknesses in the legal framework such as for election campaign financing continue. There have been no developments in limiting parliamentary immunity. Ethical principles for deputies and other groups of public officials, that is academics, the military or the judiciary, are lacking. The Ethical board of civil servants established in 2004 is still dependent on the Prime Ministry, with no separate budget or personnel of its own. It thus incurs limitations as to the proper fulfillment of its tasks of monitoring the respect of ethic principles and investigating complaints. There have been no particular developments as regards the implementation of a total of 21 recommendations of the 2005 evaluation report on corruption in Turkey by the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption (GRECO).”

“Some key elements are still lacking, in particular the Turkish Court of Accounts Law, which would enhance transparency and provide significant support for anti-corruption efforts.”

Reports that have been published by some NGOs in Turkey at the end of 2006 and in 2007, presented similar conclusions.

In addition to these observations, the president of TEPAV (Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey) Prof. Dr. Guven Sak, emphasized the following points:

- “The legislative proposal related to the establishment of a Political Ethics Committee in the Parliament is not enacted."

9Turkey 2007 Progress Report, p. 28.
11The opening speech of the “Decentralization and Corruption” conference that was organized on December 5-6, 2007 in Ankara; for full text visit: <http://www.tepav.org.tr/tur/admin/dosyabul/upload/Guven.Sak.TEPAV.Konusma.Notlari.pdf>
12The first proposition about the establishment of Political Ethics Committee in the Parliament came from Bulent Akarcalı, Istanbul MP for ANAP in the 20th period in 1997. The proposition was accepted in the Constitutional Commission but it was not enacted. Akarcalı repeated his proposal in the 21st period (1999). However, this time it was refused in the Constitutional Commission. The grounds for the refusal were stated as such: “Enacting such a proposition would harm the moral existence of Grand National Assembly and limit the freedom of MPs. The proposal was made in line with the reactions of the public in the past, but over time the number of these reactions decreased to a great extent. It is not possible to secure ethical behaviour by law”. The issue was brought to the agenda once again in September 2001 due to the resignation of two ministers of the 57th Government of Republic under the Prime Ministry of Bulent Ecevit, Cumhur Ersumer (Minister of Energy and Natural Resources) and Koray Aydin (Minister of Public Works and Settlement) for allegations of corruption.
The concept of “secret” is not defined in the legal documents. Consequently, transparency in public administration encouraged by Law on the Right to the Information and Public Financial Management and Control Law is overshadowed.

Legislative proposal that includes elimination of wage differentiation among public employees and establishing a system of meritocracy in appointments has been on the agenda of the parliament for more than three years.

Many laws related to public financial management and local administrations are problematic in terms of implementation.”

Along with the insufficiencies of the institutional and legal regulations on anti-corruption, Erdogan’s statement “We started our anti-corruption fight form the core of the phenomenon” was not quite responded by the Supreme Court in 2007. The strategy of sending the cases of illegal acts related to the previous governments’ political figures to the Supreme Court, did not work in 2007 either. In 2002 the AKP government assembled a commission, “The Commission of Corruption Investigation” in the parliament under the leadership of Azmi Ates, a previous MP of Istanbul. Both the Ministry in charge of corruption cases and the Commission of Corruption Investigation filed cases against some former ministers.

During the government of AKP, the commission focused on various cases from the period of DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition as part of its agenda and proposed the establishment of a special commission that investigates the cases of many former ministers. Along with the decisions of commissions, some of which gained the support of oppositional party CHP, the cases of former Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz, former Vice-President Husamettin Ozkan and 6 other former ministers were sent to Supreme Court.

The government started to work on a draft of a “Political Ethics Law” but it lapsed in a little while. Algan Hacaloglu, Istanbul MP of CHP with his 58 friends proposed a “Political Ethics Law” at the end of 2002 to the Parliament’s presidency and yet their efforts did not yield any result. AKP Sakarya MP Ayhan Sefer Ustun and his 14 friends prepared a draft law that proposes establishment of a “Political Ethics Commission” and “changes in some laws” and submitted it to the Parliament’s presidency on January 19, 2007. Due to early General Elections, the subject was postponed to the new legislative period. Following the 2007 General Elections another legislative proposal was made again by Algan Hacaloglu and his friends (CHP) related to the enactment of a “Political Ethics Law” The proposal aimed at establishing a “Political Ethics Committee” in the Turkish Parliament which would monitor, evaluate and report the fiscal, financial and economic relations of Ministers, MPs and their family members.

13 In 1991, the DYP-SHP coalition which was in power then had formed a commission to investigate the corruption cases of almost all the ministers in the previous ANAP government. But in the end only Sefa Giray and Cengiz Altunkaya were sent to Supreme Court and both of them were discharged of the allegations.
Mesut Yılmaz, who is the first prime minister that was sent to Supreme Court, benefitted from the 4616 Law on Release on Probation, named as “Amnesty Rahsan” by the media. Former ministers Gunes Taner and Yasar Topcu had also benefitted from the same amnesty. The charges of Yılmaz, Topcu and Taner constituted the misuse of power when they were in the government but since the execution of these acts were within the time period of amnesty, a suspension decision was taken in 2006. This decision meant that if Yılmaz and Topcu did not commit a similar illegal act in 5 years time, the “Turkbank Case” which they were stood trial for, would be completely dropped. Yılmaz celebrated this decision with his opponents and managed to enter the parliament in the 2007 General Elections as an independent deputy from his hometown of Rize after his acquittal. Former Vice-President Husamettin Ozkan and former Minister of Finance Recep Onal, who had been on trial for 3 years in the Supreme Court, were also released in 2006.

The discharge decisions continued in 2007, too. Former Minister of Energy Zeki Cakan was also discharged from Supreme Court in 2007. The only former minister, who was not discharged from Supreme Court, was the former minister of Energy and Natural Resources Cumhur Ersumer. He was sentenced to 20 months in prison on misusing power, but this charge was also suspended within Amnesty Rahsan. The “trial marathon” ended on 5 November 2007 with the discharge decision of Koray Aydin, the minister of Public Works and Settlement in the 57th government from MHP. The Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeals had requested a jail sentence of 216 years and six months for the former minister with the charges of misusing the power, illicit enrichment and rigging a competitive bidding process.

Right after the court decision, MHP leader Devlet Bahceli gave a speech in his group meeting. He stated that all the allegations against Koray Aydin were part of a plan to “disgrace MHP and the nationalists.” In this specific group session where Aydin’s Supreme Court trial was the main agenda, he also said that Aydin was subjected to unfair judgment by the media and politics and he was deprived of legal and human rights.

During 2007, corruption incidents were frequently covered by the media. From state universities to local authorities, from The Turkish Council of Higher Education to deed

14 This amnesty which was initiated by the wife of Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, Rahsan Ecevit on 22 December 2000, was about the discharge or suspension of crimes which were not committed against the state. It was valid for the crimes committed before 23 April 1999. According to the data provided by the Ministry of Justice, General Directorate of Judicial Records and Statistics, 4715 cases were suspended within this law of amnesty.
15 Yeni Şafak, 06.10.2007.
16 Yeni Çağ, 09.10.2007.
17 Zaman, 06.12.2007.
offices\textsuperscript{19}, many corruption allegations were claimed. In some of these cases these allegations were not filed to court because a specific law (“Memurin Muhakemat Kanunu”) which requires permissions from their higher authorities for prosecution. Some of the other corruption claims were swept under the carpet regardless of the reports filed by the Prime Ministry Inspection Board. On the other hand, during the same period, many operations against corruption, mainly the ones related to the Ministry of Energy, had wide media coverage. 

The official data regarding the corruption operations took place in the 2007 report of the Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime (KOM) working under the General Directorate of Security. The report which documents the drug trafficking, gang related incidents, corruption and smuggling crimes, also states that the “planned” corruption operations which took place between the years 2003-2007, were “doubled” in comparison to the previous years. According to the same report, the KOM units within the coordination of Deputy Director General, organized series of operations against the high ranking bureaucrats and organized crime groups who were associated with corrupting public contracts and gaining high earnings through illegal activities. Based on the official data in the website of the Combating Against Financial Crimes Division of Istanbul Police Department,156 “planned” operations were organized in the last 5 years to fight corruption. In these operations; legal proceedings were carried out for 2678 people 805 of whom were government employees. Likewise, most of the bureaucrats who were taken into custody were arrested and some of them were dismissed from their positions for turning a blind eye to illegal acts and corruption for their benefit.\textsuperscript{20} 

The datasets acquired from the website of KOM, show a significant increase in the number of operations against corruption in 2007 in comparison with the previous years. In 2003 the number of planned operational interrogations in the fight against corruption was 16, 9 in 2004, 8 in 2005, 38 in 2006 but then it climbed to 117 in 2007, 55 of which were planned. According to the data given in the same website, in 2007 1028 people were sent to judiciary units.\textsuperscript{21} 

In December of 2007, for the first time, KOM brought together the deputy directors of 81 cities in its annual Council of Strategic Investigations meeting. According to a report by a

\textsuperscript{18}Yakup Bulut, “YÖK’ün İnâdi Sürüyor” (YOK’s Stubbornness Goes On), \textit{Yeni Şafak}, 25.06.2007; \textit{Birgün}, 01.11.2007.
\textsuperscript{20}The official website of Istanbul Police Department, Combating Against Financial Crimes Division \texttt{http://mali.iem.gov.tr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=119};
\textsuperscript{21}Ahmet Pek, “Yolsuzlukla Mücadelemin Neresindeyiz?” (Where are we in our fight against corruption?), \texttt{http://www.kom.gov.tr/Tr/KonuDetay.asp?BKey=64&KKey=159}. 


newspaper close to AKP, the main agenda in this meeting was to enhance and intensify the fight against corruption at all levels of corruption cases including the public biddings. In the same article, it was reported that KOM deputy directors had thoroughly discussed the operations undertaken in 2007 and developed new strategies for the ones that were planned for 2008 for two days.\(^{22}\) During the same period, it was reported this time by a leftist newspaper that Prime Minister Erdogan allocated some secret funds for the investigation of corruption and organized crime and transferred 10 million YTL to the General Directorate of Security for this specific task. It was stated that by Erdogan’s instructions two different funds were allocated to KOM’s headquarters and peripheral branches for logistic needs.\(^{23}\)

Another event that could be regarded as a progressive step to fight corruption took place in a military court. The Military Court of the General Staff, for the first time, sentenced a serving lieutenant general to imprisonment for corruption. Eight officers were also sentenced in this case.

Following the November 2000 and February 2001 economic recessions, there have been attempts to restructure the public sector in order to improve the quality of public economical administration. In parallel to these, there have also been legal and institutional improvements in the fight against corruption sphere but these improvements did not quite convince the citizens about anti-corruption efforts.

TI commissioned a survey called “Global Corruption Barometer” to Gallup International and the interviewees were asked if they expected the level of corruption to change in the next three years. The responses can be seen in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Increase a lot (%)</th>
<th>Increase a little (%)</th>
<th>Stay the same (%)</th>
<th>Decrease a little (%)</th>
<th>Decrease a lot (%)</th>
<th>Don’t know/no answer (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to the data in the table, in 2003 56 %, in 2004 31%, in 2005 29 % and in 2007 38 % of the interviewees were expecting the corruption levels to increase in the next three years.

\(^{22}\) *Zaman*, 16 December 2007.

\(^{23}\) *Bugün*, 07.07.2007.
The data shows that the expectations related to the level of corruption deteriorated in 2007. This can be related to the frequent allegations of corruption within the current government that have been raised during the election campaigns.

According to the same survey, it is also difficult to assert that the responses given to the question “How would you assess your current government’s actions in the fight against corruption?” are satisfactory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5</th>
<th>2006 Results (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very effective</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not effective</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not fight at all</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not fight but actually encourages it</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know/no answer</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6</th>
<th>2007 Results (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very effective</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat effective</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither effective nor ineffective</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat ineffective</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very ineffective</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know/no answer</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


III. Corruption as a Propaganda Tool in the Elections and its Reflections

Allegations of corruption as a propaganda tool were frequently used against the AKP in the 22 July 2007 elections by CHP and other oppositional parties. Two weeks before the elections, it was rumored in the anti-AKP media channels that CHP would knock the AKP down with “corruption files”. CHP’s Istanbul MP Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who brought back many old corruption files against AKP, prepared and organized the distribution of a booklet to refresh the memories of the citizens countrywide. The booklet, which was called “Corruption Acts of AKP”, was planned to be published by the headquarters of CHP, 2 million in number and distributed all around Turkey by CHP branches and its candidates. When CHP realized that there was a huge demand, the number of copies was increased from 2 million to 10 million.²⁴

The introduction of the booklet told the readers how Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan got “rich”. The details of the comparatively modest wealth of Tayyip Erdogan when he was

running for the mayor for Istanbul were given. In 2001 Rahmi Koc (one of the biggest investors of Turkey) stated that “Mr. Erdogan has saved 1 billion dollars” (3 August 2001-CNN Turk) and the readers were also reminded of this statement in the introduction. In the booklet it was also mentioned that the Prime Minister’s son Ahmet Burak Erdogan bought a ship on 6 February 2007 for 2.325 million dollars and his other son owned a flat worth 261,000 Dollars in the USA. The story continued reminding the deed records of the sons of the Prime Minister and it was publicized that they own a mansion worth of 1 billion YTL. In addition to that it was also reminded that the Prime Minister bought a similar house, 450 square meters in size, in the same neighborhood. Right after that, a quote from Erdogan was placed in the booklet where he was stating that if he was not involved in business it would not be possible for him to live on his salary. Following that 22 corruption allegations against AKP were listed. 25

Also in an interview, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu said that the financial extent of the corruption during AKP government was 150 billion dollars.26 During the same period, just before the elections, CHP leader Deniz Baykal continued criticizing AKP with the following statement: “We investigated the corruption. We saw the triangle behind it. In one corner of the triangle there stands the corrupt businessman, adjacent to him the bureaucrat who supports him and in the third corner there is the immoral, dishonest politician.” 27

Before the 2007 General Elections, the members of the other oppositional party MHP also stated that corruption has increased in AKP government. Before the 2007 General Elections MHP proposed a new anti-corruption plan for the AKP members who were involved in corruption. Antalya representative Tunca Toskay, claimed that a new council, made up of legal experts, would be established specifically to investigate the people who were involved in corruption in AKP period. Toskay also stated that a separate investigation commission would

25 **Birgün**, 05.07.2007; **Hürriyet**, 18.07.2007. The corruption allegations in the booklet are listed as follows: 1. The Prime Minister who cannot live on a 9 billion YTL salary. 2. A Minister of Economy who is involved in preparing a fake invoice. 3. The Minister of Economy who made earnings of 1 trillion for the sale of a property and did not pay taxes for that; 4. 219 Road works contracts in 13 days; 5. The Contractor of AKP who has medical social security. 6. The corrupt people go on using VIP lounges. 7. The Prime Minister who goes to the house of a corrupt person with the helicopter of another corrupt person. 8. AKP partisan who was commissioned a 2 million Dollar public work contract without any bidding. 9. Buyers of costly items from the corrupt sell it cheap to partisans. 10. The 51 million Dollar factory of the government was sold to AKP supporters for 1.1 million Dollars; 11. Give the contract get the parliament member. 12. The sly dog son of the Minister of Internal Affairs. 13. The Minister of National Education who rigged a competitive bidding process. 14. An example of privatization pillage; 15. Continue the pillage- 4 times profit in 4.5 months; 16. How could the son of the Minister of Transportation buy a ship? 17. AKP’s local corruption brand: OER; 18. AKP’s local corruption brand: ALI DIBO. 19. Why would a prime minister not want the political immunities to be abolished? 20. Why can’t the AKP fight against corruption? 21. What does the EU say about corruption in Turkey? 22. How do AKP representatives confess the corrupt acts of AKP?

26 **Tufan Turenc**, “Baba baba satışlar baba baba ihaleler” (Giant Sales, Giant Biddings), **Hürriyet**, 22.06.2007

be formed and when this commission is convinced to abolish political immunity, the case would be sent to a unit made up of legal experts in Supreme Court of Appeals, even before it is sent to the parliament.\textsuperscript{28}

On the road to elections, not only the high ranking AKP members but members from all levels of the party administration were brought to the table for corruption allegations by CHP and the other parties as part of their election campaigns. These allegations, which were labeled “Ali Dibo” in the media, were mostly concerning the mayors and provincial chairmen. Alongside this, other corruption allegations were also raised within AKP for some administrators in AKP. Although the general expectation was towards a decrease in the votes for AKP and even a collapse of the government, AKP had an incredible raise in their share of the votes – in comparison to the 2002 elections – in these cities where corruption allegations and people in custody were the most abundant. AKP increased its votes significantly in these cities where the incidents regarding corruption took place: Hatay (2002: 29.88 % - 2007: 40.8 %), Samsun (2002: 44.84 % - 2007: 57.9 %), Çorum (2002: 48.43 % - 2007: 57.3 %), Nevşehir (2002: 43.63 % - 2007: 55.7 %), Gumushane (2002: 34.43 % - 2007: 60.3 %), Isparta (2002: 41.65 % -2007: 43.8 %), Agri (2002: 17.70 % -2007: 63 %), Sinop (2002: 32.46 % -2007: 44 %), Bingöl (2002: 31.73 % - 2007: 71.1 %) and Karaman (2002: 38.19 % - 2007: 51.3 %)\textsuperscript{29}

After the elections, Kilicdaroglu published a book about these corruption allegations of AKP by CHP. His comment on how the election results were not affected by “more than 100 corruption cases which would cause the collapse of the governments in the western countries” is noteworthy. He evaluated the situation suggesting that the people were so focused on making a living and surviving in a country where poverty and unemployment are in the forefront that they could not really pay attention to corruption cases. In the same conversation he also added that “this much unemployment and poverty is a causing significant deterioration in the structure of the public and they even cannot see that these conditions are the results of corruption and pillage.\textsuperscript{30}

However, there are solid national and international surveys and analyses, which were done through years that can easily lead to doubts with regard to the hypothesis of CHP that people are not responsive enough to corruption.

\textsuperscript{28} Toskay was explaining the new fight plan as follows: “If the judges here are convinced that the people who were stood in trial here committed the crimes alleged, they would be sent to Supreme Court […] Therefore the corruption cases will not be absolved in the parliament anymore. The legal process will be initiated by judges not politicians.” \textit{Halka ve Olaylara Tercüman}, 21.07.2007.

\textsuperscript{29} Ali Ekber Ertürk, “Ali Dibo’yu Takan Yok” (Nobody cares about Ali Dibo), \textit{Akşam}, 2 August 2007

\textsuperscript{30} Turenç, (2007).
According to these surveys corruption is perceived as one of the most important problems to be resolved in Turkey. In the research and surveys done by TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation), Transparency International (TI) and KONDA Research and Consultancy, the question “what is the most important problem to be solved in Turkey?” was directed to interviewees. The responses to this question will be summarized below.

**TESEV’s Studies**

In TESEV’s 2001 study “Household View on the Causes of Corruption in Turkey and Suggested Preventive Measures”, 2003 study “Business’ View on the Causes of Corruption in Turkey and Suggested Preventive Measures” and 2004 study “Society’s View of Public Administration, Public Services and Reform” the above question was directed to interviewees. The responses sorted according to years are listed in the tables 4, 5 and 6.

According to the findings of the 2001 study, households listed bribery and corruption as the third most important problem in Turkey right after inflation and unemployment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Most Important Problem to be Solved in Turkey (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inflation/High Cost of Living</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bribery and Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK/Southeastern Problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy/Freedom of Thought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health/Social Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Degeneration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the 2003 study, which addressed the representatives of the business world, bribery and corruption were listed as the second most important problem right after inflation.

When the table 4 and 5 are compared, the main difference between the households and the business world lies in their ranking of the problems. While the households perceive the unemployment as a more serious problem, the business world perceives education and moral degeneration as more serious problems.
In the 2004 study which addressed the public in general, bribery and corruption were again listed along with unemployment and inflation as the three most important problems in Turkey.

Transparency International
One of the questions in the TI Global Corruption Barometer that was carried out in 2004 was “in your opinion, how would you describe the following problems facing your country/territory?” (1: not a problem at all...4: a very big problem). The responses to this question are listed in table 10.
According to this survey, grand or political corruption was listed as one of the most serious problems of Turkey along with unemployment and poverty. Petty corruption is listed comparatively low. It is clear that when it comes to problems, the average priorities of Turkish people are different than the average of the world. This should be evaluated *sui generis* in relation to the specific conditions in Turkey.

**KONDA Surveys**

The most in-depth data about the problematic posed as the main objective, in the introduction part of this study, is provided by KONDA Research and Consultancy. The evaluations and opinions that frequently took place in the print media and TV about the 2007 General Elections, regarded the 27 April 2007 Communiqué of General Staff as one of the main factors that led to the significant increase in the share of the votes for AKP. However, KONDA Research and Consultancy provided an accurate estimation of the election results one year before the elections in 2006. Their study, which was called “Societal Structure Research 2006: Who are we?” and done for a newspaper in September 2006, showed that vote shares based on the part called political preferences were as follows: AKP %45, CHP %20 and MHP %15.  

One of the most important findings that can be deduced from these numbers is, unlike the evaluation above, how settled the votes were long before the General Staff-AKP conflict. In other words, Communiqué of General Staff did not have a significant effect on the share of the votes.

KONDA Research and Consultancy conducted 8 analyses to identify the trends and preferences of voters before the 2007 General Elections. It is clearly visible from the results of these surveys that voters had already decided on which party to vote for long before the elections mostly based on financial motives. Apart from the election-related questions, two of these surveys conducted by KONDA included questions on what the interviewees considered as the countries’ main problems and risks; which party/parties could resolve them and if not, whether a new party or leader was necessary to reach a solution.

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According to the findings of these surveys, Turkish voters make their decision mainly based on their own economic conditions and the economic condition of the country in general. Before 2007 General Elections, the first two factors that play the most significant role in their decision making process were “economic condition and expectations” (78.3) and the “problem of corruption” (%38.9). Another conclusion that can be drawn from these surveys is that the people voting for the AKP are more concerned about corruption than those voting for CHP. The table below displays this comparison:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Poverty</th>
<th>Corruption</th>
<th>Anti-secular activities</th>
<th>Anti-democratic activities</th>
<th>Insufficiency of the social security system</th>
<th>No idea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TÜRKİYE</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The results of the surveys also demonstrate the followings:

39.1 % of the voters believed that none of the parties could solve the most urgent problems and 32.8 % of the voters stated that “a new party is needed”. Yet, this need was felt most deeply by the partisans other than those of the AKP. All voters except the partisans of AKP have taken their position somewhat unwillingly and emphasized the need for a new party.

41.8 % of voters have stated that “a new leader is needed for solving the urgent problems”. The demand for a new leader seemed to be higher than that of a new party. Examined in the context of partisanship, the demand for a new leader came primarily from the supporters of independent candidates (61.2 %) and those of CHP (59.6 %).

At this point another significant finding is related to the answer given to the question of “which party would you never/under no circumstance vote for?” The CHP was mentioned most frequently (41 %) among voters as the party “never to vote for.” Then followed AKP (28.6 %), pro-Kurdish DTP (16.4 %) and MHP (14.8 %) respectively.

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33 Ibid., p. 2.  
34 Ibid., p. 5.  
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid., p. 4.
42.7% of the voters believed that the economic conditions were getting better whereas 30.1% believed that they were getting worse. 80.1% of AKP voters claimed the economy was getting better while 68.2% of CHP-DSP voters claimed that it was getting worse.\textsuperscript{37}

With regard to the fight against corruption, 39.8% of voters thought that the situation was getting better while 26.4% believed it was getting worse. While 74.3% of AKP voters stated that it was getting better, 63.3% of CHP-DSP voters claimed that it was getting worse.\textsuperscript{38}

In the light of these findings, regarding the evaluation of Turkey’s economic conditions and fight against corruption in the past 5 years it can easily be stated that there exists a huge difference in perception and attitude between AKP supporters and those of other political parties.

In 2007 General Elections AKP received 55% of the votes of the poorest segments, 54% of the lower-middle income segment, 43% of the mid-level income segment, 35% of the fourth, upper-middle income level and finally 23% of votes of the wealthiest segment.\textsuperscript{39} The most salient feature of these figures is that AKP received the highest amount of votes from lowest, poorest and deprived demographic groups. Thus, AKP is the choice of the underclass. When examined along with the findings on “how voters made their decisions” and remembering that voters based their decisions on concrete economic problems and demands in mind, it is imperative to understand that 2007 elections progressed not on the secular-anti secular axis as has been generally claimed, but rather on an axis of aggravation.

When the same analysis was done for the CHP, which identifies itself as social democrat party, the opposite was true. CHP received 8% of the votes of households with lowest income, 15% of those with lower middle income, 22% of those with mid-level income, 33% of those with upper middle income and 50% of those with the highest level income. When these findings are interpreted along with other demographic data regarding its voters, it is clearly visible that CHP has become the party of the established, of the winners of the system, and of those integrated into modernization.\textsuperscript{40}

Out of every 100 votes cast for AKP, 75 of them were transferred from 2002. Of AKP’s current votes, the new voters were primarily first-time voters, with a share of 12%. Following

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 6.  
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., p. 12.  
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., p. 17
that, there were previous voters of other parties (5 %), previous MHP partisans (3 %) and previous DP partisans (2 %). Seen from the other side of the coin, i.e. looking at what previous AKP voters did in the last elections, it is evident that 83 % of AKP voters once again voted for AKP, 6 % changed their preferences to MHP and others to other parties with each a share of 2 % or less41.

In a nutshell, these surveys demonstrated that the Turkish voters made their decision of which party to vote for or not vote for based on the economic problems and corruption. They seemed to be informed and opinionated about problems. Unsurprisingly, their level of information depended on various factors such as level of education and living conditions but still they had a distinct opinion about the party that they were going to vote for.

**Conclusion**

The Turkish voters who perceive corruption as one of the most important problems in Turkey along with unemployment and inflation have voted for the AKP, which has been plagued by many allegations of corruption, and thus significantly increased the voting share of this party. At first glance, it is astonishing or paradoxical to see that this party, against which there are many allegations of corruption, was not affected by any of these and even identified itself as the real owner of the center. When considering the survey results and how people listed corruption as a problem to be solved, *ceteris paribus* voters should not be expected to support AKP because of the numerous allegations of corruption. At this point it is obvious that a sociological analysis of the results of the last elections has to be conducted in a much more detailed manner.

Still, there are several noteworthy points to discuss as to why the AKP was not affected with these corruption allegations. It should be regarded as normal that people who see political stability as a fundamental prerequisite of economical stability voted with “contentment about the government and their lives”. The same voters are also the ones who have felt the effects of economic growth and the increase in the wealth since 2003. In other words, the priority of voters, as is also seen in the surveys above, is an increase in wealth. Allegations of corruption might have been overshadowed by this priority.

Another point is how the allegations mainly claimed by the CHP were not taken into consideration by the majority of the voters. There are two potential main reasons for this.

41 Ibid., p. 13.
Firstly, the fact that these allegations were mostly raised through mainstream media which are clearly against AKP, might have diminished the influence of these on the voters. There is a serious tension between two major capital groups: one which controls mainstream media and is named as “Istanbul Dukedom” and the other one (named as Anatolian Tigers\Green Capital\Calvinist Muslims etc) which the AKP represents and to which it transfers a respectable amount of public funds via seemingly legal means. Besides, as some field surveys have already shown many times, the mainstream media have very little credibility in the eyes of ordinary citizens. The mainstream media, who raised these corruption allegations, perhaps did not convince the public on doing it for the sake of public service and the right to information (i.e. as the 4th force). Thus, based on its past experiences, the public is both used to and conscious about the motives behind corruption files thrown at each other by competing mainstream print media and TV groups. The large holding companies, who own the mainstream media, have used this news on corruption from time to time to exert pressure on the government or to divert the attention from problems in other realms or even to obstruct the activities of their rival companies.

The second reason might be related to the existentialist dilemma of the main opposition party CHP, who has centered its electoral campaigns on corruption allegations against the AKP. The CHP, which claims to be a social democratic party, contrary to its ideology as is also shown above, has seemingly become the representative of an elitist class whose socio-economic level is high above that of the Turkey’s average. In other words, neither when it was in opposition nor when it was in power (as a member of coalition government), was the CHP able to develop a clear discourse on how to improve the economical status of classes who are trapped in this “corruption-deprivation-poverty” triangle and have been suffering because of long-term neoliberal economical strategies. Rather than addressing these classes, CHP prioritized addressing a specific class of voters who are justifiably concerned about losing a specific lifestyle. Therefore, while blaming AKP for becoming affiliated with corruption and not developing enough strategies to fight corruption, the CHP could not convince the voters on how they would fight with deprivation and poverty. Thus it can be asserted that its emphasis on corruption might not have been meaningful by itself.

The speech that CHP leader Deniz Baykal gave in Artvin, on 11.07.2007 on this subject is self-revealing:

“The cost of the coal that they are distributing now will be paid by the next government. They send you gold saying they could not attend the circumcision

42 Haber 7, 12.07.2007.
ceremony of your son. Your son is 18-20 years old. What I want to say to you here is that you should accept what (rice, bulgur, coal in July) they are distributing [referring AKP] with no hesitation. It is not a sin. If it is a sin, I can take it on myself. But do not attempt to vote for them. That’s a sin. Please do not do that because vote is your moral, honor and chastity.”

During the previous AKP government the idea of fighting corruption and acting on this idea through various measures has been fundamentally highlighted to ensure political support. What seemed to be more important for opposition parties was to try to reveal how government became involved with corruption through concrete examples. Consequently, corruption and how to fight or not to fight against it has been perceived as a tool of assault both by the government and the opposition. In other words, the question is “who got their hands more dirty?” and the fundamental defense argument is “your hands are as dirty as ours.” Both parties prefer to deal with scandals rather than deal with the reasons behind the corruption and the problems it creates. This situation however further enhances the distrust against politics in public and leads to a common perception where it is believed that politics is all about allocating funds by the people in power to themselves and people around them wherever they stand in the spectrum.

On the other side, as the international and national studies above demonstrate, Turkey is a country where there is corruption in different scales and governments still have a long path to fight against corruption. Turkish citizens believe that corruption is widespread. They are aware of the fact that their quality of life deteriorates with corruption. They also believe that it is necessary to fight against grand corruption and other kinds of widespread corruption. However, they do not seem to be convinced that this fight against corruption will start anytime soon. Therefore they take pragmatic decisions and support political parties that make their daily lives easier for them.
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