


“An if one man is not better than another” –
A modern statement of the dual aspect theory

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Socrates' Dual Aspect Theory

“Now you have just said that virtue consists in a wish for good things plus the power to acquire them.”

Socrates, Dialog with Menon



Overview

- Socrates' and Piaget's dual aspect theory
- A modern statement of the dual aspect theory
 - ▶ Affective aspect: Moral orientations
 - ▶ Cognitive aspect: Moral judgment competence
- Experimental evidence
- Behavioral correlates of moral judgment competence

Dual-Aspect Model

Jean Piaget

- "Affective and cognitive mechanisms are inseparable, although distinct: the former depend on energy, and the latter depend on structure." ①
- "The two aspects, affective and cognitive, are at the same time inseparable and irreducible." ②

① Piaget, J. (1976). The affective unconscious and the cognitive unconscious. In: B. Inhelder & H.H. Chipman, Eds., Piaget and his school, pp. 63-71. New York: Springer, p. 71

② Piaget, J. & Inhelder, B. (1969). The psychology of the child. Basic Books (Original 1966).

Morality as orientations (affective aspect)

“In this definition the wish is common to everyone, and in that respect no one is better than another.”

Socrates, Meno

Six types of moral orientation (Kohlberg)

- Type 1: Use of physical or psychological force as a criterion of moral rightness: The stronger party has the right of way.
- Type 2: Morality of simple exchange: "I do to you what you do to me."
- Type 3: Appeal to group solidarity and cohesion: "If this will harm my family or my friends, I will not do it."
- Type 4: Appeal to the law as the ultimate arbiter: "The law is on my side!"
- Type 5: Keeping social contracts: "I ought to do what I promised to sustain mutual trust."
- Type 6: Referring to universal moral principles: "This would be the most just solution for everyone involved, even for those people to be born in future."

MJT - Doctor dilemma (pro arguments)

A woman had cancer and she had no hope of being saved. She was in terrible pain and so weakened that a large dose of a painkiller such as morphine would have caused her death. During a temporary period of improvement, she begged the doctor to give her enough morphine to kill her. She said she could no longer endure the pain and would be dead in a few weeks anyway. The doctor complied with her wish.

20. Do you disagree or agree with the doctor's behavior?

I strongly disagree	I strongly agree
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3	

How acceptable do you find the following arguments *in favor* of the doctor? Suppose someone said he acted *rightly* . . .

- 21. because the doctor had to act according to his conscience. The woman's condition justified an exception to the moral obligation to preserve life.
- 22. because the doctor was the only one who could fulfill the woman's wish; respect for her wish made him act as he did.
- 23. because the doctor only did what the woman talked him into doing. He need not worry about unpleasant consequences.
- 24. because the woman would have died anyway and it didn't take much effort for him to give her an overdose of a painkiller.
- 25. because the doctor didn't really break a law. Nobody could have saved the woman and he only wanted to shorten her suffering.
- 26. because most of his fellow doctors would presumably have done the same in a similar situation.

I strongly reject	I strongly accept
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4	

MJT - Doctor dilemma (con arguments)

How acceptable do you find the following arguments *against* the doctor?
 Suppose someone said that he acted *wrongly* . . .

	I strongly reject	I strongly accept
27. because he acted contrary to his colleagues' convictions. If they are against mercy-killing the doctor shouldn't do it.	-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4	
28. because one should be able to have complete faith in a doctor's devotion to preserving life even if someone with great pain would rather die.	-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4	
29. because the protection of life is everyone's highest moral obligation. We have no clear moral criteria for distinguishing between mercy-killing and murder.	-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4	
30. because the doctor could get himself into much trouble. They have already punished others for doing the same thing.	-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4	
31. because he could have had it much easier if he had waited and not interfered with the woman's dying.	-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4	
32. because the doctor broke the law. If one thinks that mercy-killing is illegal, then one should refuse such requests.	-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4	

MJT-engl. © 1977-2001 by Georg Lind (rev. 12-2002)


Thank you!

Moral ideals across ideological borders in Europe ...

1st Semester University Students; only Doctor Dilemma; in 1977


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Lind (1986). Cultural differences in moral judgment competence? A study of West and East European university students. *Behavior Science Research*, 20, 208-225.




Source: Lind (1986)

Moral ideals in post-communist Poland



Source: Validation study by Ewa Nowak, 2008, personal communication

Moral Orientations of Criminal Offenders (Germany)



Moral Judgment Competence

So if one man is better than another, it must evidently be in respect of the power, and virtue, according to your account, is the power of acquiring good things.

Socrates, dialogue with Meno

Moral Judgment Competence

Kohlberg (1964)

... is defined as "the capacity to make decisions and judgments which are moral (i.e., based on *internal* principles) and to act in accordance with such judgments."


(p. 425)



The Response Pattern of Two Participants With Different **Competence-scores**


Person:	Person A		Person B	
Opinion:	"The decision was right"		"The decision was right"	
	Contra	Pro	Contra	Pro
Arguments				
Type 1	✗ -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4	-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 ✗ +4	✗ 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4	✗ -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
Type 2	✗ -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4	-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 ✗ +4	-4 ✗ -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4	✗ -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
Type 3	✗ -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4	-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 ✗	✗ -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4	-4 ✗ -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
Type 4	✗ -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4	-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 ✗	-4 -3 ✗ -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4	-4 -3 -2 ✗ 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
Type 5	✗ -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4	-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 ✗	-4 -3 -2 -1 ✗ +1 +2 +3 +4	-4 -3 -2 -1 0 ✗ +2 +3 +4
Type 6	✗ -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4	-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 ✗	-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 ✗ +3 +4	-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 ✗
	C-score: 0.4 Low judgment competence		C-score: 92.2 High judgment competence	

People differ in regard to their moral judgment competence



Source: E. Nowak,
Validation study 2008,
personal communication

Moral Judgment Competence (right) cannot be Simulated Upward Like Moral Orientations (left)




Left: Emler, N., Renwick, S. & Malone, B. (1983). The relationship between moral reasoning and political orientation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 45, 1073-80.


Right: Lind, G. (2002). *Ist Moral lehrbar? Ergebnisse der modernen moralpsychologischen Forschung. [Can morality be taught? Research findings from modern moral psychology.]* Berlin: Logos.

Brain correlates of moral judgment competence

a) Covariation of C-scores with BOLD responses in right DLPFC



b) Socio-normative judgments



The Experiment by Prehn et al.

N = 23 women

Measurement: Blood oxygen level dependency (BOLD) in the right dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC).

Method: fMRI

Factors:

a) Judgment on descriptions of norm-breaking behavior

b) Moral judgment competence (C-score, MJT)

Finding: For participants with high C-score (>37,36) the judgment was easier; they were quicker than low-C-scorers. Effect size $r = .45$


Source: Prehn et al. (2008)

[Http://www.uni-konstanz.de/ag-moral/](http://www.uni-konstanz.de/ag-moral/)

Importance of moral judgement competence for behavior: Evidence from experimental studies


- Accepting principled moral reasoning
- Norm-abiding
 - ▶ no cheating, keeping promises, no cover- up
- Helping behavior
- Rallying for democratic rights
- Decision-making ability
- Learning ability
 - ▶ Remembering facts
 - ▶ Applying new teaching methods in classroom practice
- Academic school learning

The higher people's moral judgment competence the more they accept high moral orientations ...




Parallelism in Polish Participants

Validation sample. Poznani. N= 370 (Nowak)




Moral Orientation (sensu Kohlberg)

Decision-making ability: Moral judgment competence is more important than motivation



Source:
F.-J. Mansbart (2001)

Moral judgment competence and grades in final high school year



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The Moral Judgment Test (MJT)

Lind, 2008

- The MJT presents dilemmas and pro and contra arguments to the participant, who is to rate the decision of the protagonist and the arguments.
- The MJT is a three-factorial, N=1 experiment; the standard version represents a 6 x 2 x 2 design:
 - ▶ Factor 1: Moral quality of the arguments (six moral orientations)
 - ▶ Factor 2: Opinion agreement (pro and contra the opinion of the participant)
 - ▶ Factor 3: Dilemma context (Workers Dilemma, Mercy-killing Dilemma)
- The moral task for the participant is:
 - ▶ To rate arguments according to their moral quality regardless of opinion agreement -> Moral Judgment Competence (C-score)

End

Dual-Aspect-Model

Lawrence Kohlberg

"... a moral act or attitude cannot be defined either by purely cognitive or by purely motivational criteria."

(Kohlberg, 1958, p. 16)

Morality as 'norm-conformity'

■ Proponents

- ▶ "Moral behavior must be measured "without any reference . . . to its motives or its rightness or wrongness" (Hartshorne & May, 1929, p. 11)
- ▶ "Morality presents itself as a system of commandments and rules of conduct" (Durkheim, 1924/1976, p. 92; my transl.)
- ▶ "This definition means that morality has to do with rules, moral behavior has to do with conduct oriented toward these rules (obeying, disobeying, justifying, and criticizing them), and the rules may not extend to everyone" (Hogan et al., 1978)

■ Critiques:

- ▶ "Perhaps the greatest single shortcoming underlying each of the specific criticisms discussed is the failure to view evaluative attitudes as subjective phenomena whose measurement is best achieved independent of a concern with the relationship of those attitudes to conventional and normative standards of moral valuation" (Pittel & Mendelsohn, 1966, p. 32)
- ▶ "Proponents of behavioristic conceptions of moral conduct typically define conduct as moral if it conforms to a socially or culturally accepted norm. All of us recognize this is intuitively incorrect, since moral exemplars like Socrates, Ghandi, and Martin Luther King consistently acted in opposition to, and in order to change, social norms -- in terms of the moral principles of Stage 5 or 6" (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 392).

▶

Morality as moral orientations

■ Proponents

- ▶ "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without qualification, except a good will." (I. Kant, 1985, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals)
- ▶ "Right action is defined by valid universalizable moral principles ... defined by, and justified by philosophers." (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 393)
- ▶ "Elsewhere (Blasi 1986) I suggested a set of three criteria for morality. For the purpose of psychological research, a behavior or practice is considered moral if it is intentional, a response to some sense of obligation, and if the obligation is a response to an ideal, even if vaguely understood" (Blasi, 1987, p. 86)
- ▶ "Intention is crucial when judging the moral standing of an act" (Shulman & Meckler, 1985, p. 6)

■ Critiques

- ▶ "Judgments are often required about ethical concepts or abstractions such as 'stealing' or 'cheating' rather than about behavior occurring in realistic situations. Subjects are asked to evaluate abstract acts independent of the setting in which such acts occur and in which contextual factors may serve to mitigate or justify their wrongness. The subject, in short, is asked to do something in the test situation which he would never do in real life" (Pittel & Mendelsohn, 1966, p. 32)

Correlational Parallelism

Piaget, 1976

There are "... correlations between cognitive and affective stages."

Piaget, J. (1976). The affective unconscious and the cognitive unconscious.
In: B. Inhelder & H.H. Chipman, Eds., Piaget and his school, pp. 63-71. New
York: Springer, p. 71

Affective-Cognitive Parallelism

Piaget and Inhelder (1969)

"Affectivity constitutes the energetics of a behavior pattern whose cognitive aspect refers to the structures alone. There is no behavior pattern, however intellectual, which does not involve affective factors as motives; but, reciprocally, there can be no affective states without the intervention of perceptions or comprehension which constitute their cognitive structure."

(p. 158)

Affective-cognitive parallelsim is universal

