CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN MORAL JUDGMENT COMPETENCE?
A STUDY OF WEST AND EAST EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS

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The *Moralisches Urteil Test* (MUT)** has been developed to measure simultaneously people’s preferences for moral arguments and their competence to apply self-accepted moral reasons in a consistent and differentiated manner to moral dilemmas. In two studies, large samples of (1) university students from West Germany, and (2) university students from Austria, West Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and Yugoslavia were exposed to the MUT. East European and West European students exhibited the same preference order for Kohlberg’s six moral stages. These results strongly support Kohlberg’s claims for the universality of moral principles. While gender and field of study did not systematically influence moral judgment competence, students from the five countries differed markedly in their ability to consistently apply moral principles to an euthanasia dilemma. Future research will investigate some of the possible origins of these crosscultural differences.

Cultural Differences in Moral Judgment Competence?

The cognitive-developmental theory claims that moral maturity not only means acquisition of positive attitudes toward moral norms and principles but that it also means development of the competence needed to make consistent and differentiated judgments in regard to those moral norms and principles (see Kohlberg 1958, 1971, 1984). Therefore, if moral judgment can be described in terms of cognitive criteria, such as generality, universality, consistency, and inclusiveness, then the judgment has a universal nature, regardless of the particular persons, etc., involved (Kohlberg 1958: 11).

This basic claim regarding the universal nature of morality has recently been challenged on two major levels. First, on the level of theoretical critique, it has been argued that Kohlberg’s definition of development in terms of his six stages is ideologically biased in favor of societies or sociopolitical cultures in which a democratic-liberal ideology prevails; for other societies, which prefer a different set of moral values or principles, moral-cognitive development may mean something quite different. Hence, if we employ the Kohlberg stages as a measurement scale, we may make a comparison of cultures that are not comparable in this respect (see, e.g., Sullivan 1977; Snarey 1985; Vine 1984; Gielen 1984). Second, on the level of empirical research, the claim of universality of cognitive-moral development has been regarded as functionally biased. Since there is a correlation between the degree of industrialization and urbanization, on the one hand, and the attainment of certain moral stages in different countries, on the other, developmental stages should be viewed as adaptive structures developed by people to accomplish important cognitive tasks at hand (Edwards 1975: 525; see also Edwards 1981,
In this view, the stages are accepted as a means of comparison, but are rejected as a means of making value judgments as to which society is morally more developed.

Obviously, both critiques are directed at core assumptions of the developmental approach. The notion of development, as contrasted to the notion of mere change, implies a transformation of the cognitive aspect of moral judgment and, hence, becoming more competent. It seems that we cannot strip off this competence aspect and, at the same time, keep the concept of development. How can this theoretical dilemma, which is not a hypothetical but a real one, be resolved? I believe that this question can only be answered if the prevailing research paradigm is changed in two ways. First, the affective aspect of moral judgment behavior – that is, peoples preferences for moral principles – needs to be assessed independently of its cognitive aspect. We would speak of ideological diversity – and of the inadequacy of one single stage scale for the cross-cultural measurement of moral competence – only if cultures differed from one another, and from theoretical expectations, in regard to their preference order of moral stages. If moral competence and moral preference are not independently measured, but are combined into one scale, the results would be ambiguous; the results might reflect either true differences in competence or a culture’s idiosyncratic moral order. Second, although the cognitive aspect of moral judgment – that is, the ability to make moral judgments – needs to be conceptualized and measured analytically, independent of a person’s moral concerns, the former aspect cannot be ontologically separated from the latter. As Kohlberg (1958, 1984) has postulated, neither of the two aspects can be defined – or operationalized – without reference to the other one. However, in most psychological research (e.g., in intelligence tests), the cognitive aspect is defined either as a behavioral domain, which is different in content from affective behavior, or as the competence to solve predefined tasks. In both cases, the definition of developmental progress is, to use Allport’s term, external, that is, it is relative to standards that are culturally biased; in both cases intercultural comparison is restricted, if not impossible (for a more detailed discussion, see Lind 1985a, 1985b).

For these reasons, moral judgment competence may be adequately defined as the degree to which self-accepted moral principles – or moral concerns – are cognitively organized, that is, the degree to which they are consistently and differentially applied to behavioral decisions. Only this definition, it seems to me, provides the basis for making a culturally fair comparison without giving up the notion of moral progress and development. Following these lines of thought, we have developed a new method for assessing both aspects of moral judgment behavior. In this paper I shall briefly outline this method and present some findings in our cross-national studies of university socialization in five West and East European nations – in Austria, the Netherlands, Poland, Yugoslavia, and West Germany.
To measure both aspects of moral judgment behavior simultaneously, but in an unconfounded manner, we have constructed the “Moralisches-Urteil-Test” (the MUT, or “moral judgment test”; see Lind 1984; Lind and Wakenhut 1985). This test is based on the new methodological concept of an “Experimental Questionnaire” which uses the transparency of questionnaire techniques and the hermeneutic power of experimental, multi-factorial design. The concept of the Experimental Questionnaire is dealt with in more detail elsewhere (Lind 1982, 1 985a). The MUT is not a self-report questionnaire but a behavioral test of “tacit moral knowledge”. The test’s intention is to infer behavior-guiding orientations and their organization from an individual’s pattern of judgments. In the MUT, these are judgments about the acceptability of the arguments that are given to an individual in the frame of a moral dilemma. The test consists of two subtests. Each subtest contains a story that presents a behavioral dilemma. Each dilemma is followed by a set of questions pertaining to agreement/disagreement with a suggested solution to the dilemma and to the acceptability of arguments speaking for and against this solution. The arguments were constructed to represent moral reasoning at each of the six stages described by Kohlberg (1971). The respondent is asked to evaluate twelve reasons for each story. Hence, by virtue of test construction, the MUT items constitute a complex experimental setting. The independent variables form a 2 x 2 x 6 factorial design; the three factors included are: Story, Pro-contra (agreement/disagreement), and Stage. Each item belongs to a particular story, represents a pro or a contra position, and refers to one of the six stages of moral reasoning. The dependent variable is represented by the respondents’ judgment of the acceptability of the given reasons on a scale ranging from -3 to +3. Since neither self-description nor introspection is recorded, but individual patterns of judgment behavior instead, this questionnaire can actually be viewed as a behavioral test. The dilemma of the first subtest, entitled Mercy Killing, is adapted from Kohlberg (1958: 366). It is assumed that the life-death issue requires the most unambiguously moral reasoning. For contrast, we used a second dilemma, labeled Theft, a story about two workers who break into their factory's directorate to find evidence supporting the surmised fact that the management was wiretapping (for the English version of the MUT, see Lind and Wakenhut 1985: 104-105).

The content – or the affective aspect – of the student’s moral judgment is indicated by the acceptance or rejection of the stage of orientation that the arguments represent. The cognitive aspect – that is, the degree of structural organization of judgment behavior – is indicated by two kinds of measures, both of which make use of the experimental design of the MUT: First, it is indicated by the steepness of the profile of stage-ratings – the more consistently a respondent evaluates the arguments with regard to their stage-belonging, the steeper the profile becomes, and the more it diverges from the O-line (see Figure 1.). Second, the cognitive aspect is indicated directly by a measure of response consistency in regard to the six stages of moral argumentation. An intraindividual analysis of variance is applied to the individual data pattern. For all computations, the program system KOSTAS, by Nagl and Walter (1985), was used.
Figure 1. Means and Confidence Intervals of the Acceptability of the Six Stages of Moral Judgment by First-Semester University Students in Five Countries. (Score Range from -3.0 to +3.0.)
Study One

Moral Judgment of West Germany High School and University Students

Let us first turn to the findings from our West German sample of 1,649 university students, first semester, of both sexes, who studied German languages (n = 158), medicine (211), economics (353), the natural sciences (457), and the technical sciences (289). Of the total scores, 181 were omitted because of missing data. The educational levels of the subjects are approximately equal to those of college juniors in the U.S.A. As part of an extensive questionnaire, measuring various attitudes and personality variables, the students filled in the standard MUT with two dilemmas. As far as the question of cultural comparisons is concerned, five results from this German study seem important: (1) The preference hierarchy for the six Kohlberg stages, which we use as an indicator of the affective aspect, is the same as in the original studies in the United States: Stage 6 reasoning is ranked highest by most students, and the other stages of moral concerns are ranked according to their stage numbers, as can be predicted on the basis of Kohlberg’s theory (cf. Kohlberg 1984). Although hardly anyone being interviewed about various moral dilemmas produces reasons at Stage 6, almost everyone prefers postconventional moral principles over conventional or preconventional concerns. Many of the subjects even are able to apply them consistently to the evaluation of pro and contra arguments about a concrete moral problem. The preference for high moral principles seems to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for moral judgment competence (see Rest 1973; Lind 1985c). (2) The hierarchy of preferences is invariant over differences in education and sex. A comparison of the moral judgment behavior of adolescents in different branches of secondary education, of university students in different fields of study, and of adults with heterogeneous educational backgrounds shows that there is great unanimity in regard to the preferred order of moral stages, regardless of education. Of course, this does not preclude the fact that education is positively correlated with moral judgment competence if the latter is independently assessed (see below; see also Lind 1985a). Females and males exhibit nearly identical preference orders of moral concerns in their judgment behavior. Moreover, the correlation between gender and the cognitive aspect of moral judgment competence proved to be statistically insignificant (r = O. 028; F_{1,3074} = 3.31; n.s.; see also Lind, Grocholewska, and Langer 1986). (3) Kohlberg (1963) assumed that the pattern of correlations between the stage preferences forms a quasi-simplex, which means that the correlations between the preferences of two adjacent stages of moral reasoning (e.g., Stages 2 and 3) are the highest, and that the other correlations become smaller, the further apart the stages are from one another (e.g., 2 and 4, Stages 2 and 5, etc.). In our study of the moral preferences of university students, Kohlberg’s assumption is corroborated. Any attempt to rearrange the data shows that there is no other stage order that is closer to an ideal quasi-simplex than the one that is associated with the theoretical preference order from Stage 1 to Stage 6 (see Lind 1985a: 153-157). The quasi-simplex in this study is more pronounced than in the interview data (Kohlberg 1963: 17; see also Rest 1979: 231).
The cognitive aspect of students’ moral judgment, which has no direct operational counterpart in past research, shows developmental progress over time, as predicted by the theory. Moral judgment competence, as measured by the MUT, increases invariantly and is positively correlated with the level of education (Lind 1985a). In the transitional period from Gymnasium graduation, at the age of 18, to the first year of university study, most students progress in regard to their ability to consistently apply moral principles to the evaluation of moral arguments. As in the study of Kohlberg and Kramer (1969), there was a small group of students (about 20 percent of the sample) who initially ranked highest on the MUT competence measure and whose scores decreased over one year (see also Kohlberg 1984: 426-497). Our data indicate that this decrease is a case of pseudo-regression, that is, it is due rather to methodological problems than to real developmental regressions. The decrease of scores is confined to the highly developed group, and the students’ preference order of moral stages does not become inverted, nor does their judgment competence lower beyond the scores of the less competent group. This all indicates that the regressions found in this and some other studies actually reflect a so-called ceiling effect, that is, they reflect the limits of the instrument in measuring development beyond a certain point (Lind 1985d).

Finally, the students’ moral judgment behavior agrees with Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s assumption of a cognitive-affective parallelism. Their moral judgment competence is closely associated with the degree and the direction of their preferences for moral stages. That is, the more consistently students apply principles of any moral stage to their judgments, the more positive are their attitudes toward higher stages, and the more negative are their attitudes toward lower stages (see Lind 1985b). In other words, students who are more competent in judging arguments are also the ones who more strongly prefer higher stages of moral reasoning over lower stages, when compared to those students who make less consistent judgments. This clear, and now well-established, finding justifies post hoc the confounded measurement of the two aspects of moral development, as is the case with Kohlberg’s interview method or with Rest’s (1979) “Defining Issues Test“(see Lind and Wakenhut 1985).

Study Two

Moral Judgment of West and East European University Students

Edwards (1985), Snarey (1985), and Moon (1985), among others, have pointed at two major shortcomings in cross-cultural research on moral-cognitive development: First, research on samples from socialist or communist countries is lacking and, second, there are scarcely any studies in which the national samples are strictly comparable in regard to important variables, such as level of education.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Arts</th>
<th>Natural Sciences</th>
<th>Economics</th>
<th>Medicine</th>
<th>Technical Sciences</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>1,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>4,055</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FORM-Project

**Table 1** The Sample: First-Semester University Students

When we designed our longitudinal, cross-national study on university students in the years 1974 to 1976, we included, in addition to West European samples, several East European samples in our research, and we matched these samples not only for the level of education but also for semester, sex, and subject of study (for details on this international research project, see Framhein and Langer 1984; Sandberger, Jetten, et al. 1982). The present data analysis comprises 4,055 first-semester students of both sexes in five areas of study: the arts, the natural sciences, economics, medicine, and engineering (with only males in the latter, except in Poland). The sizes of the subsamples by country and area of study are depicted in Table 1. In all five countries, the survey took place in the winter of 1977-1978. The return rates differed from country to country, but they were on the average well above 50 percent. With some exceptions, all subjects received a mailed questionnaire (in Poland the questionnaire was filled in during classes). The questionnaire covered moral problems as well as students’ attitudes and concepts in regard to several domains: studying and scientific research, professions and professional careers, sex roles, society and politics, and the self. In the international study, the number of questions and items for each domain was considerably reduced. Only the euthanasia dilemma was used in the cross-cultural MUT, while two dilemmas were used in the German study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variance</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>F-Value</th>
<th>DF1</th>
<th>DF2</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
<th>r</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral Stage:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear Polynomial</td>
<td>1766948</td>
<td>8896.81</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4011</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Square Polynomial</td>
<td>65363.75</td>
<td>542.33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4011</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cubic Polynomial</td>
<td>35405.23</td>
<td>333.36</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4011</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Polynomial</td>
<td>243.93</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4011</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Polynomial</td>
<td>50.49</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4011</td>
<td>0.519</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FORM-Project. Note: The polynomials relate to the decomposition of the overall relationship between the acceptability of arguments and the arguments moral stage. Since there are six stages, five types of relationship are possible, represented by the five polynomials. The correlation (r) equals the square-root of F/(F + DF2).
In regard to the question of ideological bias, the findings in the other four countries are roughly the same as in the German sample. Although Poland and Yugoslavia have ideologies and cultures that are quite different from those of North America or West Europe, the university students in these countries exhibit exactly the same preference order for the six moral stages as do the students in liberal democracies. There is hardly any variation in moral concerns that would indicate cultural differences in regard to basic moral values. The differential acceptance of Stage 1 through Stage 6 reasoning shows that the students in all five countries have the same preference order. Figure 1 depicts the sample means (M) of the students’ average preferences for each of the six stages of moral reasoning, and the corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals (M+1.96*s).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stage 1</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 4</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 6</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table reports partial correlation coefficients controlling for the effects of country

Source: FORM-Project

Multivariate analysis of variance of this data pattern (Table 2) confirms that the Moral Stage factor is indeed very highly correlated with the acceptability of the given arguments. The linear correlation between the moral stages of the arguments and the acceptability ratings for the same arguments is $r = 0.83$, $F_{1,4011} = 81896.81$; $p < 0.001$. ($r$ is calculated from $F$ through the formula given in Table 2; it makes the results comparable to results from studies that use different sample sizes; see Bock 1975; Class, McGaw, and Smith 1978). As Figure 1 shows, mean acceptability ratings tend to regularly increase with moral stages for all five countries, yet there are some slight deviations from this pattern, which may have been partly caused by translation problems. For instance, students in Poland have rated Stage 3 arguments as somewhat more acceptable than Stage 4 arguments, which is due to a very high rating of the contra-argument on Stage 3. In the original version of the MUT, this argument is: “[...] the doctor acted wrongly [when killing the woman who requested him to end her suffering] because he acted contrary to his colleagues conviction.” If they are against death on demand [euthanasia], the doctor shouldn’t do it. In the Polish translation it says because he acted contrary to the principles of professional ethics, which
is clearly a Stage 4 argument (see Lind 1984). Except for such minor reflections from the expected order, however, in all five countries, the students’ preference order is systematic and consonant with cognitive developmental theory. The hypothesis of a universally accepted order of moral stages is also supported by the patterns of inter-correlation of students’ stage preferences, which form a quasi-simplex. As a rule, all neighboring stages are correlated higher than stages that are developmentally further apart. This fact is especially well documented by the combined correlations across the five countries of which national means have been partialed out (see Table 3).

In contrast to this agreement over moral ideals, the students’ ability to base their choices in the moral dilemma on their own ideals differs substantially among the five countries. Students in Germany and Austria make the most consistent and differentiated judgments. Polish and Yugoslavian students, on the other hand, exhibit a low consistency in their evaluation of moral reasons. This finding pertains only to students reasoning about euthanasia, but it also seems to reflect a more general trend, since similar tendencies are evident in the students reasoning about other, i.e., political, issues. The degree of moral competence in each national group is documented in Figure 1 through the steepness of the slope of each acceptability profile. The hypothesis of cultural differences with regard to this cognitive aspect of moral development can be statistically tested through multivariate analysis of the interaction effect of country and stage of reasoning, which is highly significant and also substantial in terms of linear correlation ($r = 0.27; F_{4,5865} = 473.62; p < 0.001$). When the students’ judgment competence is directly assessed through intra-individual analysis of judgment behavior in regard to self-accepted moral ideals, the correlation between competence and culture is even higher ($r = 0.49; F_{4} = 246.59; p < 0.001$; see Table 4).

Conclusion

The central question pursued in this investigation was whether moral judgment has a cognitive basis that is universal and independent of culturally specific values or ideologies, as the cognitive-developmental theory put forth by Kohlberg assumes. According to Kohlberg, moral principles imply a universalistic basis for choice: Besides regularity or consistency in use of a reason for

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Quartile Range</th>
<th>N°</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>46.25%</td>
<td>21.25%</td>
<td>749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>62.07%</td>
<td>18.52%</td>
<td>1398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>43.25%</td>
<td>13.70%</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>22.50%</td>
<td>15.99%</td>
<td>836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>33.17%</td>
<td>17.44%</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: The percentage figures describe the degree to which individual judgment patterns are determined by moral concerns (as opposed to concerns for opinion agreement or other unidentified factors). They are calculated through partitioning the sum of the square for each individual's data pattern, as it is done in multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA).

Source: FORM-Project

Table 4 Culture and Moral Competence Consistency of judgment with regard to the arguments moral stage, by country

choice, a principle implies the universality and ideality of such a reason. The basis of choice is one which it would be desirable for all to use (Kohlberg 1958: 288). From a relativistic point of view, psychologists have challenged this assumption. They argue that the theory has originated from a specific cultural background, and that, therefore, we should expect basic moral principles to differ substantially from one culture to another. Hence Kohlberg’s assumptions about the nature and course of moral-cognitive development may be valid only for members of industrialized Western cultures, and any inference about the cognitive-developmental aspects of moral judgment may be ideologically, or functionally, biased.

Although a growing number of cross-sectional studies have been done in recent years outside North America, including studies in non-industrialized and non-Western cultures, the controversy about possible biases in Kohlberg’s theory could be settled only partially. The studies showed differences in average level of moral-cognitive development (as assessed by Kohlberg’s interview method) across cultures. These findings may be taken to support the assumptions of relativism, yet they do not decisively falsify the assumptions of cognitive-developmental theory. The obtained differences may indicate cultural differences in regard either to basic moral order, or to the pace of moral-cognitive development, or to both. Longitudinal studies in Israel and Turkey support the assertion of a universal developmental sequence (see Snarey 1985), but they do not fully settle the issue. Three objections could be, and have been, made. First, the similarity of developmental order may be due to a growing Westernization of the countries studied. Second, these studies have typically recorded transitions from Stage 3 to Stage 4, and within stage changes. These transitions and stage changes may not apply to all of Kohlberg’s six moral stages. Third, the universality of moral principles has not been directly assessed, but has been inferred from the subjects’ moral judgment competence, although the measurement of this moral judgment competence is precisely what has been called into question by the cultural specificity hypothesis. These objections are important, but they need some qualifications.

Unless the degree of Westernization can be more precisely defined, the first objection runs the risk of being tautological. Since cultural comparisons have been conducted in countries which were identified beforehand as representing a non-Western culture, the fact that people there exhibited the same developmental sequence as in the United States cannot in itself be taken as an indicator of Westernization. In our study, we have included two socialist countries, with a different political culture. According to their ideology, the responsibility for political and moral decision making rests on the shoulders of the collective rather than on the shoulders of the individual, as is the case in Western democracies. Concerning the other two objections
mentioned above, we have suggested and tested two ways of coping with them. One way was to show that the six types of moralities delineated in Kohlberg’s scheme are indeed universally accepted and are put into the same theoretically predicted preference order by respondents from diverse cultures. The other way was to measure moral judgment competence strictly in relationship to self-accepted moral principles, rather than basing measures of moral judgment competence and consistency on externally based criteria. The Moralisches-Urteil-Test, which we used in this study, was designed to assess individuals’ preferences for moral principles independently of their competence to apply these principles. In addition, the MUT measures judgment competence in relationship to the subjects’ own moral principles.

Our findings support the claim of universality of moral principles, both in industrialized, Western cultures outside North America, such as West Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands, as well as in East European, socialist nations, such as Poland and Yugoslavia. Although there are great differences between these cultures in regard to the students’ choice of the right course of action in a given dilemma, there is an astonishingly universal consensus about the moral principles that should be applied to the behavioral dilemma. Yet, our study also indicated that there are substantial differences between the five countries with regard to the moral judgment competence of their members, though this competence has been assessed in respect to the subjects’ self-accepted moral orientations. The university students in the five cultures differ markedly in their ability to apply moral principles to their judgment behavior. Whereas, for example, gender and field of study have no systematic effect on moral judgment competence, the national cultures seem to differ substantially in their ability to induce moral judgment competence in their members.

Where do the national differences in moral judgment competence originate, and what do they imply? We do not know, we can only speculate. Degree of industrialization may play a role. Poland and Yugoslavia have only recently developed modern industries, and their university students come mostly from rural or working-class backgrounds. Level, or rather quality, of education may be another important factor, in spite of the fact that the years of schooling were equal for the students from the five countries. In Poland and Yugoslavia, however, secondary and university education have been hampered by economic problems. Finally, the political culture, or climate, may account for the differences in moral judgment competence that we found in the study. Cognitive developmental theory postulates that opportunities to participate in public or private discussions of political issues are essential for moral development to occur. A lack of such opportunities may slow down a person’s moral-cognitive development, or discourage a person to use his or her moral competence. In cultures in which responsibility for political decision making is assigned to the social collective rather than to the individual person, people may feel little compulsion to engage in moral discussions. There may exist in most people a latent moral judgment competence, which manifests itself only insofar as sociopolitical circumstances allow and stimulate rational-moral discourse. It would take a large-scale psychological experiment – or a historical incident – to create the proper conditions for the stimulation of rational-moral discourse and these latent capacities for differentiated moral reasoning. With the
solidarity movement, such an incident did indeed occur in Poland while our longitudinal study was underway. In future research reports, we will analyze changes in moral development and other behavioral domains in Poland and in other countries. Such analyses should allow us to test hypotheses about the origin and manifestations of national differences in moral judgment competence.

Notes

* In meanwhile, the MUT (English: MJT) has been rename to Moral Competence Test (MCT) in order to align its name better with its measurement object. (GL 2016)

1. The terms competence, ability, and cognitive aspect, though they usually denote different things, are used synonymously here. Keeping in mind the fact that, in many instances, an individual may not fully reveal his or her competence, and that, therefore, it is sometimes variable and not easily assessed, competence has unique properties by which it can be clearly distinguished from the affective aspect of moral judgment behavior (see below; also see Lind and Wakenhut 1985).

2. This investigation was carried out within the framework of the international project University Graduates: Their Training and Conception of Life (FORM-Project), co-directed by Professor W. Markiewicz (Warsaw) and Professor H. Peisert (Konstanz). The project was initiated by the Research Group on Socialization in Higher Education at the University of Konstanz. Participants from Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and Yugoslavia collaborated in this project, which was coordinated by the European Coordination Center for Research and Documentation in Social Sciences, in Vienna.

3. Persons who give reasons on Stage 6 are not easily found. Some conclude that this is because of a general absence of Stage 6 competence in the entire population. Recent studies also suggest other explanations. In an interview situation, people may hold back high-sounding reasons, or may reason cynically, rather than seriously. Moreover, many dilemmas in current tests do not seem to sufficiently challenge postadolescent subjects. From a philosophical perspective, some tests cannot be adequately answered at Stages 5 and 6. In both cases, the tests lack sensitivity for the moral judgment of the highly developed subjects (cf. Lind 1985d).

4. For the paper by Moon (1988) see also this volume.
References


